Hazard v. Hazard.

no one would ever be safe in signing a bond of this nature; and whatever reliance might be placed on the honour and good faith of an unfortunate debtor, who rarely has any other security to pledge, his friends would be compelled to suffer him to be immured within the walls of a prison, rather than undertake for him, at a peril which no human foresight could guard against. The principal debtor is also a party to this bond, and would be liable over to his surety, if he had not faithfully remained within the limits of the jail-yard. But an action against any man for doing, after he had became insane, an act, which in his senses he had covenanted not to do, would be a novelty, and could hardly be sustained. If this were a suit on a bond or recognisance, which had been entered into for the good behaviour of Hazard, and it appeared that the breach of the peace which was alleged as the forfeiture, had been committed in a state of insanity, can it be doubted that it would not be a valid defence? For if the party who committed the offence could not be punished, surely he who had become surety for his preserving the peace, ought not to suffer. The judgment in Baxter and Tabes, in Massachusetts, proceeds on the same principle. Although Holbrook, the prisoner in that case, was not insane, the Court consider that some agency on the part of the debtor, must be employed to constitute an escape within the meaning of such a bond, and, therefore, considered his surety not liable; it appearing that the debtor was carried by others, in consequence of a sudden illness, to a house which was off the limits, where he languished and died, it being the opinion of his attending physician, that he could not be carried back to prison, without manifest danger of his life; and yet, if this had been done to a person confined in jail, it would have been an escape. This is one case, and perhaps rescue is another; and others might easily be put, in which the Sheriff would be liable for an escape; and yet the condition of such a bond as this, under simi

Hazard v. Hazard.

lar circumstances, would not be considered as broken. There must be judgment for the defendant.

D. CHIPMAN for the plaintiffs."

C. MARSH and D. EDWARDS for the defendants.

a 4 Durn. and East Rep. 789.; 1 Str. Rep. 429. ; 2 H. B. Rep. 112.; 10 Mass. Rep. 206.; 4 Mass. Rep. 361.; 2 Bos. and Pul. Rep. 362—cited by Mr. Chip

man.

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

CONNECTICUT, APRIL TERM, 1814, AT NEW-HAVEN.

BEFORE

Hon. BROCKHOLST LIVINGSTON, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

Hon. PIERPOINT EDWARDS, District Judge.

AMASA GOODYEAR V. ANSON MATHEWS.

A patent, under the law of 1793, is valid, although the invention may have been in use for years anterior to the patent, if the patentee was the original in

ventor.

A patent for an entire machine is valid, although the invention consists only of an improvement on such machine; but the patentee is entitled to an exclusive use of no more than his improvement.

THIS was an action on the case, for the breach of a patent right.

The patentee, G. W. Robinson, was the inventor of a mode of casting hard metal buttons, with wire eyes, in metal moulds, and the plaintiff was the assignee of the patent.

It appeared on the trial, that several years before the date of the patent, the patentee had taken out another patent for the same thing, but had described his invention so imperfectly that the patent was void. The present patent was taken

Goodyear v. Mathews.

For se

out, nothing having been done to affect the old one. veral years, during the first patent, the public had disregarded it, and used the invention without restraint.

N. SMITH and S. P. STAPLES for the plaintiff.

S. H. WOODRUFF and T. S. WILLIAMS for the defendant, contended

That the invention having been used publicly and freely for several years before the date of the patent declared on, the patentee could not resume the exclusive use of his invention as he had attempted. And also, that the patent was too broad, and covered more than the invention.

LIVINGSTON, J. charged the jury as follows on these

points:

The first question of law which occurs in this cause is, whether the defendant be liable for using the plaintiff's improvement, provided it shall appear that the invention were known or used previous to the application for the patent, if the plaintiff can show that he was actually the inventor anterior to such knowledge or use by others. This is a question of some difficulty, and one which will never be considered as satisfactorily settled, until it be decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. But the Circuit Courts for the Districts of Pennsylvania and of New-York having decided the same question, this Court prefers, in the present case, to adhere to those decisions. The opinion of the Court then is, that if you are satisfied that moulds of the construction described in the patent, were known and in use at the time of obtaining the patent, yet if at the same time you believe that the patentee was the inventor of these moulds, although such invention may have been years previous to his application for a patent, he or his assignees are entitled to recover.