288 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 15 omnibus procedure. But they cannot be considered insurmountable. Nor, in the light of the 1950 experience, docs the abandonment of the experiment after a single year's trial appear justified. The integration of the appropriations process to apply an over-all view of needs and resources is an extremely valuable objective. As Galloway points out, the consolidated system enables Congress more rationally to choose whether to incur a deficit, reduce the national debt, or follow some other alternative. And it makes it possible "to see the claims of spending pressure groups in relation to the total national fiscal picture and thus to appraise their relative worth.”16 Other means than the consolidated device are available for supplying a view of the impact of a particular expenditure measure on proposed spending and available resources.17 But the omnibus method would most effectively enable Congress to implement that knowledge. It is surely easier to reconcile ten or twelve bills with a fiscal policy when they are handled together than when they are enacted op widely scattered occasions. But if the omnibus method is attempted again, it is likely to be successiul only if Congress desires its success. "George B. Galloway, "The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946," The American Political Science Review XLV, No. 1 (March, 1951), 65. The omnibus system, unlike the legislative budget proposal, does not place a ceiling on expenditures. "E.g., Representative Phillips suggests that Congress establish a co-ordinating committee which could keep up to date a calculation of the probable budget total as eh separate appropriation bill was passed. Sunch a calculation could be considered in relation to recurrent, up to date reports on prospective revenue. See Congressional Record, Vol. 97, pp. 798-800 (January 29, 1951), and Phillips, op. cit., 259. IV. A STRATEGY FOR FISCAL REFORM-GOALS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS Up to this point we have raised but not faced the issue of underlying values and objectives in the budgetary process. The range of criticisms discussed and the arguments for and against specific reform proposals suggest the variety of interests and value preferences that are involved. Now as we approach the question of how Congress "should" reform itself, these value choices will have to be made explicit. This study was undertaken specifically with a congressional focus. It recognizes that Congress as a body is a national institution with a vital role in the formulation of national policy. The function of Congress in representing local constituency interests has frequently been overemphasized to the exclu sion of the broader role. It is assumed here that congressmen have considerable flexibility in developing a national perspective that is not inconsistent with the needs of representation. A broader assumption is that it is in the national interest to strengthen Congress as a national institution. The underlying question of this study is "How can congressional power be used more responsibly and constructively in the determination of a national policy?" The Choice of Goals From this perspective four general objectives or goals are assumed to be appropriate for the congressional budgetary process. In harmony with these objectives, a number of recommendations for reforming the congressional budget system are presented. Effecting economy and efficiency in government. The objective of providing services at the least cost to the taxpayer is at least as old as the Committee on Ways and Means. It provided part of the basis for specific appropriations and the major impetus for a congressional post-audit. The problem of illegality of expenditures is no longer a major concern. Instead the review of agency spending has focused increasingly on improved management as the basis for efficient operation. (The assumption is made with regard to this objective that program decisions are already determined, i.e., that "allocation" is not included in the definition of “efficiency.") Control of the growth and independent operation of the bureaucracy. Under the assumption that bureaucracy is not simply an instrument for implementing predetermined policies and that it has an independent life and interests of its own (including a natural tendency to expand), the need for congressional surveillance or "oversight" of the bureaucracy becomes a reasonable corollary. The added assumption is made that the President is frequently unable or not inclined to control the executive bureaucracy. The appropriations process af 'Recent studies of representation and constituency sanctions suggest that the congressman is relatively free in defining his role in the congressional system. See Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business and Publicity Policy (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), esp. pp. 403-24. Also Heinz Eulau, et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," American Poliitcal Science Review, September 1959, pp. 742-56. Ralph Huitt takes a more pessimistic view of the possibilities for bringing a unitary program out of a body “which is organized to respond to a multiplicity of pressures and demands." Loc. cit., pp. 407-08, 426-27, 491-95. 'See David Truman's discussion of "The Ordeal of the Executive," op. cit., esp. pp. 407-08, on the "decision to intervene." Also Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), pp. 145-72. fords one of the most effective techniques for congressional oversight. Annual and multi-year authorizations afford another. Congressional oversight assumes the values of responsibility and representation,3 and is considered here to be a valid objective in the congressional budget process. However, while oversight may contribute to the objective of efficiency, as it is extended it will limit the discretion of executive officials with the result of less efficient operation. Review of overall fiscal policy. Congress should review the overall fiscal policy of the Federal Government proposed by the executive. It is assumed here that Congress has a vital role to play in the formulation of national fiscal policy. A corollary objective is the right of "secondary initiative." Congress not only has the power to amend or reorder priorities; it may also take the initiative where the executive has not. The role of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in promoting the Polaris nuclear submarine pr gram against executive opposition a persuasive example. If Congre is to assume a positive role in bro issues of fiscal policy, it cannot r simply on its four separate fis committees. It follows that this jective will require a new integrati mechanism. This objective is related but equivalent to a number of freqen stated objectives subsumed und the term "fiscal responsibility Congress, via the appropriatio process, has final control of the le of federal spending. Control of level of spending can be defined a number of ways. One of the m frequent formulations is the pr ciple of the "balanced budget Others argue for more stringent ductions in spending with budget surpluses applied to reducing national debt. More limited for of control would be the "balan budget over the cycle" and keep the national debt within a gi percent of gross national prod The example and the term "secondary initiative" are from Congressman Chet H field. See for example H.R. 12394, 87th Congress, 2d Session, a bill "to provide that eral expenditures shall not exceed Federal revenues, except in time of war or grave tional emergency declared by the Congress." Congressman Morris Udall has proposed a U.S. Tax Commission which would ad federal income taxes so that for each four-year period federal receipts would exceed eral expenditures by at least $4 billion. (H.R. 9816, 87th Congress, 2d Session.) 1 12734, 87th Congress, 1st Session, provided for a percentage of net budget receipts to 10 percent, to be devoted exclusively to the retirement of the public debt. S.J. Res 88th Congress, 1st Session (the Curtis-Byrd amendment) would amend the Cons tion to provide for an annual reduction of the public debt "not less than $500,000,0 |