Committee for Economic Development, whose 1947 report on Taxes and the Budget is infused with a progressive spirit of continued reform.16 2. The Joint Committee may reverse the precedents of 1947-48 by accepting the President's estimates as the basis for its February determinations, as contemplated by the present law. This appears to be the most unlikely alternative, for the idea of the legislative budget accentuates the tendency to question the validity of the Presidential estimates rather than to use them as the springboard for legislative discussion and review of his policy decisions. In addition if the Joint Committee refuses to accept the budget figures submitted by the President, it faces the fact that by February 15 the appropriations subcommittees have scarcely begun their hearings on the agency estimates. It, however, is not impossible that the Joint Committee might adopt over-all budget totals in disregard of the President's recommendations. In this case, if the Joint Committee takes its function seriously, sooner or later it will have to resort to the arbitrary method of imposing ceilings or allocations in order to enforce its decisions upon the several appropriations subcommittees. 3. The Joint Budget Committee may decide to postpone its own decisions until the agency requests and Presidential estimates have been reviewed, and appropriation bills prepared, by the House appropriation subcommittees (or by joint House and Senate subcommittees aided by a joint staff). These bills and supporting schedules of estimates might be required to be submitted to the Joint Committee not later than, say, April 1 or 15. There might then be a period for intensive review and discussion of the subcommittee recommendations by the Joint Staff and membership of the full Joint Committee (of estimates and appropriations only), culminating in the joint submission by May 1 or 15 to both houses of one omnibus bill or two (a civil and a military) appropriation bills and the budget estimates including the over-all determination of total appropriations for the coming year, and the division of estimates for the major categories of expenditure, together with any recommendations for tax or debt action in the discretion of the Joint Committee. The form of action on the estimates in either house could be left to the party caucus or other appropriate machinery to decide through changes in the rules of the two houses. The British practice shows very clearly that successive and final votes may be taken either on very broad or very narrow classifications of the estimates, as the houses may choose. Alternatives 2 and 3 are not mutually exclusive. Both should be based upon a common system of estimates classification that ought to be developed in any event. The reason for distinguishing the two courses of action lies solely in the problem raised by the refusal of the Joint Committee to accept the President's budgetary figures. Neither course is impractical or utopian, except as it challenges the symbolism and custom supporting the power of the House subcommittees on appropriations to act both as judge of the facts (the detail of estimates) and of budgetary policy. The sheer volume of time and effort involved in estimates review prevents the policy questions from securing proper consideration. Until the Joint Committee lifts the coordinating function out of the hands of the subcommittees, the prospects of balanced legislative control of budgetary policy appear remote. Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee or the Committee for Economic Development (Chicago, 1947), pp. 16-19; also, see the Economic Report of the President, January 1968, p. 11. [From the Journal of Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, May 1953] THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1950 DALMAS H. NELSON With the tremendous growth in the size of the federal budget and the continued trend toward concentration of power in the hands of the executive, the necessity for improving the appropriations process of.Congress has been increasingly apparent in recent years. The consolidated appropriation bill of 1950 was an important experiment in this regard. The ideas it represented are evidently still important issues in Congress, although the 1950 procedure has not been repeated. During the first few decades of our republic's history, appropriations were in the main supplied by single annual bills, although a number of supplementary acts were passed each year. As the nation grew and governmental functions and needs expanded, there was a gradual multiplication of the number of appropriation bills. Since the birth of the executive budget in 1921 Congress has generally divided the requests therein into about ten or twelve bills, enacted separately at scattered times throughout a session. In addition there have usually been supplemental, deficiency, and special appropriation acts. This procedure has proved unsatisfactory in several respects. Congress hás lacked the ability to correlate prospective revenues with appropriations, and each expenditure act has been piled upon the other during a session with little or no planned relationship to an overall fiscal policy and perspective. Economies have been difficult to achieve and deficits hard to avoid, since the full impact of a particular expenditure was not realized until it was too late. Major attempts to reform the appropriations process were included in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Staffs for the Appropriations Committees were expanded and a legislative budget. was provided for. Meantime, support increased for the idea of consolidating appropriations into one or two annual bills. The main advocates of the consolidated procedure in Congress were Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, a leader of the economy bloc, and Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. 'See Congressional Record, Vol. 96, p. 4866 (April 5, 1950). 1953] THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1950 275 In the Seventy-Ninth and Eightieth Congress Senator Byrd and Senator Butler of Nebraska sponsored a resolution to make the omnibus procedure mandatory under the joint rules of Congress. On February 17, 1949, they introduced a similar measure into the EightyFirst Congress; this bore also the names of Senators Bridges, O'Connor, Knowland, Gillette, Ferguson, and Wherry. Senators Hunt and Lodge actively supported it. This proposal, Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, received Senate approval on September 27, 1949. No action was taken on the resolution, nor on any other omnibus proposal, by the House. Representative Cannon simply announced, on May 26, 1949, that the House Appropriations Committee would employ the consolidated procedure in the next session of Congress. Formal House action was unnecessary, he said, since the Committee had authority to decide for itself upon the number and form of appropriation bills. Thus the omnibus system used in 1950 was not based upon a resolution of Congress. Apparently many factors contributed to the willingness of members of Congress to experiment with the new device. The consolidated approach to appropriations had several influential proponents outside of Congress, including George Galloway, the late Harold Smith, former director of the Budget, and Marcellus C. Shield, former Clerk of the House Appropriations Committee. The Hoover Commission3 and Task Force Reports had indicated the vital need for Congressional reforms. Neither made any recommendations as to the onepackage procedure, but the Report of the Commission observed: "Certainly a comprehensive survey of existing appropriation practices looking toward simplification of appropriation structure, language, and procedure is long overdue." The failure of the legislative budget and the increase in governmental expenditures and in national debt doubtless helped to overcome the inertia attached to the traditional method of separate appropriation bills. And some persuasive arguments were presented by the proponents of consolidation. Under existing arrangements, Senator Byrd maintained, intelligent economizing was left to the executive branch. There were inade "Congressional Record, Vol. 95, p. 6903. Representative Byrnes of Wisconsin introduced a proposal for a revised legislative budget and an omnibus bill, but the House did not act upon it. 'Report on Budgeting and Accounting, February, 1949, pp. 12, 13. 'Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting Activities, (Appendix F), January, 1949, pp. 69, 70. "Report on Budgeting and Accounting, op. cit., p. 13. 276 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS [Vol. 15 quate means of translating appropriations made for the fiscal year, extending beyond the fiscal year, or carried over from previous years, into actual expenditures for the fiscal year involved. Thus it was impossible to get the true picture of spending relative to income. With separate bills Congress was unable to evaluate appropriations items. "by relative mèrits, importance, or cost in view of the whole fiscal situation." Senator Byrd suggested further that the consolidated device would eliminate much of the duplicating language which added to the bulk of the separate bills. Proponents argued that other results would include greater care and attention in the appropriations process, discovery of conflicts and duplications, prevention of riders. and logrolling, discouragement of deficit spending, completion of regular appropriations before the end of the fiscal year, and achievement of substantial economies as a result of these factors. Concentration of spending in one big bill would, asserted Representative Cannon, focus public attention so strongly upon its passage as to strengthen the diffused forces of economy and weaken the influence of the pressure groups which supported spending. Circumstances would compel each member of Congress to vote conscientiously: "In the fierce light of publicity which will be concentrated on that final vote, there will be no escape from responsibility. A clear, unequivocal record must be made."9 Proponents also cited the usage of the single annual bill in England, France, Sweden, and other nations, and in the great majority of states. It was pointed out that a large number of state governors advocated adoption of the system by Congress, as did national business organizations and the press. Since no House vote was taken, the attitude of the members is uncertain. Several House leaders were known to be opposed to its adoption. Speaker Rayburn, for example, was highly skeptical. The Republican leader of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative Taber of New York, expressed a lack of enthusiasm but also the belief that it was worth trying. Four basic objections were advanced regarding the new procedure. Firstly, delay in appropriations *Congressional Record, Vol. 95, p. 941, (February 8, 1949), p. 5847 (May 6, 1949). 'Consolidation of General Appropriation Bills, Hearings, Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 81st Congress, 1st Session, p. 67. These are summarized by Representative Cannon in Congressional Record, Vol. 96, p. 233 (January 9, 1950). 'Congressional Record, Vol. 95, p. 6903 (May 26, 1949). 1953] THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1950 277 might ensue. Many chapters of the consolidated bill normally enacted at an early date as individual bills would now be likely to be needlessly late because of the more controversial aspects of the gigantic measure. Consequently program-planning by government agencies would be handicapped. Secondly, Congress might, in its anxiety to adjourn for electioneering, approve the bill in haste, without adequate consideration. Thirdly, since tremendous pressures would be generated to obtain passage of a bill of its size and consequence, logrolling might be facilitated, weakening Congressional control over appropriations. Fourthly, if the President vetoed the consolidated bill, the operations of the government might be drastically upset. If, for this reason (though unlikely!) he abstained from the use of his veto power, an important part of the President's powers over spending would be sacrificed, and with it a weapon he might need to deal with obnoxious legislative riders.10 The considerations regarding the veto were reported to be among the most important in the administration's rather apprehensive attitude.11 Representatives of the Treasury, the Budget Bureau, and the Comptroller General's Office all expressed the opinion that the onepackage system was workable so far as the government's fiscal affairs were concerned. Budget Director Frederick J. Lawton insisted, however, that the President must be given the item veto if consolidation were carried out, as a protection against riders.12 Similar views had been expressed by Mr. Lawton's predecessor, Frank Pace. The omnibus procedure as inaugurated by the House Appropriations Committee under Representative Cannon's leadership was the same in several respects as the procedure proposed in Senator Byrd's Senate Concurrent Resolution 18. The Omnibus Bill was divided into chapters, corresponding to the regular appropriations acts of other years. The House Committee was in turn divided into ten subcommittees of five members each, each subcommittee concentrating on one chapter. The breakdown was as follows: (1) District of Columbia; (2) Legislative Branch; (3) State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary; (4) Treasury-Post Office; (5) Labor-Federal 1°For accounts of these objections, see U. S. News, March 24, 1050, pp. 4244; The New York Times, January 12, 1950, p. 4; Senate Report No. 391, Consolidated Appropriation Bill, 80th Congress, 1st Session. "U. S. News, op. cit., p. 42. "There is considerable uncertainty as to whether or not the President could be given the item veto without a Constitutional Amendment, although Congressional mandates requesting the executive to "reduce" are suggestive. |