Congress. The practice of impounding appropriated funds, although examined by congressional hearings and disputed in legal actions, never had been successfully challenged by Congress.

In passing the debt ceiling bill, Shultz said Oct. 26, Congress "at least backhandedly" recognized the impoundment power by requiring the President to report on funds he had withheld.

The administration found an unlikely ally in Sen. William Proxmire (D. Wis.), the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee and critic of many Nixon economic policies. Asking that fiscal 1973 spending be limited to $245-billion. Proxmire Oct. 21 urged Nixon "... to use the long-standing and traditional power of your office and set a spending ceiling now.

"By memo to your budget director or even by a verbal order, you can set a spending ceiling today," Proxmire told the President. ... The amount, rate, pace and speed of spending is peculiarly the presidential prerogative."

Appropriations and Outlays

The President has that prerogative, Proxmire told his Senate colleagues during an Oct. 16 debate on the spending ceiling request, because what Congress appropriates in any given year and what the federal government actually spends that year "are only remotely connected."

"Very few people, including many in Congress, understand what Congress has power over and what the President has power over with respect to the budget," Proxmire had said earlier.

Proxmire's position was disputed by other senators but his remarks went to the heart of the congressional spending problem: when the Congress appropriates money for government programs, it exercises little control over how much the government will spend that year. As Proxmire pointed out, only $126.8-billion out of $246.3-billion in federal spending projected by the President's fiscal 1973 budget would be made "available through current action by Congress"-subject to congressional appropriations for fiscal 1973.

In other words, of the $246.3-billion the President planned to spend in submitting the budget, $119-billion was already available without any further action by Congress. These funds, previously provided by Congress, included permanent appropriations under which funds become available without annual congressional action and unspent balances from appropriations enacted for previous fiscal years.

At the end of fiscal 1972, Proxmire noted, the executive branch expected to have at its disposal $266.7-billion in unexpended balances funds provided by Congress but not yet spent. By the end of fiscal 1973, he added unexpectedly balances would total nearly $290-billion, including $40-billion for the Pentagon alone.

BUDGET AUTHORITY AND SPENDING. As of the end of the 92nd Congress, the Joint Committee on the Reduction of Federal Expenditures reported that Congress bad adopted 15 fiscal 1973 appropriations bill granting the following estimated budget authority and outlays. Column three includes outlays during fiscal 1963 of funds appropriated for fiscal 1973 and previous years:

3 Total does not include outlays from trust funds and other permanent appropriations.

Reforming the Process

The spending ceiling debate gave impetus to proposals within Congress for reforming what the President's ceiling request message termed "the hoary and traditional procedure of the Congress, which now permits action on the various spending programs as if they were unrelated and independent actions."

Addressing itself to the problem, Congress included in the debt ceiling bill a House Ways and Means Committee amendment creating a temporary joint committee to recommend methods by which Congress could exercise greater control over both expenditures and receipts. The committee was instructed to report to Congress by Feb. 15, 1973.

During consideration of the debt ceiling legislation, the Senate approved but House conferees refused to accept-an amendment creating a permanent joint committee to analyze each fiscal year's budget and recommend a spending ceiling to the House and Senate Appropriations committees.

FINDLEY PROPOSAL. The fundamental problem to be solved, Rep. Paul Findley (R Ill.) told the House on Oct. 12, "... is the way we go about appropriating money in a piecemeal fashion, without ever fitting the pieces together to form a budget for the entire federal government. . . . At no time does the Congress adopt a budget for the federal government."

To remedy the problem, Findley proposed legislation amending the House rules "to require that each year the House adopt a budget... before beginning the appropriations process."

Findley's proposal, drawn up with the help of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), would direct the House Appropriations Committee to report at the start of each regular congressional session a resolution setting forth a House-authorized budget for the upcoming fiscal year.

Under Findley's proposal, the House budget would include: • Estimated over-all federal budget receipts.

• A maximum amount to be appropriated for the fiscal year, and a maximum amount to be appropriated by each appropriations bill.

• An estimate of total budget outlays related to the maximum appropriations, and an estimate of total budget outlays related to each appropriations bill.

No appropriations bill could be passed by the House until the budget resolution had been approved. A two-thirds majority would be required to pass an appropriations bill if either the appropriations or outlays it provided exceeded the amounts allocated by the House budget.

Findley's proposal also would direct the tax-writing Ways and Means Committee to file a report 15 days after adoption of the House budget making specific recommendations for adjusting taxes or the federal debt level to accommodate the federal outlays projected by the budget.

BROCK PROPOSAL. Another reform proposal, by Sen. Bill Brock (R Tenn.), would create a Joint Committee on the Budget to review the President's budget and prepare by May 31 a legislative budget for the upcoming fiscal year starting July 1. Other features of Brock's proposal would:

• Require that Congress project expenditures over five fiscal years in passing appropriations measures.

• Place a three-year limit on authorization of appropriations for all federal programs, requiring that each program be reviewed by Congress at least every three years.

• Require experimental testing of new federal programs before Congress authorizes a full program.

• Require annual appropriation of money to trust funds now funded under permanent appropriations (excluding interest on the public debt and tax refunds).

PERMANENT CEILING. Another alternative would be enactment of an annual spending ceiling in effect recognizing the President's authority to spend whatever amounts he wants. Although the Senate was likely to remain opposed, columnist Stewart Alsop reported in Newsweek Oct. 23 that the President, if elected to a second term, intended to ask the 93rd Congress for a spending ceiling extending into fiscal 1974. If approved, Alsop wrote, the extended spending ceiling "might well become a permanent part of the political system."

[From the Congressional Quarterly, vol. 30, Nov. 4, 1972]

ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL VIEWS ON LEGISLATION TO PUT CEILING ON SPENDING

Late in its second session, Congress refused President Nixon's request that it legislate a $250-billion ceiling on federal spending in fiscal 1973 a proposal that would have given the President authority to trim federal outlays in whatever ways he saw fit. Although the President undertook to cut spending by vetoing bills and impounding funds, the spending ceiling was expected to be a continuing issue in 1973- particularly if taexs are raised as a result of a continued budget deficit.

According to published reports, the President is considering a renewal of his spending ceiling request in 1973.

Here are some opposing views on whether a spending ceiling should be enacted by Congress:

PRO: THE ADMINISTRATION SIDE

President Nixon in his July 26, 1972 message to Congress asking enactment of a $250-billion ceiling on fiscal 1973 spending:

"What we should have . . . is that an annual spending ceiling be set first, and that individual program allocations then be tailored to that ceiling.... The present congressional system of independent, unrelated actions on various spending programs means that Congress arrives at total federal spending in an accidental, haphazard manner." Caspar W. Weinberger, director of the Office of Management and Budget, in testimony Oct. 11, 1972, before the Senate Finance Committee on the President's spending ceiling request:

"It is said that by enacting this legislation, the Congress would be giving up its constitutional control over federal spending. To the contrary, this legislation represents the only way left for the Congress to get control of spending, to take a look at the total budget and express its will on what level of spending we should have in this fiscal year.

"It is the existing congressional procedure for reviewing the budget (which precludes any comprehensive action on the total) and not the ceiling proposal that constitutes an abdication from responsibility. This legislation and this legislation alone, of the thousands of bills before you, gives the Congress an opportunity to participate in and control fiscal policy."

Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz in an Aug. 15, 1972, statement to the Republican national convention platform committee:

"The President's proposal for a firm ceiling on spending, which would bind both the legislative and executive branches, should be enacted to preserve the gains already made against inflation. As the economy moves toward full employment of resources ..., federal budget restraint will be clearly required-if we are to learn the lessons brought about by the budget excesses of 1966, 1967 and 1968."

House Ways and Means Committee report on legislation placing a $250-billion ceiling on fiscal 1973 spending:

"An expenditure ceiling, at least on a temporary basis, appears necessary at the present time if expenditures are to be kept at $250billion level. The need for an expenditure ceiling of this type arises from the difficulty Congress has experienced in establishing overall program priorities."

Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur D. Mills (D Ark.) during Oct. 10 floor debate on HR 16810, a bill including a $250-billion ceiling on 1973 spending:

"The need to control spending is particularly great now because many economic indicators again show signs of excessive rising inflationary pressures. . . . Someplace along the line there has to be confidence reposed in the chief executive ... he is not going to use this authority in a way that would make it impossible for his party to have a chance to win in 1974 or . . . in 1976. . . . There is no other way we can get a handle on our present runaway inflation."

...

Rep. Herman T. Schneebeli (R Pa.), a Ways and Means Committee member, during Oct. 10 debate:

"Some have expressed understandable concern over the delegation of authority to the President to make budget cuts in order to comply

with the ceiling we are imposing. However, we are simply recognizing that the Congress has been unable to establish over-all priorities itself...."

Rep. Al Ullman (D Ore.), second-ranking Democrat on the Ways and Means Committee, during Oct. 10 debate:

"I do not like to impose a ceiling that gives the President budgetcutting discretion, but I believe we have gotten beyond the point . . . where we have very many options left.

"We are responsible ultimately for our fiscal situation today... because we failed to establish the mechanism for budget control in the Congress.... Until we face up to that basic responsibility and establish the kind of mechanism whereby we can establish priorities and put an annual ceiling on expenditures, then we do not have many other alternatives than to take palliatives like this, and let the President chose among the options."

Sen. William Proxmire (D Wis.), chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, during Oct. 16 debate:

"All of this comes down to whether this spending ceiling does or does not limit presidential and not congressional power.... The President now has the authority to establish a spending ceiling of $250billion or $245-billion or probably one anywhere from $220-billion to $280-billion. He can do that by a memo to his budget director. He can do that by word of mouth by merely telling Mr. Weinberger to put such a ceiling on spending.

"Because the President controls spending, or outlays, and can spend very much more than $250-billion if he so desires, what we in fact are doing is limiting his power by placing a ceiling on the total amounts he might otherwise spend."

CON: CONGRESS' SIDE

House Appropriations Committee Chairman George Mahon (D Texas) during Oct. 10 debate:

"This should not be interpreted as a matter of economy so much as it is a matter of principle and relates to the preservation of the American form of government. . . . We cannot afford to abdicate, even to any President, regardless of his interest in the public welfare. "Congress should not surrender the power to legislate or the power of the purse."

Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. (D Mass.), the House Demorcatic whip, during Oct. 10 debate:

"The pivotal issue in this debate is whether Congress is voluntarily going to abdicate its constitutional responsibilities in controlling the purse strings or whether Congress is going to take a firm stand in retaining its rightful oversight review of federal government spending. "I believe Congress has already surrendered too much leeway to government departments in determining priorities within certain areas and in permitting funds to be allocated as deemed appropriate by the various government agencies. A vote for the spending ceiling without guidelines is a vote for a further erosion of the congressional responsibility."

Rep. Charles A. Vanik (D Ohio) Oct. 10:

"I refuse to yield another iota of the dwindling capacity of this Congress to do anything about the crucial activities of our government.