purpose of this provision is to alleviate the burden on administrators who would otherwise be required to appear before two authorizing committees (in addition to the two appropriations committees). However, in deference to the prerogatives of the House and Senate, the bill stops short of mandating joint reviews. It merely suggests this as an appropriate course of action. But it is up to each committee to decide whether to proceed separately or jointly with its counterpart committee in the other House. The bill contains no provisions enabling Senate and House committees to satisfy their reporting requirements jointly. Thus committees are encouraged to pursue their investigations cooperatively but to present their findings independently. This arrangement preserves the significant prerogatives and independence of each House. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM EVALUATION Section 301 (d) specifies the matters to be included in each committee's report on a terminating authorization. The report "shall contain a cost-benefit analysis of the program and the committee's evaluation of the overall success or failure of the program, and shall include (but not be limited to)" (1) Whether the program objectives are still relevant. (2) Whether the program has adhered to the original and intended purpose. (3) Whether the program has had any substantial impact on solving the problems and objectives dealt with in the program. (4) The impact of the program on the functions and freedom of the private sector of the economy. (5) The feasibility of alternative programs and methods for dealing with the problems dealt within the program and their cost effectiveness. (6) The relation of all government and private programs dealing with the problems dealt with in the program. (7) An examination of proposed legislation pending in either House dealing with the problems being dealt with in the program, including an examination of each proposed legislation in the context of (A) existing laws, (B) other proposed legislation, (C) private efforts, and (D) whether public efforts will hinder or help private efforts. The intent of this "bill of particulars" clearly is to obtain a thorough evaluation of expiring programs, including an analysis of their impacts on the public and private sectors, fidelity to their original objectives, and consideration of alternative programs. This commendable breadth, however, can tax both the resources of congressional committees and the competences of program evaluators. Data to analyze the effects of programs are not always available or reliable, nor is it always feasible to achieve the comprehensive vision sought in this listing. However, this specification of analytic and evaluative criteria can be read as a guidance to committees striving to expand their review of Federal programs. Moreover, when data or evaluative intelligence is lacking, congressional committees can serve a useful function by pointing to these deficiencies in their reports. No authorization required. Sept. 11. Nov. 6. Oct. 1. Oct. 11. Dec. 18. Dec. 29 Nov. 11. 30... 42. 89. 34. July 11. Nov. 21. Oct. 14 Oct. 21. Sept. 18. Dec. 19. Nov. 25. Nov. 15. * Appropriations preceeded authorizations for the food stamp program, fiscal year 1971; the health manpower: Comprehensive manpower and NIH health manpower in fiscal year 1972; the Coast Guard in fiscal year 1972; and NSF for fiscal year 1972. Appropriations were vetoed Aug. 11. The veto was overridden on Aug. 18. • Does not include Headstart and Follow Through programs. Note: The date given for enactment of authorization is the date that the last item in an appropriation bill requiring prior authorization was approved. The date of approval is for final congressional action-House or Senate, whichever came last. THE PILOT TESTING OF NEW PROGRAMS An Analysis of Title IV, S. 3984 (92d Congress) (By Allen Schick, Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) DECEMBER 6, 1972 Title IV of S. 3984 introduced by Senator Brock in September 1972 would require the pilot testing of all major new programs. The test would have to be conducted for at least two full years and in a manner that replicates "as nearly as possible" the conditions that would exist if the program were made permanent. Executive agencies and the Comptroller General would be responsible for reporting test results and congressional committees would evaluate the programs. These requirements would not apply to new programs concerning which a committee reports that in its judgment "pilot testing would not be feasible or desirable." RATIONALE FOR THE LEGISLATION In recent years, proposals to mandate or encourage program evaluation and experimentation have come from many quarters. A powerful call for testing and evaluation came in the 1970 report of the Fitzhugh Commission (officially the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel) which urged the testing of prototypes before major weapons commitments are made. To implement this "fly before we buy" policy, the Fitzhugh group proposed the creation of a new Defense Test Agency to continuously evaluate weapons systems and military preparedness.1 A similar recommendation covering all Federal programs was issued by the Committee for Economic Development in its 1971 publication Improving Federal Program Performance. CED proposed that Congress continue and accelerate its recent trend toward ex- The surge of interest in the evaluation of federal programs arises out of the sharp rise in federal spending, the new awareness that in future years revenues may not be adequate to meet rising program costs, the conviction that many programs launched during the past decade have not delivered on their expectations, and recognition that once a program is made permanent it may be too late to change its course of action. The critical stage, therefore, comes when the program still is new and future budget commitments haven't foreclosed the possibility for genuine and effective evaluation. In line with this reasoning, Title IV aims its experimental technique at the pilot stage. The feeling that increased spending has not been matched by improved results probably is highest in the domestic social area where total spending climbed from approximately $30 billion in fiscal 1963 to $110 billion only one decade later. But despite these spiraling investments, there is widespread disappointment because many of the human and urban ills for which new programs were established in the 1960s still await effective remedy. There no lenger is the buoyant hope that more money alone can do the job; in its place there is the entrenched realization that hard core human problems often lack easy or known solutions and that we must examine program accomplishments and failures carefully and objectively in order to obtain some new understanding of the government's role. Moreover, the fiscal dividends projected only a few short years ago have vanished under the combined pressures of inflation, tax cuts, 1 Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 58. 2 Committee for Economic Development, Improving Federal Program Performance (New York: September 1971), p. 58. 3 Charles L. Schultze and Others, Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 401. soaring program costs, and long-range commitments made years ago. Now the problem is of mountainous deficits, so that even if more spending were the answer, the money would be lacking to implement the new programs. EVALUATION: TOO LATE AND NOT ENOUGH This mood began to emerge in the late 1960s when many of the initial Great Society programs were up for renewal. In extending some of these programs, Congress set aside funds for program evaluation. The 1967 amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act directed increased evaluation activity, including an independent "performance" audit by the Comptroller General. In 1968, there were approximately a dozen mandated earmarkings funds (generally in the half percent to one percent range) for evaluation purposes. This trend has continued into the 1970s and the need for proper evaluation was used as an argument by President Nixon for converting the old Budget Bureau into the Office of Management and Budget.* At the present time, there is a steady stream of evaluations concerning many Federal programs. Millions of dollars have been applied to the appraisal of manpower programs and equally large sums have been used for assessing the effects of Federal aid on the education of disadvantaged children. It is now clear that the first crop of evaluations produced more questions than answers and raised the level of confusion and pessimism to new heights. The Coleman Report called into question the belief that had prevailed at least since the New Deal that education outcomes are substantially determined by the resources invested and that the quality of schools, teachers, and facilities accounts for differences in student performance. Instead, Coleman found that nonschool factors such as home and friends are more determinative. Appraisals of Title I compensatory efforts brought the overall conclusion that additional spending does not uplift the disadvantaged, though some success stories have been reported. The Westinghouse review of summer Headstart reported that whatever benefits are crammed into the brief, preschool experience fade away by the second grade. In a survey of educational research for the President's Commission on School Finance, a team of RAND authors examined a variety of approaches covering resources, improving the processes and methods of education, variations in the organizational environment of the school, and largescale interventions in education. Their conclusions offer no comfort. to those who hope we are at the brink of remedying our difficult educatinal problem: "... research has found nothing that consistently and unambiguously makes a difference in student outcomes. . . research has not discovered any educational practice (or set of practices) that offer a high probability of success over time and place."5 The sense of failure has infected federal manpower programs, most of which are products of the 1960s and now are budgeted at about $5 billion per year. WIN, JOBS, CAMPS, and an array of appealingly named projects have not materially closed the gap between disadvantaged and other groups. Blacks still have twice as much chance of Message of the President on Reorganization of the Executive Office of the President, March 21, 1970). Harvey A. Averch and others, How Effective is Schooling? A Critical Review and Synthesis of Research Findings (The Rand Corporation, December 1971), p. xi. being out of work and unskilled workers consistently have unemployment rates six times greater than those for skilled workers. These aggregate statistics undoubtely mask the chronically high level of unemployment and withdrawal from the labor market among the poor. On balance, it is hard to take issue with the conclusion drawn from the Brookings study of the federal budget: Manpower training programs in the 1960s also prove to be Failure dominates the urban scene where an increasingly broad range of programs, beginning with public housing and now comprehending urban renewal and model cities have not restored vitality to the central city, let alone kept it from sliding further downhill. According to news reports, HUD Secretary George Romney, told a Detroit audience in March 1972, the nation "needs one example" of a city concerned about saving its residential and downtown areas. "We don't have one," he said. The first public housing programs go back to the 1930s and it is now almost a quarter of a century since Congress legislated the goal of a decent home for every American, but we still are grappling with the problem of how to house the poor. Today's housing slums are not only old tenements but showcase public housing projects such as Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, opened in 1954 and already decaying with high vacancy rates. The abandonments that now make the headlines are not only the buildings drained by malevolent slumlords but more and more are homes recently built or rehabilitated under Section 235 subsidies. Failure has been heavily concentrated in large cities where planning first gained a foothold in the United States. Nowadays, hardly anyone believes that the city can be saved by zoning, master plans, or even model cities. Failure is the story of LEAA which has not made the streets safe and of drug control programs which have not stemmed the spread of addiction. On net, the welfare programs have not narrowed the income gap between the rich and poor. A recent study sponsored by the Joint Economic Committee reported that the difference in income between the richest and poorest quintiles has almost doubled over the past twenty years. And on an individual basis, the earnings gap between technical and unskilled workers widened from approximately $3,800 to $6,500 during the 1960s. Along with reports of program failure there has been a definite drop of interest in large program evaluation, though many federal agencies are trying to institutionalize evaluation through the collection of output and performance data. For one thing, evaluators need a continuing stream of new programs but as social innovation has slowed there has been less to evaluate. In education, most of the 6 Charles Schultze and others, Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget (The Brookings Institution, 1971), p 198. 7 The New York Times, March 28, 1972. |