having in view one class of these causes, say, that the substance only is the subject of the patent; at other times, having in view the other class of cases, they say that a method may be patentable. Now according to the explanation of Lord Chief Justice Eyre, both these propositions are true to a certain extent, but neither is true to the extent laid down in some of the cases, that is, we cannot say that substances alone are patentable, nor that methods only are so. Accordingly Mr. Grose, in one of the Watt and Boulton cases, says it signified nothing to the inventor or the public, whether the patent be for the engine made or the method of making it. Indeed, to the purposes of a title to a patent or a specification, judges have considered the words method and engine to be synonymous. "Engine and method mean the same thing," says Mr. Justice Lawrence, and may be the subject of a patent. Method, properly speaking, is only placing several things and performing several operations, in the most convenient order; but it may signify a contrivance or device, so may an engine; and therefore I think it may answer the word method."22 And Abbott C. J. says on the same subject, "When a person applies to the crown for a patent for a new engine or instrument, he may represent himself to

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22 Hornblower v. Boulton, 8 T. R. 106.

be the inventor of a new method of accomplishing that object, which is to be accomplished by his engine or instrument.”’23 That a method or mode of operating may be the subject of a patent, is plain from this, that when the object of two patents or effect to be produced is substantially the same, they may both be valid, if the modes of attaining the desired effect are essentially different.24 Therefore where judges or writers lay down the general doctrine that a method cannot be the subject of a patent, as Mr. Justice Heath does in the above case of Boulton v. Bull,25 the proposition is true in such a restricted sense as on the whole to render it erroneous.

Sec. IV.-PROCESS.

The word process has been suggested instead of method, as descriptive of the subject of a patent, and what has been said of method is, in many cases, applicable to process, the difference between the two terms, as applied to this subject, being, that method is of a wider signification. Thus Abbott C. J. says, "The word manufactures, in the statute Jac. 1. c. 3, may, perhaps, extend to a new process, to be carried

23 King v. Wheeler, 2 B. & Ald. 350.

24 Huddart v. Grimshaw. Dav. Pat. Cas. 290.

252 H. Bl. 483.

on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance; but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better and more useful kind.''26

It is true the Chief Justice speaks with great caution, because he was using a mere illustration, in doing which, he did not choose thus collaterally to express a positive doctrine, upon a question which might be a subject of much subtile discussion, but he distinctly implies his own opinion. He seems, however, to have been over-cautious, for if a method may be patentable, of which it is apprehended there can be no doubt, then, of consequence, a process, which in this application of the term is, in many respects, synonymous with method, may be so also; may be so, for in respect to this latter, we must speak with the same qualifications, and subject to the same exceptions, as when we use the term method, as descriptive of the subjects of patents.

Sec. V.-PRINCIPLE.

The question whether a principle is a subject of monopoly under the patent laws, was much discussed in the cases relating to Watt's specification of his

26 King v. Wheeler, 2. B. & Ald. 349.

improvement in the steam-engine. In that specification, the patentee stated that his invention "consisted in the following principles," and then proceeded to describe particularly the construction of the engine according to his improvement. This gave occasion to numerous, elaborate, and subtile discussions on the patentable character of a principle. Had Watt described his invention as consisting of the "following particulars," all this disquisition would have been lost, and yet this would have been substantially equivalent to the phraseology he did use, for after stating that his invention consisted of principles, he proceeded to define and explain what he meant by that expression, and it was not objected that his description was at all defective. The real question then was, whether Mr. Watt had used the word principle in a wrong sense, and, if so, whether his patent was defeated for this philological inaccuracy, which to all practical purposes was not of the slightest importance, since any person could understand the construction of his machine, and any mechanic could construct another after his description, as well as if he had committed no such inaccuracy. And the strife was a very doubtful one, and the patent would have been lost, had not the judges, on the final decision of the cause, been very strongly disposed to maintain it on account of the great merit and utility of the invention. We will proceed to a review of those discussions, which are useful in throwing

light on the question, what are patentable subjects, though the case which gave rise to this term does not, in this respect, seem to have been one of any well-grounded doubt.

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"It is a clear position of law," says Mr. Justice Heath," that the organization of a machine may be the subject of a patent, but principles cannot. Indeed it seems impossible to specify a principle, and its application to all cases, which furnishes an argument, that it cannot be the subject of a patent." 27 The very statement of what a principle is," says Mr. Justice Buller, "proves it not to be a ground for a patent. It is the first ground and rule for arts and sciences, or in other words, the elements and rudiments of them. A patent must be for some new production from those elements, and not for the elements themselves. If the principle alone be the foundation of this patent, it cannot possibly stand, with that knowledge and discovery which the world were in possession of before. The effect, the power, and the operation of steam, were known long before the date of this patent; all machines which are worked by steam, are worked on the same principle. The principle was known before, and therefore if the principle alone be the foundation of the patent, though the addition may be a great improvement, yet

27 Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 482, 483.