loss of 273 lives through the carelessness of "other persons," is open to question. Yet that statement of the Pennsylvania report is the only direct statistical evidence in support of the Commission's conclusion "that the responsibility for a majority of the accidents in coal mines rests with the men injured. This being the case"-continues the Commission-"it is evident that an inquiry as to the responsibility of a given race for accidents may perhaps best be answered by showing the extent to which its numbers are sufferers from accidents."2

Disinterested mining experts, however, do not accept the apologetic theory of the mine operators as an "undisputed fact."

At the summer meeting of the Mining Institute of America, held in 1910, shortly after the Cherry Mine holocaust, the causes of mine fires were discussed in a paper, from which the following is quoted:

In looking over the accounts of some of the mine fires which have startled the general public more than others, I was forcibly struck with three of them (Avondale, Hill Farm, and Cherry), especially in the general aspect at least of the similarity of their cause and effect, and of the cycle of years between each. The Avondale Mine was a singleshaft opening. The structural material used in the shaft lining, partitions, derrick, and breaker, was composed of wood. The fire originated at the bottom of the shaft, caused by the carelessness of the furnace man in lighting the furnace fire, thereby setting fire to the wooden partition, etc. This fire occurred in the month of September, 1869, and in it 109 lives were lost. As you remember, no adequate means were at hand with which to extinguish the fire. . . . The Cherry Mine disaster. . . originated at the No. 2 seam landing of the escapement shaft and was

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1 Dr. John Randolph Haynes, Special Commissioner on Mining Accidents of the State of California, in a paper read at the last annual meeting of the American Association for Labor Legislation, at Washington, D. C., questioned the independence of State mining inspectors: "They do not wish to lose their positions, which they are very likely to do if they annoy the owners of coal mines, who very commonly own the railroads which carry the coal, and enjoy intimate relations with banks and other corporations that exercise quiet but effective power in State politics."-"A Federal Mining Commission," American Labor Legislation Review, vol. ii, No. 1, p. 145. Ibid., p. 233.

2

caused by the ignition of hay from the flame of a crude, improvised, unprotected illuminating contrivance. The flame from the hay was communicated to the overabundance of wood supporting material at the landing, and adding thereto the inadequate means available to successfully deal with a fire of such magnitude, with the ill-judged actions of the inexperienced men at the bottom, the trap was complete and the men caught therein, so we have now to record the greatest and most disastrous mine fire in the history of the coal-mining industry of this country, so far as the loss of life is concerned. Two hundred and sixty-eight lives were lost in the Cherry Mine disaster.

It has always appeared to me that the causes of mine fires were so apparent to the thoughtful and intelligent mining men that their occurrence and their ill effects were unnecessary. . . . The prevention of mine fires lies in the removal of the causes, which are well known, and the knowledge of means and methods to be employed for their elimination, being within the range and scope of the ability of the ordinary mine official, the wonder is that they do happen. To secure freedom from mine fires I believe lies almost entirely within the intelligently directed administrative powers of the mine management, and in my opinion if the mine officials are careful, alert, and capable, immunity from them can be secured. . . .

Every coal mine should consist of two separate openings and one of them should be used exclusively for an escapement. . . . The escapement shaft, if over one hundred feet in depth, should be equipped with safe and efficient hoisting apparatus. The structure at the hoisting shaft should be built of steel, and the engine and power house should be built of concrete, brick, or masonry; the shaft linings to be of concrete, and the shaft bottoms, if needing supports for the roof, should be of steel I beams, concrete, or brickwork; doors between main shaft and escapement shaft should be so located as to be easily accessible to the workmen from all parts of the mine by convenient traveling ways, other than those which lead directly to the bottom of the hoisting shaft; mule stables, if not entirely prohibited in the mines, should be built of incombustible material and illuminated with protected incandescent electric lights; all oil, electric, and gasoline pump houses should be kept free from combustible material, and be built of concrete, brickwork, or masonry. When the main workings of a mine have advanced five thousand feet in length and the remaining extent of the property and the other conditions warrant it, an auxiliary escapement opening should be provided and equipped with efficient and necessary machinery; a water system under sufficient pressure . . . should be installed at all important mines, . . . and all parts and connections kept in first-class condition and ready for use at all times; all electric cables or wires, etc., should be well supported and insulated, and not allowed to come in contact with

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combustible material. .. A telephone system should be provided at important mines so that communication can be had between persons outside, and all important stations inside of them; refuge chambers, efficiently constructed and equipped and conveniently located, should be provided in all large and dangerous mines.

Mines should be provided with a powerful reversible fan, and it should be placed on a separate shaft, cased in steel, and fitted with relief doors.

These details have been quoted in order to show that effective prevention of accidents in mines presupposes a carefully planned equipment involving considerable expense. A separate roadway for miners means additional tunneling work. Two separate openings for every coal mine cost twice as much as one. Refuge chambers require additional excavation and construction work. Concrete or brick is more expensive than wood, which is generally used as structural material in coal mines. A powerful reversible fan placed on a separate shaft cased in steel is another item of expense; so is a water system under sufficient pressure, a telephone system, etc. All this is well known to mine superintendents, "but they are pressed for dividends by the presidents and their companies; the presidents are not heartless, but they are pressed for dividends by their directors who . . . are interested in the mines only as a matter of profit."2

The dilemma of the mine superintendent was set forth in a paper on "Mine Accident Prevention," which was recently read before the Alabama Coal Operators' Association by Mr. J. J. Rutledge, a geologist and mining engineer of many years' experience, who has made his way from the bottom up, beginning as assistant mine foreman and advancing to the positions of mine manager and superintendent. He has visited many of the important coal mines in this country, and has been brought into close personal contact with mine foremen and superintendents. He is of the opinion that "the person who is the greatest factor in the pre

"Mine Fires," by Thomas K. Adams. Mines and Minerals, December, 1910. Haynes, loc. cit., p. 145.

vention of mine accidents is the mine foreman or manager. . . . He should never cancel any requisition for supplies that are absolutely required. Perhaps the greatest abuse of this sort is the cancellation of supplies which are required to make ventilation more effective." But it is not unusual that the foreman or manager "is handicapped or hindered in his work by the failure to receive proper supplies or equipment from his superiors." That he might "be encouraged to demand the same and . . . be insured against possible loss of employment by reason of his making such a demand . . . the law should back him up in making such demands." It is an undisputed fact that poor and defective methods of ventilation largely increase the danger of gas explosion: "An adequate air supply is not only required as a safeguard against the accumulation of dangerous gases, but is prerequisite to the maintenance of the health of miners and animals employed underground."2

But the mine manager who is not "insured against possible loss of employment" will take his chances and cancel requisitions for "supplies that are absolutely required." These conditions naturally breed a spirit of carelessness among mine officials, which is, according to expert opinion, "first among the causes of the high fatality rate in American mines." Such was the conclusion reached by three European government experts, among them the Belgian Inspector-General of Mines, who made an examination of American mines upon the invitation of the United States Government. By way of illustration, one of these experts related the following incident:

While passing through a mine in West Virginia with a party carrying both naked and safety lamps, he lifted his lamp toward the roof to test for gas and was surprised to find it present in very dangerous quantities. Turning to the mine superintendent, he remarked, You should not

'J. J. Rutledge: "Mine Accident Prevention." Mines and Minerals, December, 1910.

2

F. L. Hoffman: "Fatal Accidents in Coal Mines." Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor, No. 90, p. 471.

allow naked lamps to be used in this mine." "Oh," replied the superintendent, easily, "we are installing a ventilating system that in a few months will rid the mine entirely of gas and render the use of safety lamps unnecessary." "Before that time arrives," protested the European expert, "your mine will be blown up." And this is precisely what happened. The naked lamps were not excluded, the mine was blown up a few weeks later, and hundreds of miners lost their lives. ... No European mining superintendent would dream of taking such chances as he foolishly took at the cost of so many lives; and, if he were so inclined, the government inspector would not permit him to do so.'

Mine explosions and mine fires impress the imagination by the appalling destruction of lives in a single accident. A great many more lives, however, are sacrificed under ordinary circumstances in every-day accidents, which find their way only into the statistical reports of State mine inspectors, being too common to be noticed by the newspapers.

Every advance in mining engineering within recent years has had the effect of increasing the risks of the miner in the United States. One of the original dangers in underground coal mines is from falls of roof, which are the result, at least in part, of insufficient timbering. This risk has been considerably increased by the use of high explosives." With the installation of improved mining machinery, exposure to unguarded machines has been added to other perils of mining.3 Electrocution threatens the miner as a result of the application of electricity to mining. The chief inspector of coal mines for Pennsylvania gave warning of this danger in his report for 1901:

Electricity in various forms has been the cause of many of the deaths in soft coal mines, either from the men coming in contact with the electric trolley wire, or with the electric wire that carries the power to the electric cutting machines. In my opinion, separate travelling ways should be provided for the workman, when the haulage is done by electricity. 4

Haynes, loc. cit., p. 143. 3 Hoffman, loc. cit., pp. 476-477.

2 Eastman, loc. cit., pp. 38-39. 4 Ibid., pp. 478-479.