If you permit this plan to be carried out, Mr. Secretary, we predict that the Naval Air Reserve will come out of it with a strength of no more than 12,000 officers and men. A token force. Even now the planned pilot strength has been reduced from 3,300 to 1,860. We appreciate the dilemma in which Navy Air has been placed. We believe that the Navy has had more than its share of cuts with over 200 ships de-commissioned and a reduction in force of over 100,000 personnel, particularly when the Navy's Vietnam build-up has been far less, proportionately, than in the other Services. We believe that it is imperative to the National Security to maintain a two ocean Navy with a minimum of fifteen aircraft carriers for quick response in view of our world wide commitments. We supported to the best of our ability the authorization for the Nimitz carrier. However, we believe it is wrong to reduce our reserve resources to accomplish this end. In the first place, all of the savings that may be extracted from these base closures will not keep one carrier in commission for one year, and in the second place, if the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the people through their elected representatives decide to significantly reduce our carrier force, it is all the more important to retain our Naval Air Reserve resources. The Reserve Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act was enacted by the Congress to ensure that our Nation would maintain strong reserve forces. Since its enactment, the other Services within the Defense Department have strengthened and improved their reserves. Both the Army and the Air Force have received heavy cuts, but they apparently have not been passed on to the Reserve Forces. Only in the Navy's so-called integrated system have the Reserve Forces suffered. This massive and radical change in the Naval Air Reserve has not been placed before the Navy's National Reserve Policy Board. The decision was made and informally announced to Naval Air Reservists before it was presented to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) who has the responsibility in this area. It was brought out in the House authorization hearings that it had not been c'eared or discussed with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserves) who has, by law, the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of adequate Reserve Forces in all of the Services. As far as we know there has been no effort made to comply with the directive of the Secretary of Defense to establish a single reserve appropriation to be controlled by the senior flag officer responsible for the Naval Reserve. Mr. Secretary, we ask you to take the necessary action to make the Navy's integrated system responsive to the requirements of the Reserve Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act, particularly in the budgeting area as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Until this is done, the Naval Air Reserve will continue to deteriorate. We also most respectfully and urgently request you to reverse the decision in regard to Naval Reserve Air Station closures in the interest of National Defense. We have been briefed in depth upon the proposed reorganization of the Naval Air Reserve Program. We enthusiastically concur with the plan to establish a Carrier Air Wing and other organizational changes to improve the readiness of the Naval Air Reserve but we simply cannot agree to the disestablishment of all Naval Air Reserve Stations since we know from experience it will result in a drastic dimunition of the strength of the Naval Air Reserve. Enclosed is a resolution recently passed by our Association stating our position on this matter. Sincerely yours, A. JACKSON, Jr., Rear Admiral U.S. Navy Retired, Deputy Executive Director. Major General, USAR, National President. COMMITTEE PROCEDURE Chairman STENNIS. That concludes our open hearings and the committee is at this time adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m. the hearing adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.) MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1971 TUESDAY, MAY 12, 1970 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 1202, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Jackson, Cannon, Inouye, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Smith of Maine, Thurmond, Dominick, Murphy, Brooke, and Schweiker. Staff present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief of staff; Labre R. Garcia, professional staff member. COMMITTEE PROCEDURE Chairman STENNIS. We have a combination of matters to take up today. We are delighted, as always, to have the Secretary here. This meeting was originally planned strictly on a basis of testimony concerning the strategic power relating to the SALT talks. We are going to have to finish our hearings on the authorization bill since the House has passed on the bill and sent it over to us. I wanted every member of our committee to have a chance to ask questions of Mr. Laird they might want to in open session. And if any wish to do that, today is the time to do it. We are also going to have open hearings on ABM from outside witnesses, which was scheduled for tomorrow, but one of those witnesses has become ill. It is thought he will be able to testify, though, next week. So, anticipating his recovery, we have tentatively set next Tuesday for an open hearing by outside witnesses on the ABM. The proponents and the opponents have agreed on two witnesses for each group and they will testify, and such additional statements as people want to file will be accepted for the record. Now, back to the Secretary of Defense for a moment. We have a bill coming up. It is thought it would come up this week in the Senate from the Foreign Relations Committee regarding sales of weapons to foreign countries, an authorization act, to which the committee has added an amendment which is an express limitation on the President, limiting him as to expenditure of funds in Cambodia. The newspapers predict debate will probably start on that perhaps Thursday, and I find I am inclined to agree. I think this is the best time and practically the only time for us to ask the Secretary personally about this amendment. Also that brings up the entire Cambodian question. 42-060-70-pt. 3- -33 SALT NEGOTIATIONS If I may say this to the membership: certainly we don't want to cut off anyone at all now, but with deference to Senator Jackson and his SALT Subcommittee, and the members of that committee, we ought to save plenty of time for the Secretary to go into that. I am going to have to leave in time. I want to go into the Cambodian matter first. Senator Jackson, do you want to make a statement now about that? Senator JACKSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am hopeful that our hearing today will develop the crucial issue of the relationship between our efforts at Vienna to secure a comprehensive arms control agreement and our programs at home to maintain and protect our deterrent posture. By taking steps to preserve the integrity of our deterrent posture, and, perhaps more important, by demonstrating to the Soviet Union that we will not defer needed programs unless there is a significant arms control agreement that would render them unnecessary, we enhance the likelihood of achieving comprehensive accords at the SALT talks. I believe that we must make every effort at Vienna to constrain the development of strategic force increases on both sides. The President's willingness to negotiate mutual limitation of all strategic systems consistent with our deterrent posture encourages some hope of success in these crucial negotiations. As I understand it, we will go into that after the Cambodian discussion. Chairman STENNIS. I want the members to have a chance to ask the Secretary any questions on ABM that they wish, and it is hoped they can make it fairly brief. ENTRANCE INTO CAMBODIA Mr. Secretary, I called you and told you about this matter of Cambodia, this amendment, particularly. We talked about it. I want you to be very frank, and I know you will be, but we are down to the point now where this debate is about to start and I feel this way: I am going to express myself informally here. Even though I opposed going into Vietnam, if someone wants to just pull out, just pull out, lock, stock and barrel, that is a big policy question, but this is altogether another thing. I think to try to seal off a part of the battlefield, whether it is in Vietnam or not, and then limit the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, and say that he can't take any action in that part of the battlefield, regardless of how it may affect the GI's in the main part of Vietnam. I couldn't support, wouldn't support a policy of that kind. I don't believe the people will support it once they understand it. That never has been done in any war we have ever had and I don't think it will be done under our form of government, even though it is proposed in all good faith, but I believe that is what we are confronted with as the language is writ ten now. Mr. Secretary, that brings the matter before you, and this will be the last sitting of this committee, perhaps, before any debate starts. I wish you would respond to that subject. May I say this now. It has been reported in the press that you didn't favor this matter of these sanctuaries being attacked at all. As I have understood, you have made a statement about that, but I wish you would reexpress yourself on that point. STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY DR. JOHN F. FOSTER, JR., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND CAPT. ANDREW J. VALENTINE, JAGC, U.S. NAVY, LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF APPROVAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the decision made by the President of the United States to enter the sanctuary border areas of Cambodia was debated and discussed by the National Security Council more than any question that has come befor the National Security Council since I have been Secretary of Defense and a member of the Council. All aspects of the move into the sanctuary areas were debated and discussed at great length, and all of the pros and cons of this decision had a very thorough and complete discussion. This plan was presented by me to the National Security Council. It is supported by me and by every member of the National Security Council. OBJECTIVE OF OPERATION I think it is important for us to understand thoroughly what the objectives of this military operation are. The objective is to destroy the enemy's supplies and facilities which have been used for some 4 to 5 years to attack American and South Vietnamese military personnel on a so-called hit-and-run basis. The long-term objectives of this move are, of course, to hasten the withdrawal of Americans from South Vietnam, to speed up the Vietnamization program and to reduce American casualties. The timing on this activity was based to a large extent upon the political changes which took place in Cambodia as well as the weather conditions which limited the period of time in which the sanctuary facilities could be destroyed. As you know, Mr. Chairman, there will be a period of severe rain in this area of the Southeast Asia, which will commence within 3 to 4 weeks and will last for a duration of several months. If the opportunity to destroy these facilities was going to be taken, it had to be taken now, and a decision was made on a very selective basis to move into these sanctuary areas, not to destroy people, but to destroy facilities, the supply and logistic support which was being used against American ground forces. The overall success of this operation will be assessed on the basis of whether or not we are able to hasten the Vietnamization program and the withdrawals of American forces from Southeast Asia, and of what its effect is upon American casualties 2 and 3 months from today. Thus far these operations have exceeded our expectations concerning the tactical advantages stemming from the destruction of supplies, ammunition and facilities. TIMETABLE FOR OPERATION Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: The President has laid out this operation in an open and public fashion. He has set the deadlines, the timetables for the destruction of these facilities. Already we have withdrawn American forces from Cambodia. We have withdrawn several thousand this week and there will be further reductions of American forces in these sanctuary activities by the end of this week. The entire operation will be phased out during the month of June. The major portion of the American involvement will be completed by the 15th of June and all Americans will be withdrawn by the 30th of June. COMMENTS ON LIMITATION OF FUNDS FOR VIETNAM OPERATIONS The chairman has asked me to make some comments regarding an amendment which was attached to the Foreign Military Sales Act, H.R. 15628, which is entitled: "An Act to Amend the Foreign Military Sales Act," as reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, having served for nine terms in the House of Representatives, I realize the responsibilities that the legislative branch of this Government shares with the executive branch. I have always recognized the legislative branch as the coequal branch of the Government, and from time to time I have taken part in debates which had the effect of limiting Executive power through the use of legislative limitations. Recognizing the right of Congress to move in the area of limitations on appropriations, I would also like to caution the Members of Congress against some of the actions which can be taken in a very rapid fashion without a complete understanding of the ramifications of the operations which have been approved by the President of the United States and are now being carried on in Cambodian sanctuaries. As Secretary of Defense, I am interested in Cambodia and Laos from the standpoint of how those two countries and the activities within them affect Vietnam-affect the Vietnamization Program and the withdrawal of Americans from Southeast Asia. Since I have been Secretary of Defense, I have tried to change the debate in this country from one on "why Vietnam" to one on "why Vietnamization," why it was necessary for us to move in the direction of withdrawing Americans from Southeast Asia, and I think the public debate has moved in this direction. I recognize that individuals can disagree and that we can have a public debate about whether the timetable that has been approved by the President of the United States is the correct one. There are members of the military and others in this country who have expressed grave doubts about the speed of the withdrawals that have been announced by the President of the United States. There are others in America who have stated that the withdrawal timetable announced by the President of the United States is too slow. |