SHALL GOVERNMENT RELIEVE THE POOR? 341 CHAPTER XXV. POOR-LAWS. 1. In common with its other assumptions of sec ondary offices, the assumption by a government of the office of Reliever-general to the poor, is necessarily forbidden by the principle that a government cannot rightly do any thing more than protect. In demanding from a citizen contributions for the mitigation of distress-contributions not needed for the due administration of men's rights-the state is, as we have seen, reversing its function, and diminishing that liberty to exercise the faculties which it was instituted to maintain. Possibly, unmindful of the explanations already given, some will assert that by satisfying the wants of the pauper, a government is in reality extending his liberty to exercise his faculties, inasmuch as it is giving him something without which the exercise of them is impossible; and that hence, though it decreases the rate-payer's sphere of action, it compensates by increasing that of the rate-receiver. But this statement of the case implies a confounding of two widelydifferent things. To enforce the fundamental law-to take care that every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man-this is the special purpose for which the civil power exists. Now insuring to each the right to pursue within the specified limits the objects of his desires without let or hindrance, is quite a separate thing from insuring him satisfaction. Of two individuals, one may use his liberty of action successfully-may achieve the gratifications he seeks after, or accumulate what is equivalent to many of them-property; whilst the other, having like privileges, may fail to do so. But with these results the state has no concern. All that lies within its commission is to see that each man is allowed to use such powers and opportunities as he possesses; and if it takes from him who has prospered to give to him who has not, it violates its duty toward the one to do more than its duty toward the other. Or, repeating the idea elsewhere expressed (p. 306), it breaks down the vital law of society, that it may effect what social vitality does not call for. 2. The notion popularized by Cobbett, that every one has a right to a maintenance out of the soil, leaves those who adopt it in an awkward predicament. Do but ask them to specify, and they are set fast. Assent to their principle; tell them you will assume their title to be valid; and then, as a needful preliminary to the liquidation of their claim, ask for some precise definition of it—inquire "What is a maintenance?" They are dumb. "Is it," say you, "potatoes and salt, with rags and a mud cabin? or is it bread and bacon, in a two-roomed cottage? Will a joint on Sundays suffice? or does the demand include meat and malt liquor daily? Will tea, coffee, and tobacco be expected? and if so, how many ounces of each? Are bare walls and brick floors all that is needed? or must there be carpets and paper-hangings? Are shoes considered essential? or will the Scotch practice be approved? Shall the clothing be of fustian? if not, of what quality must the broadcloth be? In short, just point out where, between the two extremes of starvation and luxury, this something called a maintenance lies." Again they are dumb. You expostulate. You explain that nothing can be done until the question is satisfactorily answered. You show that the claim must be reduced to a detailed, intelligible shape before a step can be taken toward its settlement. "How else," you ask, "shall we know whether enough has been awarded, or whether too much?" Still THE CLAIM TO A MAINTENANCE. 343 they are dumb. And, indeed, there is no possible reply for them. Opinions they may offer in plenty; but not a precise, unanimous answer. One thinks that a bare subsistence is all that can fairly be demanded. Here is another who hints at something beyond mere necessaries. A third maintains that a few of the enjoyments of life should be provided for. And some of the more consistent, pushing the doctrine to its legitimate result, will rest satisfied with nothing short of community of property. Who now shall decide amongst these conflicting notions? Or, rather, how shall their propounders be brought to an agreement? Can any one of them prove that his definition is tenable and the others not? Yet he must do this if he would make out a case. Before he can prosecute his claim against society, in the high court of morality, he must "file his bill of particulars." If he accomplishes this he is entitled to a hearing. If not, he must evidently be non-suited. The right to labour-that French translation of our poor-law doctrine-may be similarly treated. A criticism. parallel to the foregoing would place its advocates in a parallel dilemma. But there is another way in which the fallacy of this theory, either in its English or its continental form, may be made manifest-a way that may here be fitly employed. And first let us make sure of the meaning wrapped up in this expression-right to labour. Evidently if we would avoid mistakes we must render it literally-right to the labour; for the thing demanded is not the liberty of la bouring this, no one disputes; but it is the opportunity of labouring the having remunerative employment provided, which is contended for. Now, without dwelling upon the fact that the word right as here used, bears a signification quite different from its legitimate one-that it does not here imply something inherent in man, but something depending upon external circumstances-not something possessed in virtue of his faculties, but something springing out of his relationship to others—not something true of him as a solitary individual, but something which can be true of him only as one of a community-not something antecedent to society, but something necessarily subsequent to it-not something expressive of a claim to do, but of a claim to be done unto-without dwelling upon this, let us take the expression as it stands, and see how it looks when reduced to its lowest terms. When the artisan asserts his right to have work provided for him, he presupposes the existence of some power on which devolves the duty of providing such work. What power is this? The government, he says. But the gov ernment is not an original power, it is a deputed one—is subject, therefore, to the instruction of its employer-must do that only which its employer directs-and can be held responsible for nothing save the performance of its employer's behests. Now who is its employer? Society. Strictly speaking, therefore, the assertion of our artisan is, that it is the duty of society to find work for him. But he is himself a member of society--is consequently a unit of that body who ought, as he says, to find work for every man— has hence a share in the duty of finding work for every man. Whilst, therefore, it is the duty of all other men to find work for him, it is his duty to help in finding work for all other men. And hence, if we indicate his fellows alphabetically, his theory is that A, B, C, D, and the rest of the nation, are bound to employ him; that he is bound, in company with B, C, D, and the rest, to employ A; that he is bound, in company with A, C, D, and the rest, to employ B; is bound, with A, B, D, and the rest, to employ C, with A, B, C, and the rest, to employ D; and so on with each individual of the half score or score millions, of whom the society may be composed! THE CLAIM TO EMPLOYMENT. 345 Thus do we see how readily imaginary rights are dis tinguishable from real ones. They need no disproof: they disprove themselves. The ordeal of a definition breaks the illusion at once. Bubble-like, they will bear a cursory glance; but disappear in the grasp of any one who tries to lay hold of them. Meanwhile we must not overlook the fact that, erroneous as are these poor-law and communist theories-these assertions of a man's right to a maintenance, and of his right to have work provided for him-they are, nevertheless, nearly related to a truth. They are unsuccessful efforts to express the fact, that whoso is born on this planet of ours thereby obtains some interest in it-may not be summarily dismissed again-may not have his existence ignored by those in possession. In other words, they are attempts to embody that thought which finds its legitimate utterance in the law-all men have equal rights to the use of the Earth (Chap. IX.). The prevalence of these crude ideas is natural enough. A vague perception that there is something wrong about the relationship in which the great mass of mankind stand to the soil and to life, was sure eventually to grow up. After getting from under the grosser injustice of slavery, men could not help beginning in course of time to feel what a monstrous thing it was that nine people out of ten should live in the world on sufferance, not having even standing room, save by allowance of those who claimed the Earth's surface (p. 131). Could it be right that all these human beings should not only be without claim to the necessaries of lifeshould not only be denied the use of those elements from which such necessaries are obtainable--but should further be unable to exchange their labour for such necessaries, except by leave of their more fortunate fellows? Could it be that the majority had thus no better title to exist ence than one based upon the good-will or convenience of |