the region mentioned in the bill, and they deny that the agreement is in any respect the illegal result of any unlawful confederation or conspiracy. The defendants allege that the proper object of the association is to establish reasonable rates, rules and regulations on all freight traffic, and the maintenance of such rates until changed in the manner provided by law; that the agreement was filed with the interstate commerce commission as required by section 6 of the act of February 4, 1887. They also allege that it was not the purpose of the association to prevent the members from reducing rates or changing the rules and regulations fixed by the association; that by the terms of the agreement each member may do so, the preliminary requirement being that the proposed change shall be voted upon at a meeting of the association, after which, if the proposal is not agreed to, the line making the proposal can make such reduced rate, notwithstanding the objection of the other lines; that the purpose of this provision was to afford opportunity for the consideration of the reasonableness of any proposed rate, rule or regulation by all lines interested, and an interchange of views on the effect of such reduction, and that reductions of rates have been made in numerous instances through said process by the association. They admit the agreement took effect April 1, 1889, and that it has remained in operation since, and that the rates, rules and regulations fixed and established from time to time under said agreement have been put into effect and maintained in conformity to law, and it is denied that by reason of the agreement or under duress of fines and penalties, or otherwise, the defendants have refused to establish and maintain just and reasonable rates, and it is alleged that the object of the association at all times has been and is to establish all rates, rules and regulations upon a just and reasonable basis, and to avoid unjust discrimination and undue preference. They deny that shippers or the public are in any way oppressed or injured by reason of the rates fixed by the association, but, on the contrary, they allege that the agreement and the association established under it have been beneficial to the patrons of the railway lines composing the association and the public at large. These, in substance, are the allegations in the various answers.

BILL OF COMPLAINT DISMISSED.

The cause came on for hearing on bill and answer before the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, First division. That court dismissed the bill without costs against the complainant. (53 Fed. Rep., 440) The government duly appealed from the judgment to the United States circuit court of appeals for the Eighth circuit, and that court, after argument, affirmed, in October, 1893, the judgment of the circuit court, without costs, Shiras, district judge, dissenting. (19 U. S. App., 36.) From that judgment the government has appealed to this court.

A motion is now made upon affidavits to dismiss the appeal. The affidavits show that on the 18th of November, 1892, a resolution was adopted by the TransMissouri Freight association, one of the defendants, providing that the organization should be discontinued from and after the 19th of November, 1892, and the secretary was instructed to wind up its affairs at as early a date as possible. It further appeared by the affidavits that the Trans-Missouri Freight association was actually dissolved and its existence ended on the above date-November 19, 1892-and that it has not since that date been revived, nor has it since that date had any activity of any kind, "and that it has not conducted or been engaged in any operations or business whatever, but that it has been dead and out of existence."

LESS THAN $1,000 INVOLVED.

It is also alleged as another ground for dismissing the appeal that the matter in controversy does not exceed $1,000, and that the case does not come under any other provision of the act of 1891, allowing an appeal from the circuit courts of appeals to this court. In opposition to the motion it appeared upon the part of the appellant that at the same meeting at which the resolution above referred to was adopted, the following resolution was also adopted: "Resolved, That a committee of seven be appointed by the chairman of this meeting to draw up a new agreement for the conduct of business now substantially covered by the Trans-Missouri agreement, and to make a report to all lines in the Trans-Missouri association at a meeting to be called in Chicago on December 6, 1892." A committee of seven was accordingly appointed, which adopted a rosolution calling a meeting for the 6th of December, 1892, of the lines formerly members of the Trans-Missouri association and representatives of other interested lines for the purpose of considering any changes in the tariffs and of business which was under the jurisdiction of that association and which might be submitted to the parties at that time, and to further consider the organization of one or more rate committees to govern the manner of making rates on such traffic until some permanent organization could be effected. In the early days of December, 1892, the meeting so called was held, and was participated in by most of the railroad companies which were parties to the Trans-Missouri agreement, and at that meeting an agreement was made upon the subject of rates of freight, and a West-Missouri freight rate committee was appointed, the duties of which committee were to establish and maintain reasonable rates in the territory described, and other lines not therein represented but interested in the freight traffic of such territory were to be invited to become members. A plan for the establishment of sub-rate committees for the purpose of agreeing upon rates was therein set forth and agreed to. The agreement was to become effective on the 1st of January, 1892, and to remain in force until the following April, during which time it was supposed that a new and permanent association to provide for an agreement relating to rates of freight might be founded. It does not appear whether such permanent association has been formed or that the temporary agreement has been actually terminated.

In answer to the motion to dismiss on the ground that the matter in controversy did not amount to over $1,000, the parties have stipulated as follows: "It is hereby stipulated for the purposes of this case and no other, and without waiving any right to question the legal effect of such fact, that the daily freight charges on interstate shipments collected by all the railway companies at points where they compete with each other were, at the time of the agreement mentioned in the pleadings herein, and have been since, more than $1,000."

Attorney-General Harmon for the United States. John F. Dillon, James C. Carter and E. J. Phelps for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM DELIVERS THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

Mr. Justice Peckham, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants object to the hearing of this appeal and ask that it be dismissed on the ground that the Trans-Missouri Freight association has been dissolved by a vote of its members since the judgment entered in this suit in the court below. A further ground urged for the dismissal of the appeal is that the requisite amount (over one thousand dollars) is not in controversy in the suit,

and that as an appeal would only lie to this court in this character of suit under the act of March 3, 1891, (chapter 517, supplement, R. S. 901,) where that amount is in controversy, the appeal should be dismissed.

As to the first ground, we think the fact of the dissolution of the association does not prevent this court from taking cognizance of the appeal and deciding the case upon its merits.

The prayer of the bill filed in this suit asks not only for the dissolution of the association, but, among other things, that defendants should be restrained from continuing in a like combination, and that they should be enjoined from further conspiring, agreeing, or combining and acting together to maintain rules and regulations and rates for carrying freight upon their several lines, etc. The mere dissolution of the association is not the most important object of this litigation. The judgment of the court is sought upon the question of the legality of the agreement itself for the carrying out of which the association was formed, and if such agreement be declared to be illegal, the court is asked not only to dissolve the association named in the bill, but that the defendants should be enjoined for the future.

PAINS TO SHOW DISSOLUTION.

The defendants, in bringing to the notice of the court the fact of the dissolution of the association, take pains to show that such dissolution had no connection or relation whatever with the pendency of this suit, and that the association was not terminated on that account. They do not admit the illegality of the agreement, nor do they allege their purpose not to enter into a similar one in the immediate future. On the contrary, by their answers the defendants claim that the agreement is a perfectly proper, legitimate and salutary one, and that it or one like it is necessary to the prosperity of the companies. If the injunction were limited to the prevention of any action by the defendants under the particular agreement set out, or if the judgment were to be limited to the dissolution of the association mentioned in the bill, the relief obtained would be totally inadequate to the necessities of the occasion, provided an agreement of that nature were determined to be illegal. The injunction should go further, and enjoin defendants from entering into or acting under any similar agreement in the future. In other words, the relief granted should be adequate to the occasion.

As an answer to the fact of the dissolution of the association, it is shown on the part of the government that these very defendants, or most of them, immediately entered into a substantially similar agreement, which was to remain in force for a certain time, and under which the companies acted, and in regard to which it does not appear that they are not still acting. If the mere dissolution of the association worked an abatement of the suit as to all the defendants, as is the claim made on their part, it is plain that they have thus discovered an effectual means to prevent the judgment of this court being given upon the question really involved in the case. The defendants having succeeded in the court below, it would only be necessary thereafter to dissolve their association and instantly form another of a similar kind, and the fact of the dissolution would prevent an appeal to this court or procure its dismissal if taken. This result does not and ought not to follow. Although the general rule is that equity does not interfere simply to restrain a possible future violation of law, yet where parties have entered into an illegal agreement and are acting under it, and there is no adequate remedy at law and the jurisdiction of the court has attached by