owing to the fact that the Peers of the realm meet in manly ways the rough duties of political struggles.

Political parties are, in public affairs, what John Doe and Richard Roe used to be in legal proceedings, fictitious names to conceal the real actors. We are too apt to satisfy our consciences and blind ourselves to our own neglect by railing at them. As parties embrace the whole population, why not say that the American people have been corrupted, or made extravagant, or indifferent to their obligations as citizens? This is what the future historian will say of this period. Shall we not also make him say that this sad condition was followed by a revival of national virtues, and that the beginning of the second century of our existence as a people was marked by a return of the integrity and patriotism which inspired our fathers one hundred years ago?

The social, political, and business evils which affect our country are not to be cured by political strategy nor by any tricks of statesmanship. No country can be legislated out of distress, crime, or poverty. No laws in civilized countries are potent for good which do not emanate from the sentiments, habits, and vir tues of the people. They demand personal, fireside, and local reforms. They cannot be made by others for us. They must be wrought out by each man in the use of his special intelligence and personal power, in office and out of it, in all forms of unselfish work for the general welfare, in convention, upon the platform, in the pulpit, and through the press. The immigrants of varied lineages and creeds who come to our shores excite fears in the minds of some. These spring from narrow prejudices. All phases of civilization give broader views about social, religious, and political questions. Men of loyal faith in our Government feel that this mingling of European races on this continent will give us higher civilization, greater power and prosperity, than have yet been seen in the history of the world. HORATIO SEYMOUR.

II.

SYSTEMS OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE IN
NAVAL WARFARE.

ANY one who undertakes to write under the above heading must invite the indulgence of his readers on a very large scale, so much mystery exists as to what really is the best system to follow in naval warfare, and as to what would be the result should two hostile fleets of equal power meet in fair fight. Since the war ending in the year 1815, it may be said that a mere minimum of experience has been arrived at; in the great American civil war, if we leave out the action of the torpedo, then quite in its infancy, the naval fighting was almost all on one side. During the war between Italy and Austria the Italian fleet, at the battle of Lissa, took so little part in the fighting, from some unaccountable reason, that the gallant Tegetoff had it all his own way. In the so-called Crimean War the Russian fleet remained in port, not daring to face the English and French squadrons; and, barring some futile attacks made by the combined fleets on the Russian forts, nothing was done by the naval forces. In fact, excepting for the sake of doing something, and perhaps losing two or three ships for the sake of the butcher's bill, no result could possibly be arrived at during a war where no enemy's ships put in an appearance, unless, indeed, by an overwhelming force of lightdraught gun, torpedo, and mortar boats, specially constructed for attacking the forts and strongholds of the enemy. It would be well to mention, by-the-by, that the English and French fleets did attack the forts at Sebastopol, a heavy attack at the same time being made by the joint armies, on which occasion the fleets lost many men with no result whatever. In the Franco-German War no naval engagement took place, the French fleet contenting itself by looking from afar at the German strongholds. We VOL. CXXVII.-NO. 265.

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now come to the late war between Turkey and Russia, and there again we did not arrive at any practical result, as, from motives I cannot understand, the Russian Baltic fleet never attempted to move out of its own waters, and the two or three much-talkedabout, strangely-shaped iron-clads, the pets of Admiral Popoff and Mr. Reed, thought it better never to show their noses at sea, though never more than three Turkish iron-clads could be spared from their arduous duties of protecting Sulina and Batoum, carrying troops, provisions, etc., to cruise on the Crimean coast. In this, however, I do not blame the commanders of the Russian iron-clads, as, in my humble opinion, these much-talked-of Popoffskas are utterly unfitted to face an enemy at sea. Seeing, therefore, how little experience has been hitherto acquired on which to base an argument respecting the class of vessel best adapted for naval warfare, I can only offer on this subject my own opinions and observations. England, for example, doubtless requires large cruisers, vessels wherewith to defend her colonies. Should they be iron-clads, heavily plated, or fast wooden vessels, heavily armed, with compartments so well fitted that, if one or two should fill with water through being pierced by a shot, the vessel would not sink?

Admiral Farragut, who was one of the most intelligent naval officers of my acquaintance, with whom I had many conversations on this question, was of opinion that the latter class of vessel is the best. Still I can but think that when one nation has a fleet of iron-clad vessels, other nations could not meet her ships on equal grounds if they had only wooden vessels. Admitting, then, for the sake of argument, that iron-clad vessels are an absolute necessity, we come to the question, "What kind of iron-clad is best adapted for modern warfare?" In such a case I think the first point to be arrived at is speed; the second, handiness in manoeuvring; the third, sea-going qualities; and the fourth that the vessel should show as small a mark as possible to the enemy's heavy guns, to his torpedoes, and to his rams. In attacking forts (a thing I think out of date, unless by way of making a diversion in conjunction with land-forces), all these points, excepting perhaps the third, are very important. Now, as regards the first necessary qualification, many competent men say that you cannot get speed with small, short ships. In this, with the greatest

respect, I must venture to differ. I think it is only a question of horse-power and the shape of the vessel under water. Some of the small Turkish monitors, I found, kept speed better than the large frigates. Secondly, as to handiness in manœuvring, every sailor knows how much easier a short vessel manœuvres than a long one, and, in these days when ships carry enormous armaments, and guns of the heaviest calibre, a small vessel would, to use a somewhat vulgar expression, hop round the long craft like a 66 cooper round a cask," firing on her ponderous adversary from positions where her (the larger vessel's) guns would not bear, poking her with her rams, and in fact worrying her life out. For example, suppose that two or three small monitors attack a frigate four times their own size, they would, if not capture her, give her what is called in America "a bad time of it." Thirdly, sea-going qualities. I have had some experience in monitors, such as were supplied to the Turkish Navy by English builders, vessels with high free-boards, carrying four 18-ton guns in fixed batteries, which guns could fire in a line with the keel. Several such vessels I had with me in very heavy weather in the Black Sea for fourteen months, and I found that they made as good weather as, if not better than, the heavier frigates, and that in point of speed they were even superior to them. In regard to the fourth qualification, namely, that vessels should show as small a mark as possible to the enemy. There can be no question as to the smaller vessels having this advantage, not only as regards gunnery, but in relation to torpedo-attacks, with which newly-invented war-weapons it would be much easier to strike a large object than a small one. Of course, in making these remarks it is difficult to employ, in relation to England, with her huge fleets, an argument that will apply to states with smaller navies. To the former, ships of all classes are necessary for the protection of her trade and flag over the boundless seas where it flies, but I will take as an example America, and ask what sort of a navy she requires to protect her honor and fame as a naval power. In the event of war America's first thought would naturally be the safety of her magnificent ports, and if adventurous privateers are (as they certainly would be) fitted out for the destruction of her enemy's commerce, they would not be in the category of men-of

war.

What seems to be the requirement of America is small,

swift, heavily-armed iron-clads, to dart out at all hours and seasons and harass an enemy's blockading squadron. To these should be added the new, fearful, and demoralizing weapon, the torpedo, of which more anon, and I can but think that no blockading force could ever hold its own off an American port which contained a small, efficient squadron, consisting of such vessels as I refer to, in its waters. It must be borne in mind that the blockading squadron must be always on the qui vive, while those inside could choose their own time and opportunity in making their attacks. There must be many persons who will remember how, when torpedoes were quite in their infancy, and when no ships of any sort existed in Charleston on the Confederate side, the frequent night attacks of the enemy harassed the American blockading fleets cruising off that port, and how much damage was done by the yet undeveloped torpedo.

As regards America, if I might venture to give an opinion, I would say that, if, in each of her fortified seaports, such as New York or Boston, three or four small monitors, and a dozen or two of torpedo-boats, were stationed, the inhabitants might sleep quietly in their beds, more so, indeed, than the crews of the enemy's ships outside the port. When I say monitors I refer to vessels with high free-boards, mounting four guns in fixed batteries (tonnage about 1,200 tons). The reason I say high freeboards is, that such vessels might be able to go to sea at any moment, regardless of the weather, thus depriving the enemy of that repose which bad weather so often brings in naval operations. The vessels I suggest should be similar to those built for the Turkish Government by the Thames Iron-Works and Messrs. Samuda on the Thames, at the cost of about £125,000, including guns; thus five of them could be obtained for the price of one such huge sea-monster as the Inflexible.

I would now, for a moment, refer to Admiral Farragut's opinion as to fast, heavily-armed wooden vessels ultimately replacing iron-clads. The gallant admiral, whose loss as a sailor the whole world must deplore, gave his opinion on this point some years ago. Since that time iron-clad frigates, such as he condemned, have been superseded by such gigantic ships as those of the Inflexible class, whose speed is as great as has yet been arrived at by anything afloat, be it wooden or be it iron. Now,