"applied to turnpike roads, ferries, bridges, and "various other local objects, and thus, in the "vortex of this construction, almost all subjects "of legislation would be swallowed up, and it "might, eventually, lead to the total prostration of "internal improvements.

"To all municipal regulations, therefore, in "relation to the navigable waters of the state, ac"cording to the true construction of the constitution, to which the citizens of this state are sub

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ject, the citizens of other states, when within "the state territory, are equally subjected; and "until a discrimination is made, no constitutional "barrier does exist. The constitution of the Uni"ted States intends that the same immunities and

privileges shall be extended to all the citizens "equally, for the wise purpose of preventing lo"cal jealousies, which discriminations (always "deemed odious) might otherwise produce. As "this constitution, then, according to my view, "does not prevent the operation of those laws

granting this exclusive privilege to the appel"lants, they are entitled to the full benefit of "them."

The present Chief Justice Thompson, in giving his opinion, expresses himself on this part of the case, as follows:

"The objection to the laws under considera"tion, on the ground that they interfere with the power given to congress, "to regulate com

"merce with foreign nations, and among the sev"eral states, and with the Indian tribes," is less "colourable than the former; for admitting the

power here granted to belong exclusively to the "general government, it does not, in any manner "whatever, interfere with these laws, or extend "to the rights and privileges which they are in"tended to secure. They neither concern foreign 66 commerce, nor commerce among the several "states, nor with the Indian tribes, but only give "to the appellants the exclusive privilege of nav

igating all waters, within the jurisdiction of this

state, by every species of boat or water-craft, "which might be impelled by force of fire or "steam. If this can, in any sense, be considered a regulation of commerce, it is the internal "commerce of the state, over which congress has no power; and if the right to regulate internal "commerce, or the intercourse between different parts of the state, ever belonged to the state "" government, it is still retained; for it never has "been, either expressly or impliedly, yielded to "the general government. To deny to the legis"lature this right, would be at once striking from

our statute book grants, almost innumerable, of " a similar nature; all our turnpike roads, toll. bridges, canals, ferries, and the like, more or "less concern commerce, or the intercourse be"tween different parts of the state, and must depend on the same principles with the privileges

*

granted to the appellants. The truth, however, "is, that none of them relate to commerce within "the sense and meaning of the term as used in "the constitution; they are mere municipal reg"ulations, with which congress have no concern. "It can answer no valuable end, to enter into any "speculative inquiry as to what would be the ef"fect upon the a pellants' rights under these laws "should congress, in regulating commerce, in"terfere with them. No such interference has as

yet arisen, and it will be time enough to con"sider that question when it does arise. The "general and conclusive answer, however, to all "such supposed collisions of powers, is what has "already been mentioned, that the laws of congress are paramount, and must prevail.

The present Chancellor Kent, then Chief Justice, gives his opinion on the point under consideration, in the following words:

"1. As to the power to regulate commerce.

"This power is not, in express terms, exclusive, "and the only prohibition upon the states is, that "they shall not enter into any treaty or compact “with each other, or with a foreign power, nor lay

any duty on tonnage, or on imports or exports, except what may be necessary for executing their inspection laws. Upon the principles above laid "down, the states are under no other constitutional "restriction, and are, consequently, left in posses"sion of a vast field of commercial regulation; all

"the internal commerce of the state by land and water remains entirely, and I may say exclusive

ly, within the scope of its original sovereignty. "The congressional power relates to external "not to internal commerce, and it is confined to "the regulation of that commerce. To what ex"tent these regulations may be carried, it is not our present duty to enquire. The limits of this

power seem not to be susceptible of precise defi"nition. It may be difficult to draw an exact line "between those regulations which relate to exter"nal and those which relate to internal commerce, "for every regulation of the one will, directly or "indirectly, affect the other. To avoid doubts, "embarrassment and contention on this compli"cated question, the general rule of interpretation "which has been mentioned, is extremely saluta"ry. It removes all difficulty, by its simplicity "and certainty. The states are under no other "restriction than those expressly specified in the "constitution, and such regulations as the nation"al government may, by treaty, and by laws, "from time to time, prescribe. Subject to these "restrictions, I contend, that the states are at li

berty to make their own commercial regulations. "There can be no other safe or practical rule of "conduct, and this, as I have already shown, is "the true constitutional rule arising from the na"ture of our federal system. This does away all

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colour for the suggestion that the steam boat

"grant is illegal and void under this clause in the "constitution. It comes not within any prohibi"tion upon the states, and it interferes with no "existing regulation. Whenever the case shall "arise of an exercise of power by congress which "shall be directly repugnant and destructive to "the use and enjoyment of the appellants' grant, "it would fall under the cognizance of the feder "al courts, and they would, of course, take care "that the laws of the union are duly supported, "I must confess, however, that I can hardly con

ceive of such a case, because I do not, at

present, perceive any power which congress "can lawfully carry to that extent. But when "there is no existing regulation which interferes "with the grant, nor any pretence of a constitu❝tional interdict, it would be most extraordinary "for us to adjudge it void, on the mere contingency of a collision with some future exercise of "congressional power. Such a doctrine is a mon"strous heresy. It would go, in a great degree, "to annihilate the legislative power of the states. "May not the legislature declare that no bank paper shall circulate, or be given or received in payment, but what originates from some incorporated bank of our own, or that none shall cir"culate under the nominal value of one dollar? "But suppose congress should institute a national "bank, with authority to issue and circulate "throughout the union, bank notes, as well below

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