corps, and to report himself at Baltimore. On the next day, Gen. Hooker issued the following order:

FREDERICK, MD., June 28th, 1863.

In conformity with the orders of the War Depart ment, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Maj.Gen. George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of its arms may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell.

JOSEPH HOOKER, Maj.-Gen. This order was followed by the subjoined address from Gen. Meade:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
June 28th, 1863.

By direction of the President of the United States I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order, an order totally unexpected and unsolicited, I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve, in the command of this army, an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements; but I rely upon the hearty support of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has

been confided to me.

GEORGE G. MEADE, Maj.-Gen. Commanding. This change was so entirely unexpected, both by the public generally and the army, that nothing could exceed the surprise which it occasioned. The reasons for the change have not yet been made known, except that Gen. Hooker was relieved at his own request. The impression upon the army was thus described:

The report of the change soon extended to the sev eral corps, and their commanders hastened to bid farewell to the General. By three o'clock a large number of officers had assembled, and soon after Gen. Hooker appeared in the avenue before his tent. Some time was spent in social intercourse, and to the last all formalities were dispensed with. The parting was painful to every one, particularly to those who had become endeared to the General by old associations. Gen. Hooker was deeply grieved. He had been identified with the Army of the Potomac, he said, since its organization, and had hoped to continue with it to the end. It was the best army of the country, worthy of the confidence of the nation, and could not fail of success in the approaching struggle. He spoke of his successor as a glorious soldier, and urged all to give him their earnest support.

issued on the same day by Gen. Meade. The sixth and eleventh corps, which were at Middletown, in the valley between the Catoctin and the Blue Ridge, were moved east to Frederick, and then directly up the Monocacy valley, on the west side of the stream, through Mechanicsburg and Emmitsburg, toward Gettysburg. The second and fifth corps crossed the Monocacy to the east, three miles above Frederick, and moved northeast through Union to Frizelburg, which is near the State line. The third and twelfth corps took the Middleburg road. The sixth corps crossed the Monocacy, east of Frederick, and moved to Westminster. These routes took the army into such a position that it could cover Baltimore, or cross the Susquehanna below Harrisburg, or prevent any movement of the Confederates toward Washington. On Tuesday forenoon, the first and eleventh corps were at Emmits burg; the second and fifth at Frizelburg; the third and twelfth at Taneytown, and the sixth at Westminster. The Federal force at Harper's Ferry at this time was supposed to be about eleven thousand. It was incorrectly represented to Gen. Meade to be destitute of provisions, and that he must immediately supply it, or order the abandonment of the place. Accordingly, a few hours after he assumed the command, he as sented to an order drawn up by an officer of Gen. Hooker's staff, directing Gen. French to send seven thousand men of the garrison to Frederick, and with the remainder, estimated at four thousand, to remove and escort the public property to Washington. This order was unknown in Washington till too late to be countermanded. It was not entirely executed when Gen. Meade ordered the reoccupation of that point.

At this time, Gen. Lee's forces had withdrawn from York and Carlisle, and from Chambersburg, and were concentrating on Gettysburg. The corps of Gens. Longstreet and Hill, forming the main army, were moving eastward, while Gen. Meade was moving northward. This movement would bring Gen. Lee on the flank of Gen. Meade's army. On Tuesday morn ing, Gen. Meade changed the line of march of all his corps, except the first and eleventh, toward Gettysburg. The first and eleventh were then moving in that direction. At the same time, Gen. Meade issued the following address to his army:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

June 80th, 1868.

It being reported that the enemy were now massing a force north of the town to attack the rear of the first corps, the first and third divisions of the eleventh corps were ordered across the rear of the first corps to take up a position on the right, and Gen. Steinwehr was stationed as a reserve on Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town. This force of the enemy was the advance of Gens. Rhodes and Early's divisions falling back from the Susquehanna. At this time, about half past two P. M., the enemy advanced in force against the first corps, which slowly fell back to its original position, northwest of the town. Here it was somewhat reënforced and prepared to make a stand. The force of the enemy advanced across the open space in line of battle, while their batteries shelled the position of the first corps to cover the advance. At short range it met a fire so sharp and well served as to cause it to reel and fall back. The line was again formed and reënforced, and once more advanced, but with no better success. By this time the divisions of Rhodes and Early had come up from the east, and Pender's division of Gen. Hill's moved up on the right to the support of Gen. Heth. Another charge was now made by the whole force of the enemy. Their superior numbers enabled them to threaten both flanks of the Union force. The main effort was directed against the left, and, notwithstanding a brave resistance, such advantages were gained that the first corps was ordered back to the town. By this movement the left of the eleventh was uncovered, and a heavy advance completely on its right flank compelled it to retire. The enemy advanced and took possession of the town, while the two corps fell back and occupied the western slope of the hill south of the town, held by Gen. Steinwehr.

Gen. Lee says: "The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of Gen. Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack."

At dusk the third and twelfth corps arrived and took positions, the former on the ridge extending south and to the left of Cemetery Hill, and the latter on the same ridge as it curved to the right of the hill. At 11 P. M., Gen. Meade

arrived and examined the position. He then posted the several corps in the following order: the twelfth, under Gen. Slocum, on the right; the eleventh, Gen. Howard, next; the first, Gen. Doubleday, the second, Gen. Hancock, the third, Gen. Sickles, in the centre; the fifth, Gen. Sykes, arrived the next morning, and was placed on the extreme left. The line stretched in a semicircle, having its convex centre toward Gettysburg, with the extreme toward the southwest and south. The heights on which the troops were posted sloped gently down from their front.

On the part of the enemy, Gen. Anderson's division of Gen. Hill's corps, and Gen. McLaws's division of Gen. Longstreet's corps arrived late in the evening within a mile or two of the town, and bivouacked for the night. Early on the next morning, Gen. Hood's division of Longstreet's corps arrived, and their line of battle was soon after formed.

The key of Gen. Meade's position was Cemetery Hill, a little distance south of the town, and on the northern slope of which the town itself is situated. It was so called because the burial place of the town was there. Its summit was east of the road which runs south to Taneytown. The ridge passed to the west of this road and ran south along its west side, and was occupied by the second, third, fifth, and sixth corps respectively, in line of battle. On the continuation of the ridge to the east and southeast was a part of the eleventh and the twelfth corps. On this part of the line the ridge was rocky and thickly wooded, and some defences were thrown up on Thursday morning by Gens. Geary and Williams. The ridge from Cemetery Hill directly south was open and clear, and the troops there faced to the west. The left flank of Gen. Meade rested upon a sharp, rugged, and almost perpendicular peak, covered with original forest growth. At the foot of the ridge on the west was a narrow valley between one and two miles in width, on the western side of which is another ridge, somewhat lower and running nearly parallel, and mostly covered with heavy timber. The line of battle of the enemy was formed on the slope of this ridge, with Gen. Ewell's corps on the left. Beginning at the town, Gen. Early's division was at the extreme right, then Gen. Rhodes's; on the right of his division was the left of Gen. Hill's corps, commencing with Gen. Heth's division, then Gens. Pender and Anderson's divisions. On the right of Gen. Anderson's division was the left of Gen. Longstreet's corps, Gen. McLaws's division being next to Gen. Anderson's, and Gen. Hood's on the extreme right of their line and opposite the extreme left of Gen. Meade. Neither the division of Gen. Ewell's corps nor that of Gen. Pickett of Longstreet's corps at this time arrived. Gen. Pickett had been left at Chambersburg to protect the Confederate rear and escort their reserve train. Gen. Johnson had been operating near Harrisburg.

had

Emmitsburg road with the road to Taneytown. The rest of the line extended in a southerly direction, with the left resting on the Round Top Hill. He had hardly got into position when the enemy made their anticipated attack. After resisting it about two hours, and the fifth corps failing to come to his support as promptly as was expected, he fell back to his original position upon the crest of the hill, where a most desperate assault was made by the troops of Gen. Longstreet. The line was strengthened by Gen. Meade, by ordering up the fifth corps to the position it afterward occupied on the left of the third. Two divisions were also sent from the twelfth corps, as no attack was threatened on the right. This formidable opposition and the precipitate and rugged character of the slope effectually repulsed all the efforts of Gen. Longstreet, with great loss, however, on both sides. According to the order of Gen. Lee, the advance was to commence from the right and be taken up along the whole line. With the advance of Gen. Longstreet a part of the divis ion of Gen. Anderson moved upon the centre of Gen. Meade. As Gen. Sickles fell back, the second corps, under Gen. Hancock, came to his aid on his right, assisted by a portion of the first corps. These troops encountered a part of McLaws's and Anderson's divisions. The battle grew fearful. The enemy pressed forward unrestrained. Gen. Sickles was wounded in the

On the ridge occupied by Gen. Meade, a hundred guns were in position facing the enemy. The reserve artillery was in the rear, about equidistant from the extreme points of the line. The Union cavalry was east of the creek on the road to Baltimore. The artillery of the enemy in position was nearly one hundred and fifty guns. During Thursday forenoon some skirmishing took place, but no movement of importance was made. On the Confederate side, about the middle of the afternoon, Gen. Lee issued orders for the commanders to prepare for a general attack upon the Federal centre and left. The movement was to be commenced by Gen. Longstreet and followed up on his left in quick succession by the respective divisions of Gen. Hill's corps. The movements in consequence of these orders were in progress when sharpshooters were sent out by Gen. Sickles, being one regiment, under command of Col. Berdan. They advanced in the woods about a mile beyond the Emmitsburg turnpike, reconnoitering, and reported that the enemy were moving large masses to turn the Union left. On this report Gen. Sickles moved up to a ridge in front, which he deemed a more commanding position to repel the attack. On this.ridge, which he considered as commanding to a great extent the position he previously occupied, he formed his line. His right rested in the peach orchard, which is in the angle formed by the Emmitsburg road and a cross road running about southeast and connecting the

leg, and the command of his corps devolved on Maj.-Gen. Birney. Gen. Hancock was wounded in the thigh, and Gen. Gibbons in the shoulder. The first and second wavered. The enemy pressed up to the very guns of the batteries, which were exposed to capture. The sixth corps, under Gen. Sedgwick, although weary with a march that day, hurried with shouts to the support, and the enemy staggered and drifted slowly back. A strong force was now pushed on their left flank, which pressed well to their rear along the Emmitsburg road, and the Confederates retired. At this time Gen. Ewell got his forces forward and made a desperate dash on the twelfth corps, under Gen. Slocum, on the extreme right, which had been weakened to support the centre and left. For fifteen minutes the attack was furious, but the sixth corps came to its support followed by the first corps, and the struggle continued with some advantages to the enemy until 9 o'clock, when he retired, having lost the day in every quarter. It was stated that the divisions of Gens. Pender and Heth, of Gen. Hill's corps,

remained inactive.

Gen. Lee thus reports the operations of the day:

In front of Gen. Longstreet, the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position, while Gen. Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. Gen. eral line, in order to prevent reenforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack.

Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Fed

After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in get ting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.

During the night, Gen. Meade sent the following despatch to Washington:

The enemy attacked me about four P. M. this day, and, after one of the severest contests of the war, he was repulsed at all points. We have suffered considerably in killed and wounded. Among the former are Brig.-Gens. Paul and Zook, and among the wounded, Gens. Sickles, Barlow, Graham, and Warren slightly.

We have taken a large number of prisoners.

On the next morning, the following further despatch was sent:

The action commenced again at early daylight upon various parts of the line. The enemy thus far have made no impression upon my position. All accounts agree in placing the whole (rebel) army here. Prisoners report Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's forces much injured yesterday, and many general officers killed. Gen. Barksdale's (of Mississippi) dead body is within our lines. We have thus far about sixteen hundred prisoners.

The action thus commenced was chiefly an artillery fire directed upon the line of Gen. Meade, which slackened after a few hours. On the right of Gen. Meade, the contest was close and more severe. It commenced at daylight, by an attempt on the part of the twelfth corps,

under Gen. Slocum, to drive Gen. Ewell farther back. This attack met with a prompt response from Gen. Ewell. The fiercest assaults were made upon the positions of Gens. Geary and Berry, which fell back a short distance until supported by Gen. Sykes's division of the fifth corps and Gen. Humphrey's of the third. The struggle was now evenly contested for some time, when a further reënforcement arrived and took such a position as to enfilade the enemy, causing his force to retire, and at 11 o'clock A. M. a general quiet prevailed.

The movements of the enemy thus far had been made rather to cover up his designs than as serious efforts against Gen. Meade. The battle of the previous day had demonstrated that the issue of the struggle turned on the occupation of Cemetery Hill. To get possession of this spot was therefore the object of the enemy. Early in the morning, preparations had been made by Gen. Lee for a general attack upon Gen. Meade's whole line, while a large force was concentrated against his centre for the purpose of taking the ground it occupied. Gen. Longstreet massed fifty-five guns of long range upon the crest of a slight eminence, just in front of the extreme right of Gen. Hill's corps, and a little to the left of the heights upon which they were to open fire. At the same time, Gen. Hill massed some sixty guns along the hill, still farther to his left and in front of the same heights. The position of these guns was near the Bonaughton road, near the York road, near the Harrisburg road, and along the Seminary ridge to a point beyond Round Top. The artillery on Cemetery Hill was thus subject to more than a half circle of cross fires. At 1 o'clock the signal gun was fired, and the cannonading commenced. The fire of the enemy was thus concentrated on the position held by the eleventh and second corps. It drew a most terrific response from the Federal batteries. It is thus described by a spectator in the Union army:

"The storm broke upon us so suddenly that soldiers and officers-who leaped, as it began, from their tents, or from lazy siestas on the grass-were stricken in their rising with mortal wounds, and died, some with cigars between their teeth, some with pieces of food in their fingers, and one at least-a pale young Ger man, from Pennsylvania-with a miniature of his sister in his hands. Horses fell, shrieking such awful cries as Cooper told of, and writhing themselves about in hopeless agony. The boards of fences, scattered by explosion, flew in splinters through the air. The earth, torn up in clouds, blinded the eyes of hurrying men; and through the branches of the trees and among the gravestones of the cemetery a shower of destruction crashed ceaselessly, As, with hundreds of others, I groped through this tempest of death for the shelter of the bluff, an old man, a private in a company belonging to the 24th Michigan, was struck, scarcely ten feet away, by a cannon ball, which tore through