any court, department or commission authorized to hear and determine
the same." United States v. Harmon, 268.

2. Items for marshal's fees for distributing venires; and for amounts paid
for blanks for United States attorney; and for amounts charged for
marshal's travel to attend court on days when the courts were held by
adjournment over an intervening day, and were not held on consecu-
tive days, and to attend special courts or special terms of court; and
for expenses in endeavoring to make an arrest; and for travel to
serve precepts, where he had in his hands for service, several precepts
against different persons for different causes, and made service of two
or more of such precepts in the course of one trip, making one travel
to the most remote point of service, but charging full travel on each
precept; and for amounts paid for hack hire in transporting prisoners
to and from court; allowed. Ib.

3. Whether the payment of the amount of the judgment in favor of the
marshal will exceed the maximum compensation of the plaintiff as
marshal, and the proper expenses of his office, is a matter still open
for adjustment at the Treasury Department. Ib.

4. A marshal is not entitled to charge "travel in going to serve" process
when taking a prisoner, under sentence, to the place of commitment.
United States v. Tanner, 661.

5. When, for convenience in making up accounts, an outgoing marshal
relinquishes to his successor his right to expenses incurred in endeav-
oring to arrest persons for offences against the United States, the
incoming marshal may charge these fees in his accounts, and they
should be allowed. United States v. Fletcher, 664.

6. A marshal of a district into which an offender, who has committed a
crime in another district, comes, may deputize the marshal of the
district in which the offence was committed, or his deputy, to execute
the warrant of removal, and relinquish to him the fees therefor. Ib.
7. A marshal may charge mileage upon as many writs as he may have in
his hands, where the writs are against different persons. Ib.

8. Marshals are entitled to per diem fees for attendance when attending
under §§ 583, 584, 671, 672 and 2013 Rev. Stat., the same as if the
judge were present and business were transacted. United States v.
Pitman, 669.

9. A clerk of a District Court is entitled to charge for entering orders
approving marshal's accounts. United States v. Van Duzee, 140 U. S.
169, approved. United States v. Jones, 672.

10. He is also entitled to charge for certifying copies of such orders to be
forwarded to the department with the accounts, but not for the seals
affixed to such copies unless such authentication is required by the
Treasury Department. Ib.

11. He is also entitled to charge for copies of orders for marshals to pay
supervisors of elections, without regard to the necessity for such
orders, or the power of the court to make them. Ib.

12. He is also entitled to a fee for filing a marshal's accounts with vouchers
attached, but not to a separate fee for filing each voucher. Ib.

13. He is also entitled to fees for recording, after the determination of a
prosecution, all the proceedings relating to it, including the order of
commitment. lb.

14. United States y. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, affirmed to the point of the
power of the Treasury to determine whether the several allowances
increase his salary beyond the maximum compensation. Ib.

15. A clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to a per diem pay for services
in selecting juries in connection with the jury commissioner. United
States v. King, 676.

16. When a statute increases the duties of an officer by the addition of
other duties germane to the office, he must perform them without
extra compensation; but if he is employed to render services in an
independent employment, not incidental to his official duties, he may
recover for such services.

Ib.

17. When a clerk of a Circuit Court attends the court personally at one
place within the district, and appoints a deputy to attend to it at
another place or in a different division of the same judicial district,
he is entitled, under Rev. Stat. § 831, to make a per diem charge for
attendance at each. 1b.

18. A clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to charge for docketing and
endorsing an order for the removal of a prisoner for trial in another
district. Ib.

19. Charges by a clerk for making separate reports of the amount of fees
due each juror and witness and filing separate orders for their pay-
ment are disallowed: also charges for making separate recognizances
for witnesses in a criminal case, it not appearing that the witnesses
could not have conveniently recognized together. Ib.

20. The clerk of a Circuit Court is not entitled to a fee for entering upon

the final record the proceedings before a committing magistrate, as,
although they may be properly filed, and a fee charged for the filing,
they form no part of the record. Ib.

21. A District Attorney is entitled to charge a per diem for services
before a United States commissioner upon the same day that he is
allowed a per diem for attendance upon the court. United States v.
Erwin, 685.

22. A clerk of a Circuit or District Court is entitled to fees for making
dockets and indexes, taxing costs, etc., in suits upon manufacturers'
bonds under the internal revenue law where issue was joined and tes-
timony given: also for entering orders of court for alias fi. fa. and for
venditioni exponas, one folio each: also for making record entries of
recognizances of defendants, or of entering and filing such recogni-
zances, but not for both: also for making docket entries and indexes
in cases of sci. fa. and other proceedings where issue was joined: also
for entering orders approving the accounts of officers of the court, and

filing duplicate accounts: also for entering separate orders of court
excusing jurors, entering orders of court to issue subpoenas, and enter-
ing an order for alias capias when such orders are made by the court
and the fees allowed; and also for drawing recognizances of defend-
ants. He is not entitled to fees for filing vouchers: nor for making
dockets and indexing where no indictment is found: nor for attend-
ance upon
the District Court as a jury commissioner in drawing
jurors. United States v. Payne, 687.

23. On the authority of United States v. Ewing, 140 US. 142, the charges
of a commissioner of a Circuit Court for docket fees are disallowed,
and the charges for acknowledgments of sureties on recognizances of
defendants in prosecutions brought by the United States reduced to a
fee for a single acknowledgment. United States v. Hall, 691.
24. There is no legal objection to the same person holding the offices of
clerk and of commissioner of a Circuit Court, and the person so hold-
ing them is entitled to the fees and emoluments of both. United States
v. McCandless, 692.

25. The court disallows the following charges by a clerk of a District
Court: (1) Docket fees where the grand jury returned "not true
bill;" (2) Docket fees where the case is not finally disposed of;
(3) A charge for miscellaneous fees, entering orders of court, making
copies, certificates, and seals, as being too general; (4) A charge for
issuing commitments to jail in addition to copy of order of removal,
as being too indefinite; (5) An item for entering orders of court,
approving accounts of officers, and copies of certificates and seals. Ib.
26. Only one fee is allowed for taking the acknowledgment of a defend-
ant and his sureties unless it be made to appear that it was necessary
to take them separately. United States v. Taylor, 695.

27. A clerk may charge for copies of orders of court directing the marshal
to pay witnesses and jurors, but not for affixing seals thereto. Ib.
28. No charge can be made for filing orders from the District Attorney
discharging witnesses from attendance. Ib.

29. A fee may be charged for an affidavit of a witness as to his mileage
and attendance; but this affidavit need not be filed. lb.

30. The rule in United States v. King, ante, 676, that proceedings before
a commissioner form no part of the record, applies to affidavits. Ib.
31. The comptroller cannot prescribe the length of capiases or bonds, or
limit a clerk to a certain number of folios. Ib.

See COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

COSTS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

The Circuit Court had a right, under § 15 of the act of March 3, 1887,
c. 359, 24 Stat. 505, 508, c. 359, to award certain costs to the plaintiff,
considering the frivolous and vexatious nature of the objections taken
to the greater part of this claim. United States v. Harmon, 268.

COURT AND JURY.

It is not reversible error in a judge of a Federal Court to express his own opinion of the facts, if the rules of law are correctly laid down, and if the jurors are given to understand that they are not bound by such expressions of opinion. Doyle v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 413.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

Knit woollen undershirts, drawers and hosiery are subject to duty as "wool-wearing apparel," under paragraph 396 of section 1 of the act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 567, 597, c. 1244, and not as "knit fabrics made on frames," under paragraph 392 of the same act. Arnold v. United States, 494.

DAMAGES.

A railroad corporation is not liable to exemplary or punitive damages for an illegal, wanton and oppressive arrest of a passenger by the conductor of one of its trains, which it has in no way authorized or ratified. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice, 101.

See COMMON CARRIER, 3, 4, (4) (6).

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

1. The proviso in the Maryland act of cession of the District of Columbia, that nothing therein contained should be "so construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, as to affect the right of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States," has no reference to the power of eminent domain which belongs to the United States as the grantee in the act of cession. Shoemaker v. United States, 282. 2. The United States possess full and unlimited jurisdiction, both of a political and municipal nature, over the District of Columbia. Ib. 3. In the District of Columbia a judgment in an action of tort does not bear interest. Washington & Georgetown Railroad Co. v. Harmon, 571.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. Land taken in a city for public parks and squares by authority of law, is taken for a public use. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.

2. The extent to which such property shall be taken for such use rests wholly in legislative discretion, subject only to the restraint that just compensation must be made. Ib.

3. The approval by the President of the price to be paid by the United States for private land, condemned for public use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, is not a judicial act. Ib.

4. An intention expressed by Congress not to go beyond a sum named as the aggregate, in condemning land for a park in Washington, is not a direction to appraisers to keep within any given limit in valuing any particular piece of property. Ib.

5. It is competent for the legislature, in providing for the cost of a public park, to assess a proportionate part of it upon property specially benefited. Ib.

6. In condemning lands for a public park, it is competent for the court, in the absence of a legislative direction prescribing the form of the oath to be administered to appraisers, to direct them to take an oath to "faithfully, justly and impartially appraise the value or values of said parcels of land, and of the respective interests therein, to the best of their skill and judgment." Ib.

7. In determining the values of lands so taken appraisers should exercise their own judgment, derived from personal knowledge and inspection of the lands, as well as their knowledge derived from the evidence adduced by the parties. Ib..

8. An appellate court will not interfere with the report of commissioners, (or appraisers,) in such case, to correct the amounts reported, except in case of gross error showing prejudice, corruption or plain mistake. Ib.

See ROCK CREEK PARK.

EQUITY.

1. The verdict of a jury upon an issue submitted to it by order of a Court of Chancery is advisory only, and is binding upon the court only so far as it chooses to adopt it. Kohn v. McNulta, 238.

See FRAUD;

RAILROAD, 2;

TAX AND TAXATION, 2.

ESTOPPEL.

See MUNICIPAL BOND, 10.

EVIDENCE.

1. When the genuineness of a paper sued on is put in issue, papers not otherwise competent may be introduced in Oregon for the purpose of enabling the jury to make a comparison of handwritings. Holmes v. Goldsmith, 150.

2. A witness who has sworn to the genuineness of a disputed signature to a note, may be further asked if he would act upon it if it came to him in an ordinary business transaction. Ib.

3. The admission of evidence of a collateral fact, which might have been rejected by the trial court without committing error, does not consti