was afterwards set aside, as an illegal preference within the purview
of the bankrupt act, in consequence of knowledge of the debtor's con-
dition by the plaintiff's attorney. Held, that the creditor was not
thereby precluded from proving his debt against the bankrupt; and
that an endorser of the note of the bankrupt to the creditor, on which
the judgment was founded, was not discharged from his liability as
endorser by reason of the levy being declared in fraud of the provi-
sions of the bankrupt law, Rev. Stat. § 5084, and § 5021, as amended
by the act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 178, 181. Streeter v. Jefferson
County Bank, 36.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
Costs, 9, 14, 23.
1. The cases of Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 156; White-
head v. New York Life Ins. Co., 102 N. Y. 143; and Garner v. Germa-
nia Life Ins. Co., 110 N. Y. 266, distinguished. Miles v. Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 177.
2. Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, and Sands v. Manistee Improvement Co.,
123 U. S. 288, each distinguished from this case. Harman v. Chicago,
3. Gardner v. Risher, 35 Kansas, 93, distinguished from Kennett v. Fickel,
41 Kansas, 211. Clement v. Field, 467.
See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
See JURISDICTION, A, 5;
MANDAMUS.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.
1. By sec. 7 of the act of October 2, 1888, 25 Stat. 505, 523, c. 1069, in
regard to the building for the Library of Congress, which provided that
all contracts for the construction of the building should be made by
the Chief of Engineers of the Army, and repealed so much of the act
of April 15, 1886, 24 Stat. 12, c. 50, as required the construction of the
building according to the plan submitted by John L. Smithmeyer, and
enacted that "hereafter, until otherwise ordered by Congress, no work
shall be done in the construction of said Library except such as is
herein provided for, and all contracts for work or materials not neces-
sary for the execution of the work contemplated herein are hereby
rescinded," it was provided that "all loss or damage occasioned thereby
or arising under said contracts, together with the value of the plan for
a Library building," so submitted by Smithmeyer, "may be adjusted
and determined by the Secretary of the Interior, to be paid out of the
sums heretofore or hereby appropriated." Smithmeyer and his partner
afterwards brought a suit in the Court of Claims against the United
States, to recover $210,000 as the value of plans and drawings made
by them for a building for the Library, which were delivered to and
accepted by the United States, and used in constructing the building.
The Court of Claims held, that the acts of the parties indicated that
the services of the plaintiffs should be estimated according to the rule
of quantum meruit, and not according to the schedule of charges of the
American Institute of Architects, and that they were entitled to
recover $8000 a year for six years' services. Held, that that was a
proper and reasonable decision. Smithmeyer v. United States, 342.
2. The treasury officers have a right to require of a marshal items of
expenses incurred in endeavoring to arrest persons charged with the
commission of crime. United States v. Fletcher, 664.
3. When claims against the United States are presented to the proper
department for allowance, and the department suspends action until
proper vouchers are furnished, or other reasonable requirements are
complied with, the courts should not assume jurisdiction until final
action is taken. lb.
CLERK OF A CIRCUIT COURT.
See COSTS, 15 to 20, 22, 23, 24, 25 to 29, 31.
CLERK OF A DISTRICT COURT.
See COSTS, 9 to 14, 22, 25, 31.
1. In an action against a common carrier to recover damages for personal
injuries, if the facts relating to contributory negligence are disputed,
that question should be submitted to the jury; and, if the jury find
for the plaintiff, the court is not required, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, to set the verdict aside. Washington & Georgetown Railroad
Co. v. Harmon, 571.
2. A railway company being bound to deliver a passenger, its failure to
stop long enough to enable him to alight with safety is a neglect of
duty which involves liability for injuries resulting therefrom. Ib.
3. When the evidence justifies a finding that future damages will result
from an accident to a passenger caused by the negligence of a common
carrier, the jury may estimate and include such damages in their
verdict. Ib.
4. Two suits at law against a railroad company, incorporated by New York,
were brought in the Circuit Court of Saline County, Missouri, by two
different plaintiffs, to recover damages for injury by the company, as a
common carrier, through negligence, to live cattle transported by it.
The damages occurred from a collision which took place in Ohio. The
cattle were being transported from Massachusetts to Missouri. The pro-
cess of the court was served in St. Louis, Missouri, on a city passenger-
agent of the defendant, in its business office there, who had charge of
it at the time, no chief officer of the defendant being found in St. Louis
at the time. By a petition in each suit by the defendant, which stated
that it appeared only for the purpose of making the application, the suit
was removed into the Circuit Court of the United States, because of
diverse citizenship. The defendant then moved in the latter court, in
each suit, to quash the process on the ground that it conferred no juris-
diction on the state court over the defendant. The motion was over-
ruled. Both cases were then tried before the same jury. In one case the
verdict was for $8750 damages, and $2362.50 interest thereon at 6 per
cent per annum from the time the suit was brought, and in the other
case for $44,000 damages, and $11,880 interest thereon. In the first
case judgment was entered for $11,112.50, with interest from the date
of the verdict, and in the second case for $50,000, and like interest,
the plaintiffs having voluntarily remitted $5880, because the petition
claimed only $50,000 damages. There was only one bill of exceptions,
covering all matters in the two suits, and one writ of error, and one
citation, and one supersedeas bond, and one transcript of record.
This court took cognizance of the two cases, and Held,
(1) The state court acquired jurisdiction of the cases, under subdi-
vision 4 of § 3489 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1879,
and § 3481 of the same Revised Statutes: The cases on that
subject in the courts of Missouri reviewed;
(2) Whether the defendant waived any objection to the service of the
process in the state court by appearing therein and filing a
petition for the removal of the cause into the Federal court,
quære;
(3) A large number of the cattle being cows with unborn calves,
which were lost through their premature births, caused by the
collision, the defendant was liable for deterioration in the value
of such cows, caused by such abortions, although it was not
shown that the defendant knew that the cows were with calf;
(4) The cases having been tried in the court below on the theory that
the value of the cattle at their place of destination in Missouri
was the proper basis for fixing the damages, the point that their
value at the terminus in Ohio of the defendant's road was the
proper basis cannot be taken for the first time in this court;
(5) It was proper to show that some of the cattle died, or lost their
calves, after their final arrival in Missouri, from the effects of
the collision;
(6) The proper rule of damages was the difference between the mar-
ket value of the cattle, in the condition in which they would
have arrived but for the negligence of the defendant, and their
market value in the condition in which, by reason of such negli-
gence, they did arrive;
(7) It was not material whether the plaintiffs intended to keep the
cattle upon their farms, for breeding purposes, or to sell them
upon the market, the depreciation in value of the cattle being
the same in either case;
(8) The court having instructed the jury that the burden was upon
the plaintiffs to show that the abortions were the direct result
of the collision, and the jury having found in favor of the plain-
tiffs on that question, and the bill of exceptions containing all
the evidence in the case on either side, and there being sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict, this court cannot review it on
the weight of the evidence;
(9) There is no ground for holding that the plaintiffs ought to have
traced each animal and to have shown the amount received for
it when sold;
(10) It was improper, under the statutes of, and decisions in Missouri,
for the jury to allow interest on the damages from the time suit
was brought; and as the jury stated, in each verdict, the amount
of interest allowed, this court reduced the judgments by strik-
ing out the interest, and ordering judgments to be entered for
the amounts of the damages, with interest from the entry, and
costs; the costs of this court to be paid one-half by the plain-
tiffs in error and the other half by the defendant in error. New
York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad Co. v.
See ASSIGNMENT for the BENEFIT OF CREDITORS;
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.
1. Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, affirmed to the
point that a provision in a state law for the assessment of a state tax
upon the face value of bonds instead of upon their nominal value vio-
lates no provision of the Constitution of the United States. Jennings
v. Coal Ridge Improvement & Coal Co. 147.
2. It is within the constitutional power of Congress, in legislating for the
creation of a commission charged with public duties, to provide that
some members of it shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and that other members of it
shall consist of officers in the service of the United States, who had
been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, when
the duties of the new office are germane to those of the offices already
held by the latter. Shoemaker v. United States, 282.
3. Congress may increase the duties of an existing office without rendering
it necessary that the incumbent should be again nominated, confirmed
and appointed. Ib.
4. The ordinance of the city of Chicago, imposing a license tax for the
privilege of navigating the Chicago River and its branches upon steam
tugs licensed by the United States authorities under the provisions of
Rev. Stat. § 4321, is an unconstitutional exercise of municipal authority,
and is invalid. Harmon v. Chicago, 396.
5. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution operates exclusively in
restriction of Federal power and has no application to the States.
Thorington v. Montgomery, 490.
6. A controversy as to the good faith of a transaction by which the title to
the property which forms the subject of this litigation was transferred
to the plaintiff in error is held to involve no Federal question. Ib.
See JURISDICTION, A, 3, 4; C, 4;
TAX AND TAXATION, 3, 4.
See COMMON Carrier, 1, 3.
1. In a suit brought by a marshal against the United States, under the
act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, (24 Stat. 505,) to recover $1770.60 as fees
and disbursements of the marshal, from March, 1886, to October,
1888, the items having been disallowed by the First Comptroller:
Held, that the Circuit Court of the United States, had jurisdiction to
review items disallowed by the First Comptroller before March 3,
1887, although, by § 2 of the act, jurisdiction was withheld of claims
which had theretofore "been rejected, or reported on adversely, by
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