Opinion of the Court. were intended to be conclusive of the liability of a party, who had never subscribed for stock or been a transferee thereof in fact, because of the presence of his name upon the books of the company without his consent or assent thereto. In Vanderwerken v. Glenn, 85 Virginia, 14, the decision was, as stated by the Court of Appeals, that the appearance of the party, sought to be charged, on the company's books as a stockholder, was prima facie evidence of his being such, and this was conceded by the New York court. It is said that that was a mere common law legal presumption, and had nothing to do "with the statutory rights and obligations of actual dealers in the stock whose names appeared upon the books as holders of the stock with their knowledge and without dissent on their part, so far as the company and its creditors were concerned;" and that the New York court "went off upon the common law rule of evidence as to the appearance of stock upon the stock books, in respect of strangers, and utterly ignored and rejected the constitutional credit and effect due to the said statutes of Virginia in respect of persons actually dealing in such stock, and whose names appeared upon the books of the company as holders and owners of stock in the ordinary and regular course of its business as conducted under those statutes." But this involves in large part a consideration of the case upon the merits, and begs the question whether upon the facts these defendants occupied the position plaintiff ascribes to them. If we were to assume jurisdiction of this case, it is evident that the question submitted would be, not whether the decision of the New York court was against a right specially set up and claimed under the Constitution of the United States, or necessarily arising, but whether in that decision error intervened in the construction of the statutes of Virginia.' If every time the courts of a State put a construction upon the statutes of another State, this court may be required to determine whether that construction was or was not correct, upon the ground that if it were concluded that the construction was incorrect, it would follow that the state courts had refused to give full faith and credit to the statutes involved, Opinion of the Court. our jurisdiction would be enlarged in a manner never heretofore believed to have been contemplated. The distinction between the construction of a statute and the validity of a statute has frequently been adverted to by this court. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad v. Hopkins, 130 U. S. 210, and cases cited. In Grand Gulf Railroad and Banking Co. v. Marshall, 12 How. 165, 167, 168, the case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and involved an assignment by a corporation of Mississippi under the laws of that State. Mr. Chief Justice Taney, delivering the opinion of the court, after stating that, "in order to give this court jurisdiction the record must show that the point was brought to the attention of the state court and decided by it," for the obvious reason that "the party is authorized to bring his case before this court, because a state court has refused to him a right to which he is entitled under the Constitution or laws of the United States; but if he omits to claim it in the state court there is no reason for permitting him to harass the adverse party by a writ of error to this court, when, for anything that appears in the record the judgment of the state court might have been in his favor if its attention had been drawn to the question," goes on to say that "it appears that the decision turned upon the construction (not the validity) of the act of Mississippi of 1840; and upon a question of merely local law, concerning the right by prescription claimed by the trustees. Nothing is said in relation to the constitutionality or validity of this act of Mississippi, and the opinion of the court clearly shows that no such question was raised or decided." The writ of error was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It does not seem to have occurred to the Chief Justice that the writ could be maintained upon the ground of a denial of full faith and credit to the Mississippi statute by the construction given by the Louisiana court. This record may be searched in vain for any proof that, as matter of fact, the public acts of Virginia had, by law or usage in Virginia, any other effect than was given them in New York; nor can the contention of counsel, that the VOL. CXLVII-24 Opinion of the Court. Virginia statutes should be construed according to their views, be treated as the equivalent of the express assertion of a right arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States. Writ of error dismissed. WALTER v. NORTHEASTERN RAILROAD APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA. No. 1206. Argued and submitted January 11, 12, 1893. - Decided January 23, 1893. A Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction over a bill in equity to enjoin the collection of taxes from a railroad company, when distinct assessments, in separate counties, no one of which amounts to $2000, and for which, in case of payment under protest, separate suits must be brought to recover back the amounts paid, are joined in the bill and make an aggregate of over $2000. THIS was a bill in equity filed by the Northeastern Railroad Company of South Carolina against the treasurer and sheriff of Charleston, Berkeley, Williamsburg and Florence Counties, through which the plaintiff's road passes, to enjoin them from issuing executions against or seizing the property of the plaintiff for the purpose of collecting a tax based upon an assessment alleged to be unconstitutional and void. The substance of the bill was that the constitution of the State provided for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation; that real estate is assessed for taxation once in five years at a uniform rate of from fifty to sixty per cent of its actual value; that personal property is assessed every year at the same rate or less; that this rate has become a uniform rule, and was accepted and acted upon by the assessing officers and boards of the State; that plaintiff returned its property at a valuation of from sixty to sixty-five per cent of its actual value; and that the State Board of Equalization for railroads arbitrarily assessed the property of this company at a much Opinion of the Court. higher rate, although, prior to the year 1891, it had accepted and acted upon a uniform rule of assessment; but that, at its meeting in 1891, it abandoned the rule theretofore accepted, and assessed railroad property at a rate exceeding its actual value, and in some cases doubled and trebled the previous rate, with intent to cast upon it a greater proportion of taxation, although no change was made in the assessment of other real and personal property; that the plaintiff, in common with the other railroads of the State, tendered in payment of its taxes the amount due under the levy estimated upon the value of its property as theretofore assessed, under the rule prevailing in that State, and set forth in its sworn return; and brought this bill to enjoin the taking possession of or selling its property under a tax execution to collect the excess. Defendants demurred to this bill upon the ground: 1. That the court had no jurisdiction by reason of the insufficient amount in controversy. 2. That the plaintiffs had a complete. and adequate remedy at law. 3. For want of equity. The case was heard upon this demurrer, and a decree was rendered overruling the demurrer and enjoining the collection of the taxes. See Richmond &c. Railroad v. Blake, 49 Fed. Rep. 904. Defendant appealed to this court under the 5th section of the Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, 827, c. 517. Mr. Samuel Lord for appellants. Mr. D. A. Townsend, Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, and Mr. Ira B. Jones were with him on the brief. Mr. Henry A. M. Smith and Mr. W. Huger Fitzsimmons for appellee. MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Objection was taken to the jurisdiction of the court below upon the grounds, first, that the matter in controversy with each of the defendants was less than $2000; and second, be Opinion of the Court. cause the plaintiff had a complete and adequate remedy at law. With regard to the amount in controversy, it is averred in the bill that the plaintiff returned, as required by law, its real and personal property for taxation at a "valuation of the same according to and under the uniform rules and methods of valuation adopted for the taxation of similar real and personal property," and tendered to the county treasurers of the several counties the amounts due for taxes upon such valuation as returned, such amounts aggregating over $18,000, and, in addition thereto, tendered to the county treasurer of Charleston County, $813.87, for the expenses of the railway commission, but that the defendants refused to receive the same unless plaintiff would also pay the taxes claimed to be due in excess of the amount so tendered, which were as follows: In Charleston County, $177.67; in Berkeley County, $1511.16; in Williamsburg County, $1332.50; and in Florence County, $571.33; making the total amount claimed $3592.66. It was further alleged that of these taxes, 4 mills were levied for State purposes; 2 mills for school purposes; and from 13 mills to 5 mills in the different counties, for county and all other purposes. It appears, then, that, while the total amount involved in this litigation is $3592.66, there is no claim made by the county treasurer of either county which is not less than $2000, and that of the entire claim of $3592.66, the State taxes represent but $1473.38. The residue is assessed for school and local purposes, is disbursed by the county commissioners, and is never paid into the state treasury at all. In short, the amount in dispute in each county is not only less than $2000, but is compounded of a state, school, and county tax, most of which is collected and paid out by the county. authorities for local purposes. Under these circumstances, it is entirely clear that, had these taxes been paid under protest and the plaintiff had sought to recover them back, it would have been obliged to bring separate actions in each county. As the amount recoverable from each county would be different, no joint judgment could possibly be rendered. So, had a bill for injunction been filed in a state court, and the practice had permitted, as in |