Opinion of the Court.

peal, either expressly or by implication, the general jurisdictional act of the Court of Claims, to the extent of this case. The purport of the act of 1888 seems to have been to provide a method of adjusting the claim, if the claimants so desired, without a suit. The claimants had a right to the additional method, but they could also waive its benefit. The general jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the additional method of adjustment can both of them well stand together. De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 432; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188; Henderson's Tobacco, 11 Wall. 652; Shutte v. Thompson, 15 Wall. 151; Bechtel v. United States, 101 U. S. 597; Campbell v. United States, 107 U. S. 407; Chew Пleong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536; United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645; United States v. Harmon, ante, 268.

The contention on the part of the claimants is that the value of their plans or services ought not to be estimated according to the rule of quantum meruit, but that they ought to be paid according to the rates established by the general usage of the architects' profession throughout the United States. On the evidence the Court of Claims, by finding 16, found the fair and reasonable value of the services of the claimants, in preparing the plans delivered to the Joint Select Committee, reported to Congress on January 14, 1881, and which are now used by the government in the construction of the Library building, to be $48,000. This was a finding on the evidence; the evidence is not before us; and without it, we are asked, on findings of facts as to work done in connection with plans which were not adopted, to reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims as to the reasonable value of the plans which were adopted, and for which alone the right to compensation exists.

It appears from the findings of the Court of Claims that no contract, express or implied, was entered into with the claimants, or either of them, by any commission, committee or public officer, empowered to adopt plans or employ architects, or to enter upon the construction of the building, until the act of April 15, 1886, c. 50, 24 Stat. 12, referred to in finding 8, was passed, which adopted the plan of Smithmeyer. That act did not constitute a contract, but only declared the intention

Opinion of the Court.

of the legislature. It might have been rescinded at any subsequent time before the claimants changed their position and entered upon the performance of the proposed work, without either party becoming liable to the other. Tilley v. County of Cook, 103 U. S. 155, 160, 161. From 1873 to 1886, the services of the claimants were of an advisory nature, for compensation, and were such services as are mentioned in the statement of payments in finding 13 as "professional services."

As found in finding 11, the commission created by the act of April 15, 1886, 24 Stat. 12, c. 50, appointed Smithmeyer, on October 1, 1886, to be architect of the Library building, at a compensation of $5000 per annum; and on November 13, 1886, it also appointed the claimant Pelz to be principal draughtsman, at a compensation of $3000 per annum, both appointments being in writing. Mr. Smithmeyer continued in the service of the United States, as architect of the building, until October 3, 1888, a period of over two years. It is further found in finding 11, that the claimants, at the time of accepting those appointments, did not notify Congress or the commission that they intended to charge, according to the schedule of the American Institute of Architects, for the plans furnished, nor did they so notify Congress or the commission before the work began on the building under the act of April 15, 1886, although they had previously notified the chairman of the Joint Select Committee that they intended to charge for the plans.

The acceptance by the claimants of employment at an agreed compensation per annum, before either party had acted on the faith of a different understanding, leaves no room for implying any other contract or usage. There was an express contract by which the claimants, as architects, were under the duty of furnishing plans at the agreed compensation.

In the opinion given by the Court of Claims, it is stated that the court was of opinion that the acts of the parties. indicated that the services of the claimants should be estimated according to the rule of quantum meruit, and not according to the schedule of charges of the American Institute of Architects; that, instead of a percentage, the United

Statement of the Case.

States elected to give, and the claimants consented to take, two annual salaries amounting to $8000 a year, as an equivalent for such percentage; that, as the claimants thus departed from the general rule of architects, of measuring their compensation by the customary fees of their profession, and did so without any express agreement or reservation as to the preceding part of their service, the court was of the opinion that such part should be estimated according to the same rule, which the parties had themselves adopted; and that, taking those facts of mutual acquiescence as elements for computing damages, bearing in mind that a period of about six years existed between October, 1874, when the claimants began to give their entire time to what may be termed the evolution of their plans, and January 14, 1881, when the plans were submitted to Congress, and remembering also that one of the claimants had received from the government, for other professional services connected with the Library, the sum of $4600, the court found as the value of perfecting the design. and preparing the plans a like equivalent of six years' service at $8000 a year, and fixed the damages at $48,000. This we consider a proper and reasonable decision.

Judgment affirmed.

GLENN v. GARTH.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 1160. Submitted November 28, 1892. - Decided January 23, 1893.

The mere construction by the highest court of a State of a statute of another State, without questioning its validity, does not deny to it the full faith and credit which the Constitution and laws of the United States demand, in order to give this court jurisdiction on writ of error. This is especially true when there are no decisions of the highest court of the latter State in conflict with the construction made by the court of the former State.

MOTION to dismiss, or affirm. menced October 26, 1886, in the

This was an action comSupreme Court of the city,

Statement of the Case.

county, and State of New York, by John Glenn, as trustee, against David J. Garth, Robert A. Lancaster, and Samuel J. Harrison, impleaded with others, to recover the amount of two assessments made by the courts of the State of Virginia upon the stock and stockholders of the National Express and Transportation Company, a corporation of that State.

The defendants denied that they had at any time become the holders or owners of shares of the capital stock of the corporation by assignment and transfer from the original subscriber or subscribers for said shares or otherwise, and denied that they at any time became and were received and accepted by the corporation as stockholders in and members thereof for the number of shares alleged, or any shares whatsoever.

The record of the judicial proceedings of the courts of Virginia put in evidence established the basis of plaintiff's right to recover against the stockholders of the company for the assessments in question, and evidence was adduced on both sides bearing on the question of the liability of defendants as stockholders.

The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and, on motion of defendants' counsel, ordered their exceptions to be heard in the first instance at the general term and that judgment be suspended in the meantime. At the general term defendants moved on their exceptions for a new trial, and the Supreme Court sustained the exceptions, set aside the verdict, and granted a new trial. From this order the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, giving the stipulation, exacted by the New York statute in that behalf, that if the order granting a new trial should be affirmed there should be judgment absolute against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order appealed from, with judgment absolute against the plaintiff. The remittitur and record were sent down to the Supreme Court, with directions to enter the judgment and to proceed according to law, whereupon the Supreme Court. directed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be made the judgment of that court, with costs to be adjusted, and that defendants have execution. The costs were adjusted and

Statement of the Case.

judgment therefor entered May 10, 1892. Application was made in the Court of Appeals for a reargument, which was refused in due course. A writ of error from this court to the Supreme Court of New York was then allowed, and now comes before us on motion to dismiss.

The opinion of the Supreme Court in general term is given in the record, though not reported, as appears in 60 Hun, 584. The case is therein stated in substance as follows: Defendants Harrison, Garth and Lancaster were engaged in the business of bankers, and brokers in stocks, bonds and securities, in New York, under the firm name of Harrison, Garth & Co. They had a customer named Ficklin, who desired to purchase shares of the National Express and Transportation Company upon a margin. Garth agreed to carry the shares for Ficklin, that is, to pay for them as Ficklin purchased them, upon receipt of a sufficient margin to secure the firm against loss. This stock was not listed upon the New York Stock Exchange, but Ficklin informed Garth that he could pick the shares up at Baltimore and other places. Some time after the making of this arrangement several lots of the shares were purchased, presumably on Ficklin's orders, through McKim & Co., brokers in Baltimore, and, in accordance with Garth's promise to carry them, Harrison, Garth & Co. settled the account of McKim & Co. for what they had disbursed in the transaction. The certificates of stock were sent on from Baltimore by McKim & Co. to Harrison, Garth & Co., as security for the advances thus made by the firm to Ficklin. The invariable custom in such cases is for the seller to deliver the certificates to the broker with a blank assignment and power of attorney to transfer on the books of the company endorsed thereon. Such a thing as placing stock in the name of the firm, when thus acting as brokers, had never once occurred in all its business life. Instead of following the custom and forwarding the ordinary and proper documents, McKim & Co. had the shares transferred on the books of the company into the name of Harrison, Garth & Co., and it was the certificates naming the firm as the owners of the shares which were sent on to defendants. This act of McKim & Co. was not only contrary to