Opinion of the Court. obligation to return the vessel into that district, and without any leave of that court obtained or sought; that the only thing left within the Massachusetts district to be divided among damage claimants, and subject to be disposed of by the decree of the court for that district, in the proceeding there pending, was the stipulation so given; that no notice of the appraisement proceedings, or of the stipulation proceedings, or of the injunction proceedings, was required by the court to be given to any damage claimant, and neither Morrison nor any other damage claimant had in fact any notice thereof or any opportunity to be heard thereon; that neither Morrison, nor Vanderbilt nor any damage claimant had been served personally with process in the Massachusetts district, or had entered any appearance in the Massachusetts court; that Vanderbilt had received a copy of the monition and of the injunction order, but not within the district of Massachusetts, and not until after August 17, 1892; and that Morrison had not been served with any paper in the Massachusetts proceedings, either within or without the Massachusetts district. It is further contended, that Morrison and Vanderbilt have been deprived of their remedy against the Dimock and her owners, and are confined to a proceeding to obtain a share of the amount mentioned in the stipulation; that no court has power to give relief beyond a share in that amount, because the Dimock departed from the jurisdiction of the District Court for Massachusetts, and her owners never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of that court by any offer to pay any sum in excess of that amount; that that result had been accomplished by a proceeding wholly ex parte, without actual or constructive notice and without any opportunity for a hearing, on the part of Morrison, or Vanderbilt, or any other person adversely interested; that the appraisement, stipulation and injunction proceedings in the Massachusetts. court, having been taken without any notice or opportunity to be heard given to the damage sufferers, were wholly without effect upon the rights of the latter, and did not destroy Morrison's capacity to sue, and did not discharge the steamship company or the Dimock from liability to be Opinion of the Court. sued; that Morrison acquired by the collision a right to recover damages to some extent against the company owning the Dimock, personally, in any District Court which could obtain personal jurisdiction of that company; that he acquired a right also to recover damages to some extent against the vessel, in any District Court which could obtain jurisdiction in rem against her; that his right against the vessel is not a right of action merely, but is a jus in re and a property interest in her, of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law; that the limited liability act did not take away or affect any such rights ex proprio vigore, as an exercise of the legislative power of the United States, but left such rights to be limited and qualified judicially by the courts; that after the collision, and before the company filed its libel in Massachusetts, Morrison, by virtue of that statute, had a right to prosecute an apportionment suit in any District Court which could acquire jurisdiction in rem of the Dimock, and in personam of her owner, and of all known damage claimants, and the further right to have any such court adjudicate upon the questions (1) whether the company and the Dimock were liable to any extent, that is to say, whether the collision was caused by fault on the part of the Dimock; (2) if so, how much was the value of the company's interest in the Dimock and her freight for the voyage; (3) whether the aggregate losses of all the damage sufferers exceeded that value; and (4) if they did, how, or in what proportions, the amount of that value ought to be divided among the sufferers; and that the only ways in which the Massachusetts proceedings could have affected such statutory right of Morrison were (1) by destroying his personal capacity to sue; (2) by releasing the company and the Dimock from liability to be sued; and (3) by conferring upon the court in Massachusetts exclusive jurisdiction to determine those four questions, which were presented alike by the company's libel and by Morrison's libel. It is contended, also, that the "due process of law," guaranteed to every person by Article 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, implies, with reference to proceedings under the judicial power of the United States, Opinion of the Court. notice of some kind, and opportunity to be heard, not only as a requisite, but as a prerequisite; that the rights of the damage claimants had never been submitted or subjected in any form to the Massachusetts Court; that proceedings in court, of which the persons whose rights purported to be affected thereby had no actual or constructive notice, and in which they had no opportunity to be heard, were ineffective and were not judicial proceedings; that it could not be said that an opportunity to be heard would necessarily, and as matter of law, have been of no advantage to the damage claimants, for they might have convinced the court (1) that the appraisement ought to have been made on sworn testimony, with an opportunity to both sides to produce and cross-examine witnesses; or (2) that the experts selected were not competent or were not impartial; or (3) that the appraisers' report ought to have been rejected, because it did not show the plans on which they proceeded, or as of what time the value of the Dimock was taken, or because the appraisers did not personally examine her; or (4) that the stipulation should have been broad enough to cover not merely what the appraisers estimated to be the value of the company's interest in the Dimock and her freight, but also what the damage claimants asserted the value of such interest to be, so that, if, on final hearing, the issue tendered in the company's libel and petition as to such value was determined in favor of the damage claimants, the court would have some means of compelling the company to pay the adjudicated value into court for distribution; or (5) that the sureties on the stipulation were insufficient; or (6) the court might have been convinced that, for the reasons above stated, no injunction ought to issue, or else, only on condition that the company bound itself with sureties, to pay into court the value of its vessel and freight, as finally adjudicated, or that the rights of the parties could be more conveniently and justly determined by permitting the damage claimants to assert their claims in their own way, and allowing the steamship company to set up the apportionment proceedings as a plea, or that no injunction ought to issue until the value of the vessel and freight had been adjudicated, and paid into court, or secured to be paid. Opinion of the Court. It is further urged, that the proceedings in Massachusetts were not, as matter of law, equivalent to a transfer of the Dimock and her freight by the company to a trustee under $4285 of the Revised Statutes; that they were very far from being an equivalent in fact; that there is nothing in the statute which authorizes the owner of a vessel, at his option, either to transfer his interest in the vessel and freight to a trustee, or to pay into court the value thereof as determined by an ec parte appraisement, or which declares that it shall be a sufficient compliance with the statute on the part of the owner if he pays or secures to be paid into court the value so appraised, or which provides that, after such payment all suits and proceedings against the owner shall cease; and that the act leaves the creation of a substitute in lieu of a transfer to a trustee, to a court which proceeds judicially. It is further contended, that the rights of the damage claimants against the company and the Dimock, arising out of the collision, remained precisely as they were before the company filed its libel and petition in Massachusetts; that those rights were never transferred from the company and the vessel to the fund represented by the stipulation; that said fund cannot be regarded as the fund to be apportioned among the damage claimants, as it had never been adjudicated or judicially established to be such; that, if Morrison's right to proceed against the company and the vessel in the Southern District of New York had been taken away or suspended by the proceeding in Massachusetts, it must be for some other reason than (1) that the court in Massachusetts had adjudicated that damage claimants ought to be enjoined from proceeding in any other court; or (2) that such claimants had been incapacitated or rendered personally incompetent to sue; or (3) that the company and the Dimock had been released and discharged from liability to be sued; and that the only other way in which Morrison's right to proceed in New York could have been affected was that the jurisdiction of the court in Massachusetts over the subjectmatter had somehow become exclusive, so that Morrison could proceed against the company and the vessel only in that forum. It is also contended, that the court in Massachusetts was not Opinion of the Court. competent to adjudicate the question whether or not the collision was caused by fault on the part of the Dimock, because it did not acquire personal jurisdiction of one or more of the damage claimants or jurisdiction in rem of the Dimock; that the fund represented by the stipulation had not been judicially substituted for the Dimock, and she had not been discharged from liability for the collision; that, as she still remained liable for it, nothing but possession and control of her would authorize any court to pronounce a judgment in rem as to her liability; that the court in Massachusetts had never actually assumed possession and control of her by the officers of the court, by seizure or otherwise, or jurisdiction of her; that, whatever jurisdiction that court acquired of her by her having been within the district when the company's libel and petition was filed, was lost, and all the rights of the company arising therefrom were abandoned by the company's having taken the Dimock, before the return day of the monition, out of the district, to the port of New York, without leave of the court or procuring any release or discharge of her, or entering into any obligation to bring her back; that the court in Massachusetts never acquired personal jurisdiction over Morrison or any other damage claimant; that, there having been no voluntary appearance of any damage claimant, service of process within the Massachusetts district was essential; and that no process had been served on Morrison or Vanderbilt within that district. It is further contended, that the court in Massachusetts did. not acquire jurisdiction to determine any of the other questions presented by the two libels; that what the steamship company ought to have done was to make in its libel an unconditional offer, substantially in the terms of the statute, to pay into court. for partition among the damage sufferers whatever the court. should determine was the value of the company's interest in the Dimock and her freight; that the only offer which could be implied from the libel was one to pay or secure to be paid the amount at which the court might cause the value of the vessel and her freight to be duly appraised; that such offer was insufficient, because it did not mean the amount which the court should adjudicate, after hearing the parties adversely |