Opinion of the Court.

void or open to collateral attack. It is very rarely that proceedings are wholly void and without force or effect as to all persons and for all purposes, and therefore incapable of being or being made otherwise; and we are entirely clear that this patent cannot be treated as falling within that class.

The record shows, as we have said, the existence of a contract between Rankin and Boyle, by which the latter was to advance the money to apply for and obtain the patent for a half interest, and that Rankin carried out the contract on his part. The agreement between Rankin and the widow, then acting as having a colorable right to administer, is also set out, under which Mrs. Boyle agreed that as soon as she should receive five thousand dollars in the way specified she would "release any further interest in said patents to be obtained and the machines then in use." Rankin was appointed temporary administrator, March 9, 1876, and on July 18, 1876, the temporary letters of administration issued to Rankin "were superseded by the appointment of the said Theresa Boyle as permanent administratrix. She thereafter filed an inventory of her husband's estate, in which she included the patent in question as held and owned jointly with Thomas L. Rankin. Neither Theresa Boyle, nor her children, nor Thomas L. Rankin ever repudiated the proceedings whereby said patent was obtained, but enjoyed the beneficial ownership thereof, and sold their interest therein for a valuable consideration."

When Mrs. Boyle took out the letters of administration, her prior acts, presumably upon this record beneficial to the estate and certainly not such as appellees have any right to complain of, should be viewed in the same light as though she had been made administratrix upon the death of her husband. And upon the facts stated, without discussing the particular nature of the instrument of December 2, 1875, we conclude that Rankin acquired under the two contracts the equitable title to the patent; and the circumstance that there was no record evidence of the transaction in the Patent Office made no difference, in the absence of question as to the rights of third parties. The patent, therefore, enured to his benefit. Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211; Day v. Union

Opinion of the Court.

India Rubber Co., 20 How. 216; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How.

477.

Boyle made the oath to the application filed in his lifetime in accordance with section 4892 of the Revised Statutes, and the certificate states that after his death "the specification. originally filed with said application for a patent was amended within the scope of the original oath and the invention described in said original specification, and by way of limitation of the claims, but without the filing of any new oath or power of attorney." In Eagleton Manufacturing Co. v. West Manufacturing Co., 111 U. S. 490, 498, before referred to, the patent was held invalid because the authority given to Eagleton's attorneys ended at his death, and the patent was granted upon amendments made by the attorneys without any new oath by the administratrix. And Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the court, said that the file wrapper showed, "beyond doubt, that there was no suggestion, in the specification signed and sworn to by Eagleton, of the invention described in the amendment," and that "in view of the entire change in the specification, as to the invention described, the patent, to be valid, should have been granted on an application made and sworn to by the administratrix. The specification, as issued, bears the signature of Eagleton and not of the administratrix, and it is sufficiently shown that the patent was granted on the application and oath of Eagleton, and for an invention which he never made."

In the case at bar, there was not only no amplification of the original application by the amendment, but it was within the scope of the original specification and a limitation and narrowing of the original claim, so that it was the identical invention sworn to by Boyle, and there was no more reason for requiring a new oath from his administratrix than there would have been for requiring it from Boyle himself. The attorneys who had acted for Boyle continued to act under Rankin's direction, and although it is not shown that their authority was conferred in writing by a power of attorney executed and filed in accordance with the rules of the office, that is not a fatal objection, since the attorneys had authority

Statement of the Case.

in fact, and their acts were subsequently ratified by Rankin and by Mrs. Boyle.

We are of opinion that the grant was not void because of the death of Boyle before the patent was issued, and that it should be construed in the alternative as a grant to James Boyle, or his heirs, or assigns, which would include a grantee or grantees in being, capable of taking the patent and to whose benefit the grant would enure; that the patent should be construed as a grant to Thomas L. Rankin as assignee, and held to have been obtained by the authority of Mrs. Boyle as administratrix, as well as of Rankin; and that the amendment did not render the patent absolutely void, nor did the fact that no oath was filed after Boyle's death.

These conclusions answer the questions propounded, and will be certified accordingly.

SUTLIFF v. LAKE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 1085. Submitted December 12, 1892. - Decided January 9, 1893.

Where the constitution and a statute of a State forbid any county to issue bonds to such an amount as will make its aggregate indebtedness exceed a certain proportion of the assessed valuation of taxable property in the county; and the statute requires the county commissioners to publish, and to enter on the public records of the county, semi-annual statements showing the whole amount of the county debt; a purchaser, for value and before maturity, of a bond issued in excess of the constitutional and statutory limit, is charged with the duty of examining the record of indebtedness; and the county is not estopped, by a recital in the bond that all the provisions of the statute have been complied with, to prove, by the record of the assessment and the indebtedness, that the bonds were issued in violation of the constitution.

THIS was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado by a citizen of

Statement of the Case.

Connecticut against the county of Lake, a municipal corporation of Colorado, upon coupons for interest of six bonds for $500 each, part of a series of ten bonds, issued by the county on July 1, 1881, payable to bearer in twenty years, and redeemable at the pleasure of the county after ten years, and containing this recital:

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This bond is one of a series of five thousand dollars, which the board of county commissioners of said county have issued for the purpose of constructing roads and bridges, by virtue of and in compliance with a vote of a majority of the qualified voters of said county, at an election duly held on the 7th day of October, A.D. 1879, and under and by virtue of and in compliance with an act of the general assembly of the State of Colorado, entitled 'An act concerning counties, county officers and county government, and repealing laws on these subjects,' approved March 24, A.D. 1877, and it is hereby certified that all the provisions of said act have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond."

One defence was that the bonds were illegal and void, because they increased the indebtedness of the county to an amount in excess of the limit prescribed by art. 11, sect. 6, of the constitution of Colorado, which is copied in the margin.'

On March 24, 1877, the legislature of Colorado passed an act, entitled "An act concerning counties, county officers and county government, and repealing laws on these subjects,"

1 No county shall contract any debt by loan in any form, except for the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, making or repairing public roads and bridges; and such indebtedness contracted in any one year shall not exceed the rates upon the taxable property in such county following, to wit: Counties in which the assessed valuation of taxable property shall exceed five millions of dollars, one dollar and fifty cents on each thousand dollars thereof; counties in which such valuation shall be less than five millions of dollars, three dollars on each thousand dollars thereof. And the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county for all purposes, exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of this constitution, shall not at any time exceed twice the amount above herein limited, unless when, in manner provided by law, the question of incurring such debt shall, at a general election, be submitted to such of the qualified electors of such county as in the year last preceding such election shall have paid a tax upon property assessed to them in such county, and a majority of those

Statement of the Case.

(General Laws of 1877, p. 218,) the material provisions of which are also copied in the margin.1

voting thereon shall vote in favor of incurring the debt; but the bonds, if any be issued therefor, shall not run less than ten years, and the aggregate amount of debt so contracted shall not at any time exceed twice the rate upon the valuation last herein mentioned: Provided, that this section shall not apply to counties having a valuation of less than one million of dollars. 1 SEC. 21. When the county commissioners of any county shall deem it necessary to create an indebtedness for the purpose of erecting necessary public buildings, making or repairing public roads or bridges, they may, by an order entered of record, specifying the amount required and the object for which such debt is created, submit the question to a vote of the people at a general election; and they shall cause to be posted a notice of such order in some conspicuous place in each voting precinct in the county, for at least thirty days preceding the election; and all persons voting on that question shall vote by separate ballot, whereon is placed the words "for county indebtedness,” or “against county indebtedness; " such ballots to be deposited in a box provided by the county commissioners for that purpose, and no person shall vote on the question of indebtedness unless he shall have the necessary qualifications of an elector as provided by law, and shall have paid a tax upon property assessed to him in such county for the year immediately preceding; and if, upon canvassing the vote, (which shall be canvassed in the same manner as the vote for county officers,) it shall appear that a majority of all the votes cast are for county indebtedness, then the county commissioners shall be authorized to contract the debt in the name of the county: Provided, that the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county, exclusive of debts contracted prior to July 1, 1876, in which the assessed valuation of property shall exceed one million of dollars, for all purposes, shall not be in excess of the following ratio, to wit: Counties in which the assessed valuation of property shall exceed five millions of dollars, six dollars on each thousand dollars thereof; counties in which the assessed valuation of property shall be less than five millions and exceed one million of dollars, twelve dollars on each thousand dollars thereof.

SEC. 30. It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners of each county to make out semi-annual statements at the regular sessions in January and July, at which times they shall have such statements published in some weekly newspaper published in the county, if there be such published; and if there be no newspaper published in the county, such commissioners shall cause such statement to be posted in three conspicuous places in said county, one of which shall be the court-house door; and such statement shall show the amount of debt owing by their county, in what the debt consists, what payments, if any, have been made upon the same, the rate of interest that such debts are drawing, also a detailed account of the receipts and expenditures of the county for the preceding months, in which shall