Opinion of the Court.

to pay the interest maturing December 1, 1887. It made an arrangement with most of its bondholders for an extension of two years. Jennings was asked to agree to this arrangement, but refused, threatening foreclosure unless the interest due him were fully and promptly paid. The company thereupon tendered him $570, being the interest due, less $30, which the treasurer of the company proposed to deduct for state tax alleged to be due, at the rate of three mills per annum upon the nominal or par value of the bond. Jennings agreed to submit to the deduction of a tax based upon the actual value of the bonds, which did not exceed 75 per centum of par, but the treasurer of the company insisting that he was compelled by law to assess them at par, regardless of actual value, refused to make any concession."

"The decision of the trial court being in favor of Jennings, the Coal Ridge Company carried the case to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, assigning as error the affirmance of the above and other points by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the ruling of the trial court and, allowing the tax, reduced the judgment to $570, to correct which action this writ of error was taken."

A brief was also

Mr. M. E. Olmsted for plaintiff in error. filed in his behalf in Bell's Gap Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, decided at October Term, 1889.

Mr. S. P. Wolverton for defendant in error.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The judgment is affirmed on the authority of Bell's Gap Railroad v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S.

232.

Opinion of the Court.

UNITED STATES ex rel. TRASK v. WANAMAKER.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 1232. Argued and submitted December 20, 21, 1892. Decided January 3, 1893.

A writ of error does not lie to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, denying a writ of mandamus to the Postmaster General to compel him to readjust the salary of a postmaster when the additional amount to become due him would be less than $5000; and this is not affected by the fact that many similar claims for relief exist, in which the aggregate amount involved is over $100,000.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Harvey Spalding for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Maury filed a brief for defendant in error, but the court declined to hear him.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the

court.

The relator applied for the writ of error herein to one of the justices of this court by a petition, setting up the alleged errors relied on, and stating that the questions of law involved concern the interest of more than one thousand persons, expostmasters, who reside in many different States and Territories, and are in like case with herself and who have presented claims for like relief before the Postmaster-General, and that all of such claims amount to more than one hundred thousand dollars;" and praying that the writ be allowed "under section 706 of the Revised Statutes." The order was thereupon granted.

Upon an almost identical petition, a writ of error was allowed in United States v. Vilas, 124 U. S. 86, but no question as to the pecuniary amount involved in its relation to jurisdiction, or as to the repeal of section 706, was suggested by counsel or considered by the court.

Syllabus.

Section 706 of the Revised Statutes and section 847 of the Revised Statutes of the District of Columbia, which provided for the allowance of appeals and writs of error by the justices of this court under special circumstances, are no longer in force. Act of February 25, 1879, c. 99, 20 Stat. 320, c. 99; Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398; Dennison v. Alexander, 103 U. S. 522; Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 443, c. 355; Cross v. Burke, 146 U. S. 82, 87.

The sum in dispute on this record, exclusive of costs, is more than one thousand and less than five thousand dollars. It is well settled that our appellate jurisdiction, when dependent upon the sum or value really in dispute between the parties, is to be tested without regard to the collateral effect of the judg ment in another suit between the same or other parties. It is the direct effect of the judgment that can alone be considered. New England Mortgage Co. v. Gay, 145 U. S. 123; Washington and Georgetown Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 146 U. S. 227.

This case does not come within either of the sections of the act of March 3, 1885, regulating appeals and writs of error from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the writ of error must, therefore, be

HOLMES v. GOLDSMITHI.

Dismissed.

UNITED STATES FOR THE

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE

DISTRICT OF OREGON.

No. 93. Argued December 14, 15, 1892. — Decided January 9, 1893.

The maker of a promissory note signed it entirely for the benefit of the payee, who was really the party for whose use it was made. The maker and the payee were citizens of the same State. A citizen of another State discounted the note, and paid full consideration for it to the payee, who endorsed it to him. The note not being paid at maturity, the endorsee, who had not parted with it, brought suit upon it against the maker in the Circuit Court of the United States. Held, that the court had jurisdiction, notwithstanding the provision in the act of August 13,

Statement of the Case.

1888, 25 Stat. 433, 434, c. 866, that such court shall not have cognizance of a suit to recover the contents of a promissory note in favor of an assignee or subsequent holder, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court if no assignment had been made.

When the genuineness of a paper sued on is put in issue, papers not otherwise competent may be introduced in Oregon for the purpose of enabling the jury to make a comparison of handwritings.

A witness who has sworn to the genuineness of a disputed signature to a note, may be further asked if he would act upon it if it came to him in an ordinary business transaction.

The admission of evidence of a collateral fact, which might have been rejected by the trial court without committing error, does not constitute error which will of itself justify reversal of the judgment below, if the case of the plaintiff in error was not injured by it.

THIS was an action brought by L. Goldsmith and Max Goldsmith, doing business as partners under the name of L. Goldsmith & Co., citizens of the State of New York, against M. B. Holmes, John Dillard and R. Phipps, citizens of the State of Oregon, as makers of a promissory note, in the words and figures following:

"$10,000.

PORTLAND, OREGON, Aug. 9, 1886.

"Six months after date, without grace, we, or either of us, promise to pay to the order of W. F. Owens ten thousand dollars, for value received, with interest from date at the rate of ten per cent per annum until paid, principal and interest payable in U. S. gold coin, at the first National Bank in Portland, Oregon, and in case suit is instituted to collect this note or any portion thereof, we promise to pay such additional sum as the court may adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in said. suit.

"M. B. HOLMES,
“JOHN DILLARD,
"R. PHIPPS."

On the day of its date, W. F. Owens endorsed the note, waived, in writing, demand, notice and protest, delivered the note, so endorsed, to the agent of the plaintiffs, and received the sum of ten thousand dollars.

Argument for Plaintiffs in Error.

The complaint alleged that the transaction was a loan by plaintiffs to W. F. Owens; that the defendants executed the note for the accommodation of Owens, to enable him to procure the loan thereon; and that Owens was, in fact, a maker of said note to the plaintiffs, and never himself had any cause of action thereon against the defendants.

To this complaint the defendants demurred, on the ground that it did not bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Upon argument this demurrer was overruled. 36 Fed. Rep. 484.

The defendants answered, denying the execution of the note, and knowledge of the other facts alleged in the complaint. At the trial a verdict was given in favor of the plaintiffs for the amount of the note, with interest from date, and on June 19, 1889, judgment was entered on the verdict, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, for the amount of the note with interest and with costs and disbursements.

A writ of error was duly sued out and allowed, and the case brought into this court for review.

Mr. John H. Mitchell for plaintiffs in error.

The first and second assignments of error relate to the jurisdiction of the court: whether the note sued upon comes within the prohibitory provision of the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866. That provision is as follows:

"Nor shall any Circuit or District Court have cognizance of any suit except upon foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made."

It is scarcely necessary to state the familiar rule that all facts essential to confer jurisdiction on a Federal court must be made to appear affirmatively by material allegations, and