STEAMER.

See COLLISION, 1-3, 8, 14; SHIPPING, 6, 7.

STORAGE.

See WAREHOUSE, PRIVATE, 1.

STRANDING.

See AVERAGE, GENERAL, 1.

UNLADING.

See NOTICE, 1-5.

VERDICT.

1. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the verdict of a jury on the ground of excessive damages, in cases, such as an action against a town for damages received in consequence of a defective highway, because the law affords no definite rule by which the precise compensation for the injury can be ascertained. Wightman v. City of Providence, 524.

2. The rule goes no further than to point out the grounds of complaint which may be taken into the account as elements of the computation, and the evidence that may be introduced to support the claim, and then the estimation of the amount of the damage is necessarily left to the jury. Ibid.

3. The court will not interfere, except when the verdict is so large as to show that it was perverse, or the result of gross error, or that the jury had acted under undue motives or misconception. Ibid.

WAREHOUSE, PRIVATE.

1. Where certain merchandise was stored in private warehouses by the plaintiff, with the consent of the collector of customs, but without expense to him or the United States, and it appeared that this arrangement was made by the plaintiff because he desired to warehouse his goods, and thus obtain the benefit of the warehouse laws, and that the defendant would not assent to such deposits except on condition that the plaintiff would pay to him, in his official capacity, half the usual rates of charges on similar goods stored in the public warehouses, held, 1. That the goods were "warehoused"; 2. That the stipulated sum was rightfully received by the collector, and that the same could not be recovered back in an action for money had and received. Atkins v. Peaslee, 446.

2. Goods deposited in private stores by the importer are to be taken possession of by the collector, at the charge and risk of the owners; consequently the goods are in the custody of the United States, and in charge of an inspector. Clark v. Peaslee, 545.

See HALF-STORAGE, 1-4.

WARRANTY.

1. A warranty is a stipulation forming a part of the contract, and is construed as a condition. Eddy Sheet-Iron Foundry v. Hampden Stock and Mut. F. Ins.

Co., 300.

2. Warranties, unless strictly complied with, will invalidate the insurance, whether they are or not material to the risk. Ibid.

3. Where property described as contained in a certain building was insured, that description, being made a part of the contract, is material, and the insured cannot recover for the loss by fire of such property while in a building other than the one thus described. Ibid.

See INSURANCE, 3.

WATCH.

The owners of a vessel properly moored at a wharf are not bound to keep a watch on board. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. v. Steam Ferry-Boat John Adams, 404.

WITNESS.

1. In a suit by the owners of a ship against the owners of the cargo, for contribution for the loss of masts sacrificed for the common benefit of ship, cargo, and freight, the master, except in cases where he would be exonerated from some certain liability, if the owners should prevail, is a competent witness for the owners. Patten v. Darling, 254.

2. Parties to a suit in equity are not competent witnesses in their own behalf, under the existing legislation of Congress, in the Circuit Court. Blanchard v. Sprague, 288.

See EVIDENCE, 19.

WRIT OF RIGHT.

While a writ of right may still be maintained in the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts, the common-law rule that a final judgment in a writ of entry is not a bar to such a suit is no longer in force in this district. Certainly not if such judgment was recovered in the State court since the writ of right was abolished by the statute of the State.

THE END.

University Press, Cambridge: Printed by Welch, Bigelow, and Company.