United States v. Williams and Cox. the rule, left it to the jury to say, whether the deceased was killed before his body was cast into the sea; and the jury found in the affirmative, and the prisoner was convicted, and on a case reserved the conviction was approved by all the judges. According to the statements of the prisoners in this case, Quinton D. Smith was dead before he was sewed up in old sails with weights and thrown overboard. His death is certain if the confession is true; whereas, in the case above supposed, everything confessed might be true, and yet the captain might have been alive. A careful attention to this distinction, and to the facts of each case, will explain what may otherwise seem to be an inconsistency in several of the authorities cited at the bar. The confessions in this case were free and voluntary, and are so comprehensive as to make it certain, if they are true, that death actually ensued, through violence inflicted by the prisoners, many hours before the body was thrown overboard; and having been made in respect to a case where the discovery of the body is impossible, and where the death, therefore, according to the well-settled rule of law, may be proved by other means, why are they not admissible, and, if admissible, who shall judge of the credit to which they are entitled except the jury? There can be but one answer to the question, when viewing it merely in the light of principle; and yet courts of justice in such cases are required to act with the greatest caution, and ought not to shut their eyes to the fact that a too ready credence of confessions has sometimes led to improper convictions; and in view of experience, perhaps it would be safer in every case, where there are no corroborative circumstances, to recommend an acquittal. "Confessions," says Mr. Greenleaf, "are divided into two classes, namely, judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before the magistrate or in court in the due course of legal proceedings, and it is essential that they be made of the free will of the party and with full and perfect knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession. Of this kind are the preliminary examinations taken in writing by the magistrate pursuant to statutes, and the plea of guilty made in open court to an indictment. Either of these is sufficient United States v. Williams and Cox. to found a conviction, even if to be followed by a sentence of death; they being deliberately made with the deepest solemnities, under the advice of counsel and the protecting caution and oversight of the court. . . . . Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a magistrate or in court, and they embrace not only explicit and express confessions of crime, but all those admissions of the accused from which guilt may be implied." All confessions of this kind, it is admitted by the learned author, are receivable in evidence, being proved like other facts, and are to be weighed by the jury; and where it appears that they were freely and voluntarily made in respect to facts within the knowledge of the accused, we have no doubt that the rule, as stated, is correct; and if so admissible, it is difficult to say that the jury are not the sole judges of the credit to which they are entitled. And yet it has been gravely questioned whether such confessions, when uncorroborated by any other proof of the corpus delicti, are of themselves sufficient to warrant a conviction in a capital case. Mr. Greenleaf strongly doubts their sufficiency, though he admits that they are receivable in evidence; and he adds emphatically, that in the United States a prisoner's confession, where the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, has been held insufficient for his conviction; and in support of the proposition he refers to the following authorities. Guild's Case, 5 Halst. 163; Long's Case, 1 Hayw. 524; Hawk. P. C. B. 2, c. 46, § 18. Considering the language employed by that author, it is somewhat doubtful how far he would carry the doctrine; and if it is to the extent that the corpus delicti must be fully proved independently of the confession, we are not prepared to adopt it, as in that view the admission of the confession would be useless, except to prove the agency of the accused, and would operate as an exclusion of the confession for any other purpose; whereas, if freely and voluntarily made, it is clearly admissible as evidence in support of any element in the charge to which it applies. Full proof of the body of the crime, the corpus delicti, independently of the confession, is not required, says Nelson, C. J., in The People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 59, by any of the cases; and United States v. Williams and Cox. in many of them slight corroborating facts were held sufficient. The cases cited by Mr. Greenleaf do not assert a different doctrine; the one first cited distinctly affirms the same principle, and Long's Case, when carefully examined, is to the same effect. It merely asserts that naked confessions, unattended by circumstances, are not sufficient to warrant a conviction; but the court admit that where the circumstances related in the confession are proved to have already existed, that the confession may be evidence sufficient to authorize the jury to find the prisoner guilty. Hawkins says, B. 2, c. 31, § 1, that an express confession is where a person directly confesses the crime with which he is charged, which is the highest conviction that can be, and may be received after the plea of not guilty recorded, notwithstanding the repugnancy. Russell says, that the highest authorities have now established that a confession, if duly made and satisfactorily proved, is sufficient alone to warrant a conviction, without any corroborating evidence. 2 Russ. (7th ed.) 824. And it must be admitted that the cases cited in support of the text sustain the proposition. Wheeling's Case, 1 Leach, 311, note; Rex v. Eldridge, Russ. & R. 439; Rex v. Falkner, Russ. & R. 481. While we admit that the cases cited appear to sustain the proposition, we still think that the proposition itself admits of essential qualifications, without which we should not be prepared to adopt it. A corpus delicti is always made up of two elements, in respect to which there is an important distinction, which should never be overlooked in an investigation of this kind. In felonious homicide they consist, first, of the fact of death; and, secondly, of other facts or circumstances showing the criminal agency of another: and in all cases the former constitutes the basis of the latter inquiry, and in general ought to be first proved. And even supposing that a free and voluntary confession may, under some circumstances, be sufficient, as where the body has been destroyed by fire, or consumed by chemical means, or sunk in the sea after life was extinct, yet it could only be so where the particulars given in the confession itself furnish the most satisfactory proof that the party confessing had full knowledge that death had actually taken place through his United States v. Williams and Cox. own acts. No such question arises in this case, and therefore we forbear to pursue the inquiry. Where the fact of death is fully proved by other evidence, no reason is perceived why the free and voluntary confession of the party, if deliberately made, may not be sufficient to establish the other element of the corpus delicti, provided it satisfactorily appears that other evidence does not exist. The best proof of the corpus delicti, as well as the most effectual means of ascertaining its cause, is the finding and the inspection of the dead body, and a resort to other evidence, in respect to either element of which it is composed, ought never to be allowed except in cases where the discovery of the body is impossible. Where the body cannot be found, the fact of death may be proved by cogent and unequivocal circumstances, provided they are sufficient to establish the fact beyond every reasonable doubt. Whether, under any circumstances, a free and voluntary confession, deliberately made, would be sufficient without corroboration, it is not necessary now to decide, and therefore we forbear to express any decided opinion upon the subject, as no such question is raised in the instructions given to the jury, and none such arises on the evidence reported by the judge who presided at the trial. Many facts and circumstances were proved at the trial, independently of the confessions, tending to show that the crime had been committed; and some of the circumstances thus proved were of a character strongly to implicate the prisoners in the transaction. It was proved that the prisoners left Portland on the 7th of July, 1857, in the same vessel with Quinton D. Smith and the other men supposed to have been murdered, and that neither Smith, the other men, or the vessel have ever since been seen or heard from except through the confessions of the prisoners and of Lahey, who died before the trial. Neither the vessel nor the officers or men ever arrived at the port of destination or returned to the home port. At the time, or about the time, when the vessel should have arrived at Cardenas, the prisoners were picked up in a boat in the open sea, which boat was subsequently brought home and identified, and proved to be the only boat of the vessel in which they sailed. United States v. Williams and Cox. It was tarred inside in a manner to indicate that they had not left the vessel without preparation, and that fact was still more strongly indicated by the circumstance that they had in the boat the ship's compass, and a supply of water and provisions. They had in their possession also the watch of the captain, and the clothing of the murdered men, and all these articles were fully identified at the trial, as was the ship's register, which was also in their possession. After they were picked up, they gave contradictory and false accounts of what had occurred before they left the vessel, and persisted in the falsehood until Lahey disclosed the truth; and when they saw that detection was certain, they freely and voluntarily confessed their crimes. All these facts and circumstances were fully proved at the trial before the confessions were admitted, and we think they were of a character to be regarded as tending to prove, not only that the crime had been committed, but that it had been committed by the prisoners; and in that view of the case we are satisfied that the instructions given to the jury were correct. There is no decided case, either English or American, which asserts a contrary doctrine. It was supposed by the counsel at the argument that the Mississippi case constituted an exception, but we think it does not. The question there was, whether the extra-judicial confessions of a prisoner charged with a capital felony is sufficient without any proof whatever of the corpus delicti, independent of the confession; and it was held that the confession was not suf ficient. Stringfellow v. The State, 26 Miss. 169. See also State v. Cowan, 7 Ired. 239; State v. Aaron, 1 South. 231; People v. Hennessy, 15 Wend. 147; Burr. on Cir. Ev. 495; Best on Presumptions, § 257, p. 382. Other cases to the same effect might be cited; but these already referred to we think are sufficient to show the state of the law in the United States, and it will be seen that they do not sustain the doctrine that the corpus delicti must be fully proved by evidence independent of the confession. It is doubtful whether Mr. Greenleaf intended to lay down any such rule, and if he did we are not prepared to adopt it, as it does not appear to have the sanction of any decided case either in England or the United States. All that can be required is, |