justly consider as an inestimable contribution to the science. Whateley's "Logic." By this time, Aristotle must be consulted. The indexes will facilitate the search; and, if the tyro is not a thorough hellenist, let him get help from the best translators, or rather the paraphrasers and commentators on the "Ethics," "Politics," and "Analytics." Cudworth's "Immutable Morality." Butler's "Analogy," and all his "Sermons." Bentham's "Essay on Legislation." How remarkable that he should consider Hume as the original author of his ethical system! Mackintosh's Dissertation-to be read with care. Dr. Brown's "Lectures." The ethical lectures seem to me inferior to the metaphysical, being not only wordy, but erroneous in the fundamental principle. He has misconceived Hartley's and Hume's opinions; yet, the earliest parts of the work are of much value; especially his account of the origin of our notion of extension and external existence. This excepted, it appears to me that even his best passages are chiefly commentaries on Hartley's thoughts, though he does not seem to have read him carefully. Brown is also too declamatory and too full of repetitions. Mill's "Analysis of the Human Mind." The writers here recommended often differ from each other; but it frequently happens that, to understand an author, it is necessary to look at his predecessors and his antagonists. In most speculations, prevalent opinions are either disputed or defended. This should never be forgotten. I am aware that this is the road-book of a long journey; but, I believe that, in such subjects, "the "farthest way about is the nearest way home." I remember Mr. Horne Tooke's saying of intellectual philosophy, that he had become better acquainted with the country through having had the good luck, sometimes, to lose his way-"Si non errasset fecerat ille minùs." To you, it is altogether needless to add one word as to the probable advantages of such a laborious pursuit of first principles, being so well aware, as you are, that to begin at the beginning in the sciences, as well as in matters of fact is the nearest and safest road to the L end. Even sensible men are too commonly satisfied with tracing their thoughts a little way backwards, and they are, of course, soon perplexed by a profounder adversary. In this respect, most people's minds are too like a child's garden, where the flowers are planted without their roots. It may be said of morals and of literature, as truly as of sculpture and painting, that to understand the outside of human nature, we should be well acquainted with the inside. You can handle the anatomist's knife as well as the artist's pencil. TO SIR JAMES MACKINTOSH. January 30, 1831. As your Dissertation must, undoubtedly, be published separately, I hope it will be done without delay, and I am anxious that you should render it complete. This will cost you but little trouble, and will require but a short addition. I have now read it attentively for the second time, and I feel it to be merely justice to say, that I think it by far the most profound and convincing work on Ethics that I have ever met with. In saying so much, I am aware that I am giving it no less than the praise of being the best book on the best subject in all philosophy. Are you content? At the same time, let me own, that I think its value would be greatly increased by a short statement of your own view of MORAL OBLIGATION. This will be little more than an abridgment of scattered passages in your Dissertation. Were it otherwise, I should be disinclined to withdraw your attention from more pressing and, I fear, more engaging pursuits. So much of our happiness inevitably depends on the conduct of others, that it has been a serious inquiry, in all times, by what rules we should be guided in our mutual intercourse. Indeed, to man only it belongs to know what should be as well as what is. Few differences of opinion have existed respecting these rules, and none but such as can easily be reconciled, or accounted for; but, far otherwise is the case when it has been asked, "What is a good action?" Why ought we to seek the well-being of others as well as of ourselves?" 66 The answers given you are well acquainted with, and they have been enumerated by writers of great learning and of much acuteness. To you, therefore, I shall only say, that it appears to me indisputable that benevolent intention and beneficial tendency must combine to constitute the moral goodness of an action. To do as much good, and as little evil as we can, is the brief and intelligible principle that comprehends all subordinate maxims. Both good tendency and good will are indispensable; for conscience may be erroneous as well as |