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United States: that he had not seen that paper, but it was their duty to enquire into the subject: and if they had not turned their attention to it, the attorney for the district would be pleased to examine a file of that paper, and if he found any thing that came within the sedition law, would lay it before them."This is the substance of what the respondent said to the jury on that occasion & he believes nearly his words on the morning of the NEXT DAY, they came into court and declared they had no presentments or indictments to make, on which they were immediately discharged. The whole-time therefore, for which they were detained, was twenty four hours, far less than is generally required of grand ju

ries.

In these proceedings, this respondent acted according to his sense of what the duties of his office required. It certainly was his duty to give in charge to the grand jury, all such statutes of the United States as provided for the punishment of offences, and among others, that called the sedition act; into all offences against which act, while it continued in force, the grand jury were bound by their oaths to enquire. In giving it in charge, together with the other acts of Congress for the punishment of offences, he followed moreover the example of the other judges of the supreme court, in holding their respective circuit courts. He also contends, and did then believe, that it was his duty, when informed of an offence, which the grand jury had overlooked, to direct their attention towards it, and to request for them, and even to require if necessary, the aid of the district attorney in making their enquiries. In thus discharging what he conceives to be his duty, even if he committed an error in so considering it, he denies that he committed or could commit any offence whatever.

With respect to the remarks which he is charged by this article with having made to the grand jury, relative to "a highly seditious temper, which he had understood to have manifested itself in the state of Delaware, among a certain class of people, particularly in Newcastle county, and more especially in the town of Wilmington," and relative to "a most seditious printer, residing in Wilmington, unrestrained by any principle of virtue, and regardless of social order;" this spondent does not recollect or believe, that he

made any such observations. But if he made them, it could not be improper in him to tell the jury that he had received such information, if in fact he had received it; which was probably the case, though he cannot recollect it with certainty at this distance of time. That this information, if he did receive it, was correct, so far as it regarded the printer in question, will fully appear from a file of the paper called the Mirror of the Times," &c. published at Wilmington, Delaware, from February 5th, to March 19th, 1800, inclusive, which he has lately obtained, and is ready to produce to this honorable court when necessary, and some extracts from which are contained in the exhibits seven ly marked No, 7, which he prays leave to make part of this his answer.

And for plea to the said seventh article of impeachment, the said Samuel Chase saith, that he is not guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor, as in and by the said seventh article is alledged against him, and this he prays may be enquired of by this honorable court, in such manner as law and justice shall seem to them to require,

The eighth article of impeachment char ges, that this respondent. " disregarding the duties and dignity of his official cha racter, did, at a circuit court for the district of Maryland, held at Baltimore, in the month of May, 1803, prevert his of ficial right and duty to address the grand jury then and there assembled, on the mat ters coming within the province of the said jury, for the purpose of delivering tothe said grand jury anintemperate and inflam matory political harangue, with intert to excite the fears and resentment of the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against their state government and constitution," and also that this respordent, under pretence of exercising his judicial right to address the grand jury as aforesaid, did endeavor to excite the odi umof the said grand jury, and of the good people of Maryland, against the govern ment of the United States by delivering opinions which were, at that time and as delivered by him, highly indecent, extrajudicial, and tending to prostitute the high judicial character with which he was invested, to the low purpose of an electionering partizan."

In answer to this charge this respondent admits, that he did as one of the associ ate justices ofthe supremecourt of the Uni

te! States, preside in a circuit court held at Baltimore in and for the district of Maryland, in May 1803, and did then deliver a charge to the grand jury, and express in the conclusion of it some opinions as to cer tain public measures, both of the government of Maryland and that of the United States. But he denies that in thus acting, he disregarded the duties and dignity of his judicial character, perverted his official right and duty to address the grand jury, or had any intention to excite the fears or resentment of any person whatever, against the government and constitution of the United States or of Maryland. He denies that the sentiments which he thus expressed, were "intemperate and inflammatory," either in themselves or in the manner of delivering; that he did endeavor to excite the odium of any person whatever against the government of the United States, or did deliver any opinions which were in any respect indecent, or which had any tendency to prostitute his judicial character, to any low or improper purpose. He denies that he did any thing that was unusual, improper, or unbecoming in a judge, or expressed any opinions, but such as a friend to his country, and a firm supporter of the government both of the state of Maryland and of the United States, might entertain. For the truth of what he here says, he appeals confidently to the charge itself; which was read from a written paper now in his possession ready to be produced.—A true copy of all such parts of this paper as relate to the subject inatter of this article of impeachment, is contained in the exhibit marked No. 8, which he prays leave to make part of this his answer. That part of it which relates - to the article now under consideration, is in these words :-"You know,gent men, that our state and national institutions were framed to secure to every member of the society equal liberty and equal rights; but the late alteration of the federal judiciary, by the abolition of the office of the sixteen circuit judges, and the recent change in our state constitution. by the establishing universal suffrage, and the further alteration that is contemplated in our state judiciary, (if adopted) will in my judgment take away all security for property and personal liberty. The independence of the national judiciary is already shaken to its foundation; and the virtue of the people alone can restore it. The independence of the judges of this state will be entirely

destroyed, if the bill for the abolishing the two supreme courts, should be ratified by the next general assembly. The change of the state constitution, by allowing universal suffrage, will, in my opinion certainly and rapidly destroy all protection to property, and all security to personal liberty; and our republican constitution' will sink into a mohocracy, the worst of all possible governments.

"I can only lament that the main pillar · of our state constitution has been thrown down, by the establishment of universal suffrage. By this shock alone, the whole building totters to its bate, and will crumble into ruins before many years elapse, unless it be restored to its original state.If the independency of your state judges, which your bill of rights wisely declares "to be essential to the impartial adminis-, tration of justice, and the great security to the rights and liberties of the people," shall be taken away, by the ratification of the bill passed for that purpose, it will participate the destruction of your whole state constitution, and there will be nothing left in it, worthy the care or support of freemen."

Admitting these opinions to have been incorrect and unfounded, this respondent denies that there was any law which forbid him to express them, in a charge to a grand jury; and he contends that there can be no offence, without the breach of some law. The very essence of despotism consists, in punishing acts which, at the time when they were done, were forbidden by no law. Admitting the expression of political opinions by a judge, in his charge to a jury, to be improper and dangerous; there are many improper and very dangerous acts, which not being forbidden by law cannot be punished.-Hence the necessity of new penal laws; which are from time to time enacted for the prevention of acts not before forbidden but found by experience to be of dangerous tendency. It has been the practice in this country, ever since the beginning of the revolution, which separated us from Great Britain, for the judges to express from the bench, by way of charge to the grand jury, and to enforce to the utmost of their ability, such political opinions ás they thought correct and useful. There have been instances in which the legisla tive bodies of this country, have recommended this practice of the judges; and it was adopted by the judges of the su

preme court of the United States, as soon as the present judicial system was established. If the legislature of the United States considered this practice as mischievous, dangerous or liable to abuse, they might have forbidden it by law; to the penalties of which, such judges as might afterwards transgress it, would be justly subjected. By not forbidding it, the legislature has given to it an implied sanction; and for that legislature to punish it now by way of impeachment, would be to convert into a crime, by an ex post facto proceeding, an act which when it was done at all times before, they had themselves virtually declared to be innocent. Such couduct would be utterly subversive of the fundamental principles on which free government rests; and would form a precedent for the most sanguinary and arbitrary persecutions, under the forms of law. Nor can the incorrectness of the political opinions thus expressed, have any inAuence in deciding on the guilt or innocence of a judge's conduct in expressing them. For if he should be considered as guilty or innocent, according to the supposed correctness or incorrectness of the opinion, thus expressed by him, it would follow, that error in political opinion how ever honestly entertained, might be a crime; and that a party in power might, under this pretext, destroy any judge, who might happen in a charge to a grand jury, to say something capable of being construed by them, into a political opinion adverse to their own system.

There might be some pretence for say ing, that for a judge to utter seditious sentiments, with intent, to excite sedition, would be an impeachable offence: altho' such a doctrine would be liable to the most dangerous abuses; and is hostile to the fundamental principles of our constitution, and to the best established maxims of our criminal jurisprudence. But admitting this doctrine to be correct, it cannot be denied that the seditious intention must be proved clearly, either by the most necessary implication from the words themselves, or by some overt acts of a seditious nature connected with them. In the present case no such acts are alledged, but the proof of a seditious intent must rest on the words themselves. By this rule this respondent is willing to be judged. Let the opinions which he delivered be examined and if the members of this honorable court an lay their hands on their hearts, in the

presence of God, and say, that these optnions are not only erroneous but seditious also; and carry with them internal evidence of an intention in this respondent to excite sedition, either against the state or general government, he is content to be found guilty.

In making this examination, let it be borne in mind, that to oppose a depending measure by endeavoring to convince the public that it is improper, and ought not to be adopted; or to promote the repeal of a law already past, by endeavoring to convince the public, that it ought to be repealed and that such men ought to be elec ted to the legislature as will repeal it, to attempt in fine, the correction of public measures, by arguments tending to shew their improper nature or destructive tendency; never has been or can be considered as sedition in any country, where the principles of law and liberty are respected; but it is the proper and usual exercise of that right of opinion and speech, which constitutes the distinguishing feature of free government. The abuse of this privilege, by writing and publishing as facts, malicious falshoods, with intent to defame, is punishable as libellous, in the courts having jurisdiction of such offences; where the truth or falshood of the facts eiledged, and the malice or correctness of the intention, form the criterion of guilt and innocence. But the character of libellous, much less of seditious, has never been applied to the expression of opinions concerning the tendency of public measures, or to arguments urged for the purpose of opposing them, or of effecting their repeal. To apply the doctrine of sedition or of libels to such cases, would instantly distroy all libery of speech, subvert the main pillars of free government, and convert the tribunals of justice into engines of party vengence. To condemn a public measure, therefore, as pernicious in its tendency; to use arguments for proving it to be so; and to endeavor by these means to prevent its adoption, if still depending, or to procure its repeal in a regular and constitutional way, if it be already adopted, can never be considered as sedition or in any way illegal.

The first opinion expressed to the grand jury on the occasion in question, by this respondent, was, that "the late alteration of the federal judiciary, by the abolition of the office of the sixteen circuit judges;

and the recent change in our state constitution, by establishing universal suffrage; and the further alteration that was then contemplated in our state judiciary, if adopted;" would, in the judgment of this respondent, "take away all security for property and personal liberty." That is, "these three measures, if the last of them, which is still depending, should be adopted, will in my opinion, form a system whose pernicious tendency must be to take away the security for our property and our personal liberty," which we have hitherto derived from the salutary restrictions, laid by the authors of our constitution on the right of suffrage, and from the present constitution of our courts of justice." What is this but an argument to persuade the people of Maryland to reject the alterations in their state judiciary which were then proposed; which this respondent as a citizen of that state, had a right to oppose; and the adoption of which depended on a legislature then to be chosen? If this be sedition, then will it be impossible to express an opinion opposite to the views of the ruling party of the moment, or to oppose any of their measures by argument, without becoming subject to such punishment as they may think proper to inflict.

The next opinion is, that "the independence of the national judiciary was already shaken to its foundation, and that the virtue of the people alone could restore it." In other words, "The act of congress for repealing the late circuit court law, and vacating thereby the offices of the judges, has shaken to its foundation the independence of the national judiciary, and nothing but a change in the representation of congress, which the return of the people to correct sentiments can effect, will be sufficient to produce a repeal of this act, and thereby restore to its former vigor, the part of the federal constitution, which has been thus impaired." This is the obvious, meaning of the expression: and it amounts to nothing more then an argument in favor of that change which this respondent then thought and still thinks to be very desirable; an argument, the force of which as a patriot he might feel, and which as a free man he had a right to advance.

The next opinion is, that "the independence of the judges of the state of Maryland, would be entirely destroyed if the bill for abolishing the two supreme courts should be ratified by the next general as

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sembly." This opinion, however incor rect it may be, seems to have been adopted by the people of Maryland, to whom this argument against the bill in question was addressed; for at the next session of the legislature this bill which went to change entirely the constitutional tenure of judicial office in the state, and to render the subsistence of the judges depend ent on the legislature, and their continuance in office on the executive, was abandoned by common concent.

All the other opinions expressed by this respondent, as above mentioned, bear the same character with those already considered. They are arguments addressed to the people of Maryland, for the purpose of dissuading them from the adoption of a measure then depending; and of inducing them, if possible, to restore to its original state, that part of their constitution relating to the right of suffrage, by a repeal of the law, which had been made for its alteration.

Such were the objects of this respondent in delivering those opinions, and he contends that they were fair, proper and legal objects, and that he had a right to pursue them in this way: a right sanctioned by the universal practice of this country, and by the acquiescence of its various legislative authorities. Such he contends is the true and obvious meaning of the opinions which he delivered, and which he believes to be correct. It is not now necessary to enquire into their correctness; but, if incorrect, he denies that they contain any thing seditious, or any evidence of those improper intentions which are imputed to him by this article of impeachment. He denies that in delivering them to the grand jury, he committed any offence, infringed any law, or did any thing unusual, or heretofore considered in this country as improper or unbecoming in a judge. If this article of impeachment can be sustained on these grounds, the liberty of speech on national concerns, and the tenure of the judicial office under the government of the United States, must hereafter depend on the arbitraty will of the House of Representatives and the Senate, to be declared on impeachment, after the acts are done, which it may at any time be thought necessary to treat as high crimes and misdemeanors.

And the said Samuel Chase, for plea to the said eighth article of impeachment, saith that he is not guilty of any high crime and misdemeanor, as in and by the

p.52 ante.

said eighth article is alledged against him and this he prays may be inquired of by this honorable court, in such manner ás law & justice shall seem to them to require. This respondent has now laid before this Honorable Court, as well as the time allowed him would permit, all the circumstances of this case. With an humble trust in Providence and a consciousness that he hath discharged all his official duties with justice and impartiality, to the best of his knowledge and abilities: and that intentionally he hath committed no crime or misdemeanor, or any violation of the constitution or laws of this countryConfiding in the impartiality, independence and integrity of his judges, and that they will patiently hear and conscientiously determine this case, without being influenced by the spirit of party, by popular prejudice or political motives, he cheerfully submits himself to their decision.

If it shall appear to this honorable court from the evidence produced, that he hath acted in his judicial character with wilful injustice or partiality, he doth not wish any favor, but expects that the whole extent of the punishment permitted in the constitution will be inflicted upon him.

Ifany part of his official conduct shall appear to this honorable court, stricti juries, to have been illegal or to have proceeded from ignorance or error in judgment; or if any part of his conduct shall. appear, although illegal, to have been irregular or improper, but not to have flowed from a deprity of heart, or any unworthy motives, he feels confident that this court will make allowance for the imperfections and frailties incident to man. He is satisfied that every member of this tribunal will observe the principles of humanity and justice, will presume him innocent until his guilt shall be established by legal and credible witnesses; and will be governed in his decision, by the moral and christian rule, of rendering that justice to this responden which he would wish to receive. This respondent now stands not merely before an earthly tribunal, but also before that awful Being, whose presence fills all space, and whose allseeing eye more especially surveys the temples of justice and religion. In a little time, his accusers, his judges, and himself must appear at the Bar of Omnipotence, where the secrets of all hearts shall be disclosed, and every human being shall answer for his deeds done in the body, and shall be compelled to give evidence against himselfin the pretence of

assembled universe. To his omniscient. judge, at that awful hour, he now appeals for the rectitude and purity of his conduct, as to all the matters of which he is this. day accused.

He hath now only to adjure each member of this honorable court, by the ving GOD, and in his holy name, to render impartial justice to him, according to the constitution and laws of the United States. He makes this solomn demand of each member, by all his hopes of happiness in the world to come, which he will have voluntarily renounced by the oath he has taken; if he shall wilfully do this respondent injustice, or disregard the constitution or laws of the United States, which he has solemnly sworn to make the rule and standard of his judgment & decision.

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By the House of Representatives of the United States, to the preceding answer and Pleas of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the Articles of Impeachment exhibited a gainst him by the said House of Representatives-and presented in open Court by the managers on Thursday, February 7th, 1805.

THE House of Representatives of the United States have considered the Answer of Samuel Chase, one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court of the United States, to the Articles of Impeachment against him, by them expeople of the United States, and observe, hibited, in the name of themselves and of all the

"That the said Samuel Chase hath endexvoured to cover the high crimes and misdemeanors laid to his charge, by evasive insinnations and misrepresentation of facts; that the said answer does give a gloss and coloring ufterly false and untrue, to the various criminal matters contained in the said articles; that the said Samuel Chase did, in fact, commit the numerous acts of oppression, persecution, and injustice of which he stands accused; and the the truth and justice of their accusation, and of House of Representatives, in full confidence of the necessity of bringing the said Samuel Chase to a speedy and exemplary punishment, and not doubting that the Senate will use alf becoming diligence to do justice to the proceedings of the House of Representatives and to vindicate the honor of the nation, do aver their charge against the said Samuel Chase to be true, and that the said Samuel Chase is guilty in such manner as he stands impeached: And that the House of Representatives will be ready to prove their charges against him, at such convenient time and place as shall be ap pointed for that purpose.

Signed by order, and in behalf of the house.
NATH. MACON, Speaker.

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JOHN BECKLEY, Clark.

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