they were the judges both of the law and the fact, and were to determine whether the traverser had made good his defence. For ought the judge knew the jury might have been of opinion, that all the rest of the charges except what colonel Taylor would prove true, did not come under the fedition law. The fourth article accufes the refpondent of partiality. I will beg leave to call the attention of the court to the refusal to continue the trial until the fucceeding term. The reafon affigned was, that it did not appear that the witneffes who were wanting, would prove the truth of all the charges; let us examine this doctrine. The charges against Callender, were many. Under the plea of not guilty to the jury, it was competent for him to contend that the charges were true or were not criminal; both of these grounds of defence the jury were to pass upon. With what juftice could the judge fay, that because the witneffes could not prove the truth of the whole of the charges, that there abfence was no good caufe for a continuance, when the queftion of law was not to be decided by him. No other conclufion can be given to this conduct of the refpondent, than an attempt to wreft from the jury their right to decide on the criminality of the acts. The conftitution provides that the accufed fhall have compulsory process to compel the attendance of his witneffes, of no avail is this priviledge unless time is allowed for the witneffes to attend. Of what avail is it to fay, that procefs fhall iffue to compel the attendance of witneffes, when the party is forced to trial before the process can be returned? This is worse than mockery, it is high treafon against the majetty of the conftitution. Callender was indicted, tried, convicted and purifhed whilst his witneffes were abfent. Shall we be afked for proofs of corrupt intent in the refpondent? It is on all hands admitted, that he yields to none in legal learning and abilities, and is

poffeffed or talents, we might adorn the tribunals of any country. Then I afk, whether on a question fo fimple, he could have erred without intention? I answer, no fir. Can it be fuppofed that every thing was done to stifle the defence of the accufed, and yet the judge be free from corrupt intention.Let gentlemen look at the teftimony, & they will find damning proofs of an intention in the refpondent, to opprefs, and produce the conviction of Callender. The fifth and fixth articles, are founded on grounds fo fimple, that I will not take up the time of the court in difcuffing them, but will proceed to the feventh. This article charges a conduct in the refpondent, than which, nothing could tend more to tarnish his official character. The conftitution and laws of the United States, have intended that all judges fhould be impartial difpenfers of juftice. In criminal cafes, it was intended that they fhould ftand aloof from prejudice, but judge Chafe in this tranfaction, became a hunter after accufation. Difregarding his high judicial station, he becomes the procurer of profecution. Surely his thirst for punishment must have been great, when he could not await the tardy movements of the public profecutor and of the grand jury. If, Mr. Prefident, our judges are to turn informers, and feek after profecution, then must this country become the nurfery of oppreffion. Í fhall not make many obfervations on the eighth article. I confider it of peculiar importance as it exhibits the general fpirit of the refpondent. It places the refpondent in a grand fituation. We have heretofore feen his power only extended to individuals, but on this occafion, we behold his gigantic genius. railing him to a furprising height, and whole governments fubject to his wrath. Both the acts of the ftate of Maryland and of the United States, are expofed to the whip and the rack. There is no truth more facred, than the language of the eighth article, that "without

public harmony there can be no public happiness." What language can defcribe the conduct of a judge who at tempts to deftroy the refpect which the people entertain for the acts of both the state and general governments. It was not fufficient that a perfon fitting in the judgment feat of the nation, converted it into a forum to pronounce philippics against the ftate in which he fat as judge; but the congrefs of the United States must be held up to view as the facrilegious violators of the conftitution of their country. Mr. Prefident, I have done, and in conclufion, will obferve, that in my opinion, we have established against the refpondent, a volume of guilt, every page of which calls aloud for vengeance. I fhall leave the cause of the refpondent, in hands where there will be a different measure of justice than he is wont to mete to others, and where it will be administered without refpect to perfons.

Mr. CAMPBELL,

are adequate to the investigation of the fubject, and that there is no probability that juftice will not take, place.The fcene before us is more than ufually interefting and important. One of the highest officers of the country is called upon to answer before the very tribunal that sanctioned his elevation. It is a truth which has been eftablished by the experience of ages, that high offices generally corrupt thofe to whom they are entrusted, and few have been found able to refist the impulfe of grafping at ftill greater pow ers than they poffefs. Hence it has been the exertion of all governments who regard the liberties of the people, to guard against the abufe of power, by calling on those to whom it is entrufted, to give an account of the manner in which they have executed their truft. For this purpofe the trial by impeachment was early reforted to in England. More than five hundred years ago, the reprefentatives of the people in that nation, called upon the higheft officers to account for their conduct, and to be punished for a violation of the law. The trial by

Senate,

It is with peculiar diffidence that I rife on this important occafion. Senfible of my inability to do juftice to the caufe, were I left to confult my own inclination, I fhould decline the undertaking. But being called upon by the house of reprefentatives, to aid in the profecution, I must obey the voice of my country, and perform my duty. Under thefe impreflions I fhall proceed to investigate the queftion as well as the short time which I have been able to devote to it, owing to my other avocations and the narrow means of information in this place on the fub ject of impeachment will permit me. I feel however fully confident, that I am affociated with gentlemen fully competent to fupply my deficiencies; and that the members of the fenate

accufed, because the higheft tribunal in the nation cannot be influenced, and party fpirit will always be laid afide. In the view which I fhall take of this fubject, it will be proper first to notice the provisions relative to impeachment, and to fhew how far they apply to the prefent accufation. In the conftitution of the United States it is faid, "that the fenate fhall have the fole power of trying all impeachments." Here let me obferve, that the wisdom of the framers of the conftitution is plainly difcovered in this fection. The highest and most enlightened tribunal in the nation, is charged with the protection of the people, and to proteft against thofe whom they themselves had elevated to power, and of whom they had once entertained fo favorable an opinion. -No inferior tribunal is allowed to

try an officer of the government, and judges are placed out of the reach of fufpicion. But the "judgment in cafes of impeachment cannot extend farther than a removal from office, and a difqualification to hold an office of honor, truft or profit, under the United States." Here the conftitution makes, an evident distinction between fuch crimes as are punishable by impeachment, and those punishable by indictment. So far as the offence of the officer is injurious to fociety, and calculated to endanger the lives and liberties of the people, fo far is he impeachable before this tribunal, and not elsewhere. But where an indictment will lie for the offence, there an impeachment will not. An impeachment is a kind of inqueft, to examine in what manner the officers have difcharged their duty. It is not therefore neceffary that the offence fhould be an indictable one, to render it a fubject of impeachment, but that the officer has abufed the trust repofed in him and endangered the liberties of the people. The mode of proceeding in the cafes of impeachment and indictment clearly fhews the diftinction between them. In the former no procefs issued to take the party into cuitody, but merely a fummons for him to appear at the bar of this court, to an fwer the charges. This plainly evin ces, that it is not confidered a criminal acculation. Incafes in courts of ordinary jurifdiction, the perfonal attendance of the party accufed is neceffary, but in this cafe it is not. Either there must be a diftinction between the offences, or this monstrous abfurdity is involved; that a man may be punished twice for the fame offence, firit by impeachment and then by indictment. It must I think appear evident to every gentleman who hears me, that the diftinction does exist between impeachable and indictable offences; and that when the conftitution declares that the officer may be proceeded against by indictment, it

must mean in offences not impeachable. And that an impeachment lies for an abufe of the power entrusted to an officer, and done in his official capacity, and punishable by this tribunal; and an indictment lies for fomething not done in his official capacity, and to be tried in a court of ordinary jurifdiction. With this view of the fubject I will proceed to examine the articles of impeachment and the evidence. It will not be expected that I fhall enter into a minute detail of the volume of evidence which has been adduced in this cafe, I fhall only confider the facts which have been proved, and from thefe I will attempt to establish that on the whole conduct of judge Chafe, he was actuated by motives of oppreffion, and a difpofition to bear down all oppofition to his principles. There is not a fingle article not strongly marked with oppreffion, and fpringing from political intolerence. In order to obferve some arrangement in my argument. I fhall confider first the conduct of the judge at the trial of Fries. I fhall alfo confider his conduct at the trial of Calleuder for a libel, fo far as it is embraced in the fecond, third and fourth articles. The fifth and fixth articles I fhall leave to thofe of my colleagues who are better acquainted with the fubject than I am. The two last articles shall be relied upon by me to fhow the motives of the judge. In examining the first article I thall rely on the following pofitions. I fhall firft endeavor to fhew that Fries

was entitled to the benefit of his counfels being heard on the law as well as the fact, without being fubject to the reftrictions impofed on them by the judge. I fhall fecondly contend, that the judge by delivering his opinion, did virtually prevent the counfel from arguing the cafe. And that he did impofe reftrictions unknown before, and then I fhall infift that those actions could only fpring from corrupt motives, and a difpofition in judge Chafe

to opprefs all thofe who came before him for trial who differed in political opinions with him.

My firft pofition is fupported by the eighth article amendatory of the conftitution, which provides "that the accufed fhall have the benefit of counfel for his defence." Of what benefit will counfel be when an opinion is delivered before they are heard. Of what benefit can counfel be when they are to be fubject to the arbitrary rules of the court? According to the doctrine of the refpondent, the right of the accufed to have counfel would be a mere nothing. If a man has the benefit, he has alfo the means of ufing it. Although it is faid, in the answer filed by the refpondent, that in fome refpects the counfel are the mere officers of the court, yet counfel are protected in the exercife of their rights as completely as the judge; and not fubject to the arbitrary restrictions of the court. I will now proceed to the fecond pofition which I laid down, which is, that the judge by delivering an opinion, did virtually prevent the counfel from arguing the cafe. The fact of the judges having delivered an opinion, is admitted in his anfwer, pages 11 and 13. It is alfo proved by testimony that will not admit of a doubt, and it only remains, to enquire into the reafons of the judge, for departing from the univerfal practice. It was a direct violation of the conftitutional right which the prifoner had fecured to him. But it is infifted on by the judge, that the cafe had before been decided and the point of law fettled, and it is afked, "whether any evil could refult from the delivery of the opinion at any stage of the trial." We do not charge that the opinion was erroneous, but that the judge decided without hearing counfel, and prevented the counfel from being heard, thereby depriving the prifoner of his conftitutional right. If this conduct was correct, what would be the confequences? The judge might pafs final

fentence without a jury trial. This is the fum of the excufe made by the refpondent, that the opinion was correct, and that he muft finally have delivered it, and therefore there was no neceffity to hear counfel. Dangerous, fir, would be this doctrine. If true, the boafted trial by jury is a mere phantom, toffed about by the breath of every judge, and would be unable to anfwer any good purpose whatever. I' will now ftate, that the conduct of the judge was contrary to the rules and ufages of courts. For the truth of this affertion, I may refer to the whole teftimony adduced in this caufe. Not a folitary inftance has occured, where all the witneffes practifed law, of a judge delivering an opinion before argument. By this act, the judge has broken the eftablished practice of courts, and it is incumbent on him to fhew that it was proper. I will here notice an admiffion of the judge, which faves me the neceflity of proving what he admits. In the eleventh page of his anfwer, he ftates that the jury had the right in the cafe of Fries, to decide on the law; but he alfo ftates, that the court had a right to give an opinion on the law. If this is true, the judge had an equal right to give an opinion on the facts; becaufe the jury had the fame power to decide the law as well as the fact. Once establish this doctrine, and the trial by jury is not worth prefervation. I will now proceed to the third pofition, which is that the judge did impofe arbitrary restrictions on the counfel for Fries." This pofition is clearly established by the teftimony of Mr. Lewis and Mr. Dallas. Mr. Lewis, declared in his evidence, that judge Chafe faid, "that in a former trial, great wafle of time had taken place in reading common law authorities and decifions under the ftatutes of England, before their revolution, and alfo the ftatutes of the United States, and that it fhould not take place again." Let me bring to the recollection of the court, the delivering of the R