Ohio was substituted for the Mobile & Ohio in the respective routes shown. On January 26, 1943, in Emerson's I. C. C. No. 299, supplement 97, as item 4697 P, the route numbered 2089-8 under item 14496 F was published as YM 545, except that the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio appears instead of the Mobile & Ohio. On March 5, 1943, Emerson's No. 299 was superseded by his I. C. C. No. 325, wherein, under item 4585 which published the rate of 29 cents, route YM 545 became IC4140, and "Y&MV" in the route was changed to "IC Sys." This was the state of the governing tariff at the time complainants' shipments moved.

From the foregoing history, it is now plain that route IC-4140 was published with the words "and connections" upon specific request therefor by at least one of the parties thereto, and that its publication cannot be ascribed either to error or to inadvertence.

At the time complainants' shipments moved, there were published in Emerson's I. C. C. No. 325 a number of routes on various commodities from Baton Rouge and nearby points to St. Louis, East St. Louis, and other destinations which reflect circuities as great as, or greater than, any claimed by complainants herein. Thus, on class and column rates from Baton Rouge to St. Louis and East St. Louis the maximum circuity specifically authorized was 75 percent. As stated, the Nashville route here claimed reflects a maximum circuity of 52 percent. On lead sludge from Baton Rouge to St. Louis a specifically published route is circuitous by 81 percent. A specific route in connection with a rate on pig iron from Baton Rouge to Memphis, Tenn., through Nashville, is circuitous by 165 percent. A rate on motor fuel antiknock compound from Baton Rouge to various destinations in Illinois and Indiana carries specific routing which in some instances embraces eight different lines (a maximum of six lines participated in the routes claimed by complainants) and reflects a maximum circuity in routes which specified Chattanooga as an authorized junction point of 73 percent. A rate on bagging from New Orleans to Kansas City, Mo., specifically authorized a route through Chattanooga and East St. Louis which is 90 percent longer than the direct route. From New Orleans to St. Louis or East St. Louis rates on various commodities were published in this tariff in connection with specific routes through Chattanooga which reflect circuity ranging up to 77 percent. Other specific routes in the tariff in connection with rates from Louisiana origins to Missouri and Illinois destinations are circuitous by as much as 123 percent.

It thus appears that, measured by the common practice of defendants at the time these shipments moved, the routes here claimed can

not be regarded as unusual, unnatural, or impracticable. See ArcherDaniels-Midland Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 272 I. C. C. 776, (October 12, 1948), by division 2.

Our decision herein, however, turns more specifically upon the application of another principle of tariff interpretation, namely, that where an intermediate rule is published in connection with specific routing or with a routing provision stating that the rates will apply over all routes composed of lines of carriers parties to the tariff, a rate subject to the intermediate rule will apply at intermediate points. Union Underwear Co., Inc., v. Frankford & C. R. Co., 214 I. C. C. 695; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Alton R. Co., 231 I. C. C. 743. The evidence upon which this principle applies will now be discussed. Item 4585 of Emerson's I. C. C. No. 325, in effect at the time these shipments moved, under which item route IC-4140 was published, embodied a circled reference mark "F50" ahead of the commodity description. That reference mark was explained to mean that the rates under that item were subject to item 185 of the tariff. This latter item was entitled "Commodity rates applicable from and to intermediate points," and was subject to three specific limitations. The first provided that the rates in item 4585 were not applicable from or to intermediate points on the lines of the Gulf Transportation Company or the Tennessee Central Railway Company; the second, that such rates were not applicable to intermediate points in Canada in connection with rates applying from and to points in the United States over routes through Canada; and the third, that the provisions of item 185 would apply only where that item was specifically referred to, subject, however, to items 200, 205, and 215. Items 200 and 205 had reference only to rates from New Orleans, and item 215, to the expiration dates of certain rate items. Since none of the destinations to which complainants' shipments moved was served by the Gulf Transportation Company or the Tennessee Central as a destination carrier, and none of the routes used passed through Canada, such limitations have no application to the issues before us.

Section 2 of item 185, so far as here pertinent, provided:

to any point of destination to which a commodity rate on a given article from a given point of origin and via a given route is not named in this tariff, which point is intermedate to a point to which a commodity rate on said article is published in this tariff via a route through the intermediate point over which such commodity rate applies from the same point of origin, apply to such intermediate point from such point of origin and via such route, the commodity rate in this tariff on said article to the next point beyond to which a commodity rate is published herein on that article from the same point of origin via the same route.

Complainants are opposed to a determination of this issue on the basis of cost of service. Nevertheless, an analysis of the costs, if accurately computed, is of substantial assistance in examining the question of reasonableness. Normally, switching operations should be conducted without a loss and the carrier performing such services is entitled to charges which produce sufficient revenue to pay not only for the expense of providing the service but also a proper proportion of the carrier's taxes and return on investment. See Sonken-Galamba Corp. v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 181 I. C. C. 229, 248, 194 I. C. C. 239. In the instant proceeding, the cost study as restated clearly demonstrates, from the standpoint of cost of service, that the assailed charges are not in excess of maximum reasonable charges. The record is free of any convincing evidence from any other standpoint leading to a contrary or different conclusion.

Unjust discrimination.-Complainants contend that defendant's practices of applying charges for switching at Brownsville without due regard to their uniformity as between shippers and defendant's watercarrier connections violate section 2 of the act. To support this position they show that 19 separate and distinct charges apply to traffic handled in switch service at Brownsville. As hereinbefore indicated the switching charges range from $3.72 for a haul of approximately 1 mile between defendant's interchange with the Texas & New Orleans and Aransas Compress No. 1 to $24.00 for a haul of approximately 10 miles between the defendant's interchange with the bridge company and navigation district. There is no showing on this record that different charges are exacted by defendant for the performance of like and contemporaneous services in the transport of like kinds of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions. A mere difference in charges does not establish unjust discrimination. Chicago Coal Merchants Assn. v. Director General, 151 I. C. C. 21, 25. Undue prejudice and preference.-Complainants' allegations with respect to undue prejudice are also based on the comparisons of the charges applicable at the compared gateways and ports with those applicable at Brownsville. It has been previously noted that the defendant does not serve, and does not publish switching charges at any of the compared points with the exception of Houston. Under the decision of Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U. S. 627, which holds that the legal test of undue preference and prejudice is the effective participation of a given railroad in both the preferring and prejudicing rates, it would appear that only the switching charges at Houston are relevant to this issue. Complainants, however, assert that the charges at the other gateways and ports may be considered in support of the section 3 allegation since the carriers performing or

participating in the switching at such points, as well as the defendant, are all a part of the Missouri Pacific Lines. Consequently, it is contended there is sufficient participation by the defendant in the service at the allegedly preferred points, in addition to Houston, to satisfy the legal requirements of Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. United States, supra. Particular emphasis is placed on the fact that the railroad companies affiliated under the trade name of Missouri Pacific Lines, now being reorganized under the bankruptcy statutes of the United States, are being operated by a common trustee under the supervision of the Federal Court.

The sole carrier, however, before us in this proceeding is the named defendant. The other carriers who served the compared gateways and ports, other than Houston, are not parties defendant and would not be subject to any order entered herein. In any event, the question is largely academic since complainants have failed to show a section 3 violation for other reasons. Fundamentally, under this section of the act, it is encumbent to establish injury or damage, actual or potential, as a result of the prejudicial rates or charges. Complainants attempt to sustain this burden by the general assertion that the terminals at Brownsville are partially closed to traffic as a result of the lower switching charges at the compared terminals. The record fails to substantiate such a conclusion. The population of Brownsville has increased from 22,000 in 1940 to 35,000 in 1948. Bank deposits from 1940 to 1947 have increased approximately sixfold and consumption of power has already increased to a point not previously anticipated until 1954. At the navigation district, a 21-million dollar refinery plant and two chemical plants costing between 20 and 30 millions of dollars are now under construction. Negotiations are also under way with other industries for plant locations on the port property. This indicates a continuing and substantial industrial development at Brownsville which is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with complainants' assertion that the terminals are partially closed as a result of the assailed switching charges. We have previously concluded that operating conditions at the allegedly preferred terminals have not been shown to be similar to those found at Brownsville. The failure to establish affirmatively a similarity of circumstances and conditions as between the compared locations, coupled with a lack of injury or damage to Brownsville, precludes any finding that the assailed charges are unduly prejudicial.

Since the submission of the instant proceeding, general increases in rates and charges have been authorized, Increased Freight Rates, 1948, 272 I. C. C. 695, decided December 29, 1948. Increases in the

wsmiled charges, as authorized by that report, are not precluded by our findings herein.

We find that the charges published and exacted by the defendant for the performance of the above-described switching services at Brownsville are not shown to be unreasonable or otherwise unlawful. The complaint will be dismissed.