able barrier between man and brute. Mr. Darwin has shown that the rude germ of all the more characteristic features of the human mind may be discovered in animals; but his investigations in this direction amounted only to a beginning. His unfinished work has now been taken up by one who adds to the biological knowledge of the expert a considerable acquaintance with psychology. Dr. Romanes's present contribution to the theory of evolution is emphatically the construction of hypothetical stepping-stones for the purpose of passing smoothly from the territory of animal to that of human reasoning. In order to do this, he has, on the one hand, to follow up animal intellection to its most noteworthy achievements, and, on the other hand, to trace the process of human intellection down to its crudest forms in the individual and in the race.

As it is obviously language which marks off human thought from its analogue in the animal world, our author is naturally concerned to limit the function of language, and he urges that there is a good deal of rudimentary generalizing prior to, and therefore independent of, language. To establish this, a careful examination of the higher processes of animal "ideation" has to be carried out. In doing this, Dr. Romanes introduces a number of phychological distinctions of a somewhat technical kind. Of these the most important, perhaps, is that between the time-honored concept of the logician and the recept. According to our author, animal reasoning remains on the plan of recepts, and he has clearly made out the existence of a very creditable power among animals of carrying out processes analogous to our own reasonings without any aid from language.

Yet the account of the recept is a little unsatisfactory, owing to the circumstance that the writer does not make it quite clear in what sense it involves generalization. He writes in some places as if the fact of the generic image having been formed out of a number of percepts corresponding to different members of a class, e. g., different sheets of water seen by the diving bird, gives it a general representative character. But this, as indeed Dr. Romanes himself appears to recognize in other places, is by no means a necessary consequence. A generic image may form itself more readily than a particular one, just because the animal is unable to note differences sufficiently to distinguish one object from another.

The recept or generic image is the first of the psychological stepping-stones leading across the unfordable Rubicon, and it is also the principal stepping-stone. Should this prove to be unstable the transit would certainly become exceedingly doubtful.

From the recept we pass to the concept, which, according to our anthor, is in its simplest form a named recept. The addition of the name or sign is thus the differentiating character of the concept.

In order to understand how the concept is marked off from the recept our author inquires into the psychological conditions and concomitants of the naming process, giving a full and detailed account of names and signs in general, distinguishing different grades of sign-making from the merely indicative pointing or other gesture up to the bestowal of a general symbol, with a consciousness of its significance as connoting certain common qualities. One of the most curious features of this theory of concepts and naming is the proposition that the name is bestowed on the idea, and has for its psychological condition an act of introspection. We are told that before we can bestow a name on a recept we must be able to set this recept before our mind as an object of our own thought; or, to put it in the author's own words, self-consciousness is the necessary presupposition of naming and so of conceptual thought.

The doctrine seems by no means as clear and convincing as the author supposes. Is a child when inventing a name for his toy-horse or doll reflecting on the idea as his and naming this idea? Is he not rather thinking wholly about the

object, and is not the name given to this external object and not to the idea in the namer's mind?

In naming things the mind is occupied, not with itself and its ideas, but with the qualities and relations of things perceived or represented. We ask, is an animal at the stage of mental development at which it appears to begin to understand names, and even to make use of them, capable of carrying out the processes that go along with, and in fact constitute, naming in its true and complete sense? To say that an animal is carrying out, in a rudimentary way, these thought-processes, we must be prepared to endow it with the power of naming, whether under the form of understanding or that of using names. Dr. Romanes deals with this point by distinguishing between the higher and lower forms of the concept. He discovers four stadia in the evolution of the complete logical sign or general name. Of the the first (a) the indicative sign, representing the characreristic tones by which animals express their emotions. These are not names at all. Next come (b) denotative signs, but by the use of these signs children or animals do not really connote anything of the particular object, quality, or action which the signs denote. Next in order follow (c) connotative signs which involve the “classificatory attribution of qualities to objects." This attribution of qualities may be effected by either a receptual or a conceptual mode of ideation. A child uses the term star for all brightly shining objects. Here there was a perception of likeness, but no setting of the term before its mind as an object of thought. Lastly (d) the denominative sign, which means a connotative sign consciously bestowed with a full appreciation of its office and purpose as a

name.

Altogether the author's account of sign-accompanied ideation is not quite satisfactory; and Dr. Romanes cannot be said to have succeeded in his main object, viz., the obliteration of all qualitative difference between human and animal intellection by the interposition of psychological links which have the essential characters of both.

IF

SCIENCE AND IMMORTALITY.
AUGUSTUS JAY DUBOIS.
Century, New York, December.

F a man die, shall he live again? The Christian meets the issue raised by this question with a hope that reaches beyond the grave. But even to the Christian must come times when the hope grows dim and doubts press, and he realizes that hope alone does not necessarily imply conviction. The heart would fain believe, but the intellect falters and hangs back. Thus it becomes of supreme importance to inquire whether the faith based upon revelation can be securely linked to intellectual conviction.

What has the science of to-day to say about the problem of immortality? is a question that appeals to all.

The future life we believe in is based directly upon the manifestations of matter and force as interpreted by science, not upon their negation, It is always within the province of science to employ legitimate inferences from observed facts. Its proudest claim has been its ability, from a study of the past, to foretell the future, and if this process is sound, then it seems to me that science furnishes material for an argument of the greatest strength in favor of immortality.

By rational inference from observed facts, the conclusion was reached independently by two astronomers, Laverrier and Adams, that, far beyond the orbit of Uranus, another planet must exist. By further rational study of the known facts, the place of the new planet was fixed; and when Dr. Galle turned his telescope to the indicated place. the planet (Neptune) was found. But, suppose the planet had not been found? Astronomers would, nevertheless, have been forced to conclude that, whether visible or not, the planet existed.

The scientific argument for a future life is similar in character to this supposed case. Irresistibly indicated by the facts,

the character of the argument and the validity of the conclusion is not less scientific in every sense, and should be no whit less conclusive even though the test of experimental verification is withheld.

It was the recognized fundamental principle of gravitation that made necessary the conclusion that there existed beyond the orbit of Uranus an unknown planet. To give scientific value to our discussion of the question of immortality, we must be guided by some such generally acknowledged principle. This principle I would state as follows:

The universe in all its parts is the visible manifestation to us of underlying mind, and all interpretation by us of the phenomena of nature should, therefore, be guided by the assumption of underlying purpose.

This principle is the direct outcome of what we know of nature, as necessary for harmonizing our knowledge as the assumption of the existence of Neptune, and I, therefore, claim it a strictly scientific deduction from known facts. It is an understood fact of science that a change in any of the parts of the universe affects the whole. If the motion of a single atom of matter is changed, every atom in the universe must be affected thereby. It is another admitted fact that physical contact of any two atoms or ultimate particles of matter is impossible.

If this be so, how is it that a change of motion of one atom can affect all other atoms in the universe? This question remains mechanically unsolved; but when we come to study our own organism, we find the mysterious fact to have a very striking connection with our own daily experience. We find that within our organism certain portions of matter are governed by mind, and move in accordance with the dictates of will. Following the sequence of cause and effect, we finally arrive at some molecular brain-disturbance, and there, as with the physicists, mechanical explanation can go no further. We meet again the same inscrutable mystery. We are thus obliged to recognize mind as an essential condition of motion, so far as voluntary motion affects ourselves.

But these brain disturbances, which thus reveal to us the action of the mind, must affect the motions of every particle of matter in the universe. This is admitted. This forces the conclusion that the universe is so constructed that in every part and throughout its whole extent, mind not only can but does affect it.

If now all our experience were confined to observation of ourselves alone, we could not imagine even a possible exception to the conclusion of a universe governed by mind. We should thus consider it demonstrated that in mind, and mind alone, all motion had its origin.

(Concluded next week.)

EXPLOSIONS AND RAIN.

CH. ED. GUILLAUME.
La Nature, Paris, November 7.

A QUESTION still in suspense and in regard to which no

decisive conclusion has been reached, is that of the possible connection between explosions and rainfalls. Observations alternate, for or against. If on one side numerous and very exact coincidences have been remarked, on the other side are recorded many cases in which explosions appeared to have no effect on clouds or mist. From all the experiments can be drawn, at least, one conclusion, that the agitation of the air provokes condensation under favorable circumstances only. As I have heretofore remarked, this important question cannot be solved, save by registering with the utmost care all the circumstances which accompany each experiment: temperature, nature of the clouds, nature of the explosions, interval between the first explosion and the beginning of the rain, the extent and duration of the latter,

Let me mention two recent observations. Of these, the

first was communicated by Mr. W. R. Pidgeon to the excellent English Review, Nature:

'On the first of October, at five o'clock in the evening, in the quarries of Penryhn, a great quantity of useless stone was. cleared away by a single explosion of five tons of powder. During the entire day a violent wind had been blowing and the clouds, while heavy, were high; there had been no rain, and little sun, and the temperature was quite low.

'Immediately after the explosion the wind lulled, there was. an absolute calm for five or six minutes, and, twenty minutes. after, a fine rain began to fall, which became gradually harder and did not stop for an hour and a half. At seven o'clock all the perturbations caused by the explosion had apparently ceased, and the weather became like what it had been all day. The rain was wholly local and did not extend more than six or seven miles from the quarry."

The second observation was communicated to me by one of our readers in Bordeaux:

An explosion of gun-cotton took place, about a month ago, at a powder-mill in the suburbs of the city. The explosion was felt at a great distance. The sky was cloudy that day, but without rain. Three minutes after the powder went off, abundant rain fell."

Of course, while admitting that these narratives are exactly true, it is not disrespectful to keep in mind the well-known story of the Academicians and the fish of Frederic II.— —a story told with several variations, of which the following is one. A physicist had some friends to breakfast. When the cigars were passed round, the company went out and smoked them in the garden. One of the guests, placing his hand accidentally on a glass globe covered with silver foil, remarked, with surprise, that it was warmer on the shady side than on that on which the rays of the sun fell. The savans put their heads together to examine and discuss this singular phenomenon. Plausible reasons were not lacking, but it was finally decided that none of these reasons were satisfactory. They were about to declare that the matter was inexplicable, when the gardener, guessing what they were talking about, approached the group and said: Gentlemen, I am the cause of the difficulty, for I have just turned the globe round."

Examples of this kind multiply. I will try to show one way in which can be explained the action of shocks of the air upon the condensation of watery vapor.

I remark, in the first place, that the effect of an explosion can be perceived at a great distance without any warning to the ear. The great instance of Krakatau will remain memorable. It has not been forgotten that the wave of compression produced by this formidable perturbation, was perceived at Paris by a disturbance of the barometer, which was twice manifested, first, for the shortest passage of the wave and then, some hours afterwards, for the passage over the other part of the great circle passing through Paris and Krakatau.

In the next place, we know, by the admirable experiments of Messrs. Aitken and de R. von Helmholtz, that the air can be saturated to excess with vapor, notably, if it be thoroughly free from dust; but, as soon as the smallest drop forms, it enlarges in the twinkling of an eye, and the equilibrium, before unstable, becomes stable by the sudden condensation of all the vapor which has passed beyond the state of saturation. This experiment confirms in a striking manner the theorem demonstrated intuitively by Sir William Thomson, that the tension of vapor in the vicinity of a liquid depends on the superficial curve of the latter. What is wanted by the perturbation of the air, is not to produce a working power, but only to start the thing after the fashion of the train of powder which makes a cartridge explode.

We know, by the classic experiment of the pneumatic tinderbox, that a compression of the air produces an elevation of the temperature, while an expansion of the air has the effect of cooling the temperature. Assuredly, the variations of temper

ature caused by an explosion are slight, but nothing prevents our admitting that the cooling is sufficient to cause the saturation to go beyond the point at which it can be held by the air. Dew is formed in some place by the wave of expansion, and the rupture of equilibrium thus begun is bound to increase.

This hypothesis is not the only one that can be made. In all hypotheses account must be taken of the fact that explosions act very unequally. When the action of dust can be perceived, as in the case of explosions separated from the smoke in the midst of the surrounding air in unstable equilibrium, the effect, confirmed by the experiments of the laboratory, is undeniable; but in most cases it is impossible to admit that the dust has acted, and we are obliged to explain this rain by the agitation of the air. It is very difficult to appreciate the efficiency of the different actions which can be attributed to this agitation. As I said at the beginning, exact observations are indispensable. I think I have shown that it is not a waste of time to make experiments, if they are made without the experimenter having made up his mind one way or other. Let us hope that in a few years the question of whether explosions can produce rain will be resolved in the affirmative or be finally buried.

THE

CORAL ISLANDS.

DR. E. GOEBELER.

Das Ausland, Stuttgart, November.

THE existence of reef-building coral insects is conditioned by three factors, a certain minimum temperature of the water, a sufficiently flat bottom for settling, and a certain purity and nourishing quality of the water. Where these conditions exist, the insects settle in such numbers that their calcareous sediments form reefs and islands.

The reefs often stretch many hundred kilometers from the tropical shores like rockwalls, usually swept by flood tide, but reaching out of water at ebb like a broad platform. A long line of breakers indicates their whereabouts. The reef around Vanua Levu is more than one hundred sea miles long, and on the west coast of New Caledonia there is one four hundred sea miles long. The great reef on the east coast of the Australian continent is 1,250 sea miles long, An "Atoll" is a circular coral formation and synonymous with "lagoon island, and called so by their inhabitants in the Indian Ocean. They are from one kilometer to over fifty kilometers in diameter. Thousands of them are to be found in the tropical seas.

We have succeeded in following the development of coral growths from a certain stadium, but that does not prove their origin. We have studied the development of the reef from a certain depth on and thus left out of consideration two important facts. If the growth of corals is limited to about 30 m., then we should expect new beginnings to take place within that limit only. But if that be the case how is it, then, that there are such immense depths around cora! islands, depths which probably reach far below the zone of coral life? The Atolls" might be crowns upon submarine mountains, but that explanation is insufficient to account for reef walls. Were it so, then we would be compelled to suppose that all those islands and continents, which are surrounded by reef walls, were also surrounded by circular mountains in the depths of the ocean. Darwin has estimated the size of some of these walls. Those at the Gambier Islands he thought 600 m. high; the size of the Upolu reef is probably 130 m., and some of the reefs at the Fiji can be no less than 600 m. At the Atolls" the depths are, no doubt, much greater. Darwin's theory offers the simplest solution of the difficulty. He was the first who made exact and systematic examinations of the coral islands. On his voyage around the earth, 1832-36, he studied the coral islands of Keeling, Gambier, Tahiti, etc., and was surprised at the frequent changes of the reefs, from marginal reefs to wall reefs, to" Atolls," but came to the conclusion that they were all various stages of the same development, and that

"

one and the same cause was their origin. The cause he took to be the gradual sinking of the bottom of the sea; a sinking so gradual that the corals arise correspondingly in the same time. Let us suppose a continent surrounded by a far and wide-stretching marginal reef. The reef will grow up straight while the land gradually sinks. The outer edge of the coral reef grows fastest, the inner slower. In course of time a wall reef arises in that way. An island surrounded by a marginal reef will, while sinking gradually, be encircled by a wall reef, and the inner sphere, formerly the island, is replaced by a lagoon; or, if the island does not sink entirely out of sight, it remains partly in the centre, surrounded by the lagoon; in this case it is an "Atoll."

The main objections to the theory of land sinking have been formulated thus by Langenbeck: (1) That "Atolls," wall reefs, and shore reefs, alike, occur in near related places, stand in conflict with the theory of land sinking. (2) The discovery of extensive submarine sedimentary banks of organic calcareous remains point to the possibility of the formation of "Atolls' and wall reefs without the help of land sinking. (3) The circular formation of "Atolls" and the building of wall reefs is explained by the better growth of corals on the outside of the reef in the surf of purest water, and the throwing back by the force of the surf of the decayed parts. (4) The calculations of the extent of coral reefs, as based upon the theory of land sinking, have no foundations in fact as regards modern reefs, nor in earlier geological formations.

W

THE REFLEX EFFECT OF ASIATIC IDEAS.
Spectator, London, November.

E all think of the increase of communication between Europe and Asia as increasing the intellectual grip of Europe on Asia, but it must also facilitate the reflex action of Asiatic ideas on Europe. This prophecy, made a quarter of a century ago, has not hitherto been fulfilled. The dividing barrier between the thoughts of the East and West has proved tenacious, and though, to the surprise of many, Oriental art has made capture of the European mind, the special thoughts of the East have made little visible impression. We fancy, however, that the barrier is cracking. By far the most startling fact in the biography of Laurence Oliphant was the proof it afforded that Western minds-for Oliphant was not alonecould accept and act on a leading Asiatic idea, that if a man could utterly dominate self, and make the body a completely passive agent of the will, he would wrest from Heaven, or Fate, or the Universum, whichever it was, powers transcending those known from experience to be possessed by human beings. That was the governing hope which impelled Laurence Oliphant to his strange life, with its victory, as he thought, over the flesh; and it will, by and by, probably impel much stronger natures than his. Fortunately, those who try it will be few, for the Western mind, unlike the Eastern, can never be quite dominated by an idea, and always applies to it some test which, in the case of a theory like self-suppression, is sure, sooner or later, to be fatal. We shall see, however, a few trials, witness the rise of some strange sects, and probably see a large diffusion of that Eastern idea, the presence of the all-pervading universal spirit in all things, good, evil, and indifferent, which, if Mr. J. A. Symonds is a sound critic, is the governing thought, indeed the sole thought, of Walt Whitman, and which his critic also believes to be of the essence of democracy. You see both ideas filling Russian literature even now, and the thought of the Slav, which differs from all other thought in Europe by instantly producing act, as thought does in children, has a great part yet to play in moulding the West.

So has Buddhist thought. All that stuff about Mahatmas is rubbish, unsupported by a trace of evidence, a merely stupid expression of the desire of so many minds for guidance either incapable of error, or less capable than the guidance of ordinary beings; but the Mahatma notion is a mere excrescence on a

creed which has a big thought imbedded in it. We are surprised to perceive that the French Buddhists, and the English as represented by Mrs. Besant, avow a belief in the doctrine of transmigration, or, as the latter prefers to call it, of reincarnation. To most Englishmen that idea, which in one way or another dominates the whole of non-Mussulman Asia, has a slightly comic effect, derived, we fancy, chiefly from the impression that to become an animal-which could only be a result of continuous degradation—would be an absurdity. The doctrine, however, as really held in Asia, has an astonishing charm for some subtle minds. There is not a particle of evidence for the hopothesis, which has against it, in a philosophic sense, the want of purpose in the total of existence; but it does explain the visible phenomena, and that, in so modern a way that nothing would surprise us less than to see it adopted by great crowds who, in their passion of pity, accuse God of oppression because He suffers unearned pain to exist among mankind. It will have its career, too, if faith in a personal God dies out, for humanity will always explore the whence and the whether; and if the ultimate cause be either universal and eternal matter, or intangible and undesigning spirit, the central thought of Buddhism is as good an explanation as man is likely to forge. We wonder if the worst idea of Asia, that morality has no immutable basis, but is a fluctuating law dependent upon some inexplicable relation between the individual and the Creator, or the individual and the All, will ever come over here. The Indian holds that a line of conduct may be right for one man, or indeed imperative, but wrong for another, or indeed insufferable; that a world-wide law is unthinkable; and that each man will be judged because of his obedience to some law external to himself, yet peculiar to his own personality. The king's obligation to the Divine is not the peasant's; the ordinary Brahmin must be monogamous, while the Koolin Brahmin may have sixty wives; the trader may cheat where the carrier must keep a contract; the usual Hindoo must spare life, while the Thug may take it and yet remain sinless. That opinion subverts the very foundations of morality and conduct. We have little fear of the idea in Europe, which recoils from it more and more, tending always toward equality, at least in fetters, be they for good or evil; but we have some apprehension of the last Asiatic idea, which we shall mention as likely to be imported. This is the notion of man's irresponsibility for anything but his individual conduct, for the general system of things as it exists around him. That, says and thinks the Asiatic, is the work of superior powers, and no more to be modified than the procession of the seasons. The submissiveness of Asia to evils that could be remedied springs ultimately from that, and is because of that nearly incurable. The genuine Asiatic, uncorrupted by white teaching, considers that which is as the will of God, and leaves it to Him to alter. Why put a lightning-conductor by the Mosque? God, if he please, can take care of his own; and if He do not please, of what use to try and thwart His will? The Mussulman avowedly holds that theory, but there is not an Asiatic free of it, even the strong-willed Chinaman yielding to it almost, though not quite entirely. The combative energy of the European, who when roused to consciousness will put up with nothing, and who has the stimulus of living on a continent in which the powers of Nature are comparatively feeble, has kept him from his soporific belief; but take away from him a little hope-and the resistless strength of democracy may take some away, as it is doing from Americans—or increase by a little his impression that 'God has no need of human aid' -an impression of all the more rigid Calvinists and Quakersand he would sink back, reluctantly but certainly, to the submissiveness of Asia. The dream of the right of all men to everything they want, which is a mere thought unsupported by evidence, or rather, denied by the ever-present evidence that the earth yields food only in return for human sweat, and that every human being lives under sentence of capital punishment, is already shaking the very foundations of European society. Thought is stronger than armies, even when it is as baseless as the main thought of the Buddhist creed.

IN

RELIGIOUS.

THE FUTURE OF ROMAN CATHOLICISM.
ABBÉ DE BROGLIE.

Le Correspondant, Paris, November 10.

N several recent articles in the Revue des Deux Mondes, Mr. Taine, after having described the reorganization of the Church of France in the time of the Concordat, has endeavored to give account of the force and utility of the religion thus restored.

From the past his thought quickly and insensibly turns to the present and future of Roman Catholicism. Although in this survey he concerns himself about France alone, his observations apply to every civilized nation. He recognizes thoroughly the immense benefits of Christianity; he affirms its necessity for the preservation of the superior civilization which dates from the Gospel. He is of the opinion, however, that the influence of the Roman Catholic Church over the popular masses and society in general is constantly decreasing. He believes that this decrease of influence will be aggravated in the future, by reason of the general idea, well founded according to Mr. Taine, that there is an opposition between the faith and modern science.

The calm moderation with which Mr. Taine explains his views, his evident good-will towards Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church, his vast erudition, his talent for analysis and synthesis, give to his words extraordinary weight. I believe that his conclusions are erroneous and that there is no such opposition as he supposes, between the Christian faith as expounded by the Roman Catholic Church and modern science.

The picture of the history of the physical and moral universe as that picture is drawn by modern science, is composed o three parts; the history of the inorganic world up to the time of the appearance of life, the history of the organic world, and the history of humanity.

The scientific history of the inorganic world is reduced to the great hypothesis of Laplace as to the formation of the solar system—the Nebular Theory-an hypothesis which can be extended by analogy to other systems.

Although this theory is but an hypothesis, it is so probable, so well supported by proved physical laws which permit the verification by analogy of certain parts of the theory, that it may be considered to be, as a whole, saving some corrections of detail, a result acquired by science.

The nebular theory is not, in a single point, contradicted by Roman Catholic dogma. The Roman Catholic Church finds nothing in the Bible inconsistent with Laplace's sublime theory.

Let us pass to the second part of the scientific picture, to the history of the living and organic world.

Here, as before, we find a grand hypothesis, but an hypothesis very different from the former one. According to a certain number of savants, the entire living and organic world has come as the result of an evolution caused by the laws themselves of living nature, from a very simple first germ. If we believe this theory the living and organic world is a great tree of which a primitive protoplasm would be the embryo. This hypothesis, however, is not like that of Laplace, based on the application of known and verified laws of the physical world. You are obliged to imagine new laws. The modifications which the theory supposes in organic types cannot be produced, save through long secular periods.

How has this transformation of organic types taken place? By insensible changes, as Darwin taught, or suddenly, in a manner analogous to the change from the caterpillar to the butterfly?

About this there is a controversy. Whichever way the controversy be decided, the decision will not be in opposition to

the Roman Catholic Church. Evolutionists can remain good Roman Catholics, if they respect two essential dogmas; the primitive creation of the universe and a new intervention of the Creator to give man a soul endowed with reason and called to immortality.

It is the negation of a Providence alone which is contrary to Roman Catholic dogma. The Roman Catholic doctrine assents to the evolution caused and directed by God; it rejects only the absurdity of an evolutionism without God.

Thus the pretended contradiction between science and faith is absolutely imaginary. If there is any contradiction, it is between science and atheism, a marriage of which to science it is attempted to bring about.

As regards the third part of the scientific picture, the history of the origin of humanity, what is it that science affirms? She says that man is evolved from an animal and is the result of a gradual transition from one to another. This, however, is but hypothesis pure and simple. True science, admits that we cannot tell anything about the condition of man when he appeared for the first time on our planet. The supposition that between man and the animal, between animal society and human society, there has been a gradual and insensible transition is indirectly belied by the facts. The passage from instinct to reason, from the beast's cry to language, from sensation to an abstract idea, is a sudden passage, a leap on the part of nature. The intermediary between the two does not

exist.

The great reproach made by Mr. Taine and his school against the history of humanity as taught among Christians, is that it admits in certain circumstances the existence of miracle. Is miracle contrary to science? Not at all. Miracle, the free intervention of the sovereign power of the universe, is contrary neither to the physical nor to the historical sciences. Those who reject miracle found their rejection on metaphysical principles, on atheism, pantheism, and absolute determinism.

Whether a free transcendent Cause can intervene and modify the ordinary course of facts, is a problem which the physical sciences can neither raise nor solve.

Being thus unable to find the slightest contradiction between Roman Catholic dogma and that which alone has the right to be called physical science, which consists in proving the laws of nature, that is, the order of succession of phenomena, I am unable to discover any ground for believing that the influence of the Roman Catholic Church over the masses and society generally will suffer diminution in the future.

THE METHODIST ECUMENCIAL CONFERENCE. Donahoe's Magazine, Boston, December.

THE

nadjourned, this great

HE great Methodist Ecumenical Conference has met, discussed, resolved, and adjourned, and this world moves on very much as it did before. We think, too, that we may, without undue presumption declare that notwithstanding the tremendous assaults made upon the old "Roman" Church, she still survives, and with majestic tread pursues the even tenor of her way. What a compliment to the old "corrupt" Church, the "Mother of harlots," and the "man of sin," to be thus noticed by such a learned and distinguished body of good Christian men! One is led to ask what is there about this old, effete, played-out Church that constitutes such a powerful attraction for these methodical saints? Is it because she presents such a striking contrast?

For instance in the matter of unity, one brother thought “Christian unity" should be substituted for union; that is, such unity as is practicable among separate sects. Another brother remarked that this subject of union had been thoroughly discussed at the first council ten years ago. But why discuss the subject of union at all. It seems a hopeless What is the use of keeping up the agitation? Ah! but do you not see? There is that grand old Catholic Church, looming up above us all, with its compact unity, its thorough organization, its aggressive energy, and its plausible arguIf we don't look out, these wily "Romans

case.

ments.

will over

run the land. So they have set themselves deliberately to destroy this hydra-headed monster.

No less than three tremendous guns were fired off in one day. The shots were like the following: "It is the boast of Rome that she never changes, and is infallible in all her

deliverances and doings." This is rich. To say that the Catholic Church claims infallibility in all deliverances and doings, indicates a degree of ignorance and loose thought and writing on the teaching of the Catholic Church nothing short of ridiculous.

The second deliverance on the subject, "Romanism as a Political Power," tells us, among other things, that "the Pope controlled the people by assumed authority at the confessional." This is not bad! We could sometimes most heartily wish that he could do so, and do it effectually. Of course, the politicians would not like it, for he would go for honest politics every time and under all circumstances. But they do not hesitate to indulge in the most reckless and absurd charges against the tyranny of the Pope and the threatening aspect of the Papacy toward our American institutions; whereas the Catholic Church is really the only institution in the world that combines authority with liberty, conservatism with true progress, and always goes for honest and just administration of Church and State. The third attack was made by a Dublin Methodist, and he proved himself a true Irish Protestant by the vigorous manner in which he wielded the spiritual shillalah. He said: "There were many gross and corrupt teachings of the Church of Rome The idea of Romanish moralty was incorrect. The Church of Rome taught immorality," It is too late in the day for a grave and dignified body to give sanction to such an outrageously absurd and mendacious charge. They seem to have realized this; for the final, formal resolution which they adopted on the subject of Romanism, though sufficiently aggressive, comes far short of the openly mendacious and abusive language which they had applauded in their set speakers.

It must be admitted that the strong desire for union which exists among all Protestant denominations is a hopeful sign; but it is not that there is any good ground of belief that organic unity among themselves is any nearer than it was forty years ago, or that the hope will ever be blessed with fruition in this world, but that they will, in time, come to see that the hope can only be realized in that very old Roman Catholic Church which they now so much dread, but which is really their loving, holy mother, who awaits their return to her bosom with intense desire, and loving, hopeful confidence.

TH

THE METHODIST ECUMENICAL COUNCIL.'

EDITORIAL.

Chautauquan, Meadville, December.

HE most striking religious event of October, 1891, was the two weeks' session in Washington, D. C., of representatives of all the Methodist denominations in the world. The Council was imposing in view of the vast numbers represented and the importance of the themes discussed.

The question of Methodist unity did not provoke a serious debate; a general desire for some connect nal bond-some federation of Methodisms-was manifested, and here, too, an affirmative settlement was promoted by the discussion. The reasons that there are twenty-seven divisions of Methodism are in small part geographical; geographical separation accounts for only five of the branches. One division is made by race, white and colored. The rest are historical and relate (1) to slavery, which no longer exists, (2) to questions of polity, which are less and less bitterly discussed, and (3) to conflicts of personal feeling and leadership, which have burned out. The branches of Methodism are not divided by any new issues; indeed, new issues tend to bring all Methodists together; for example, they all agree to promote temperance reform. In view of the removal of old causes of difference and the development of new ground for union in thought and work, it is easy to see that some kind of federation is soon to be vigorously advocated with good hope of success. The conference moved this question up to the front line and firmly planted it there.

The differences of opinion developed in the conference were neither denominational nor national. English Wesleyans and English Primitives, Methodists of the North and Methodists of the South, agreed and stood together on the very picket lines of progress. Irishmen, Englishmen, Scotchmen, New Englanders, South Carolinians, and Afro-Americans were found holding common opinions. The sharpest differences were purely personal. Individuals held antagonistic views, not because they were of different churches or nations, but strictly as individuals. Perhaps this fact is the most instructive one of the conference meetings. It is significant of a leaven of common faith and conviction throughout Christendom.