provide for sanctions then our choices would be to pass the corrective legislation or accept the sanctions.

Our third choice is simply to drop out of the convention at that point in time and terminate our membership in Berne. As I said, that is not an unusual series of events. We have been found in violation of other international conventions. It would be certainly nothing startling if that were to occur here in the future. So it seems to me that a lot of the concern on this subject is really unnecessary concern because it does not in any way indicate how the United States would approach that subject if and when the time came. Finally, I would simply say, Mr. Chairman, that I think this is a question of a leadership.

This is an important area to the United States. It is an area Secretary Baldrige indicated where we have a significant international trade surplus at the moment. It is one where we think we have a lot of potential internationally. It is one very important to this country, and it seems to me obvious that we ought to provide the leadership to do what needs to be done in this area and have sound international standards and sound implementation of that standard, and I do not think we can do that by sitting on the sidelines. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Thank you very much, Mr. Yeutter, for that realistic and insightful statement. I would like to now call on Under Secretary Wallis.

STATEMENT OF HON. W. ALLEN WALLIS

Secretary WALLIS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate having this opportunity to present the views of the Department of State. In fact, we would identify completely with the statement that Secretary Baldrige read and also with the comments just made by Ambassador Yeutter, and I have submitted a statement of some length for the record. So for now, I would propose just to make some very brief comments to substantiate the fact that-well, it substantiates two facts. One, that we do agree with what Secretary Baldrige and Ambassador Yeutter said, and also substantiates the fact that they covered the topic completely, and I think they did not leave a lot that needs to be added.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Without objection, your statement in its entirety, however, will be made a part of the record.

Secretary WALLIS. Thank you. [Statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF

ALLEN WALLIS

UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES

AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 23, 1987

Thank you for this opportunity to present the views of the Department of State on one of the most important questions confronting this Government in connection with intellectual property problems, whether the United States should adhere to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. The question has an obvious and important relationship to the kind of copyright protection our citizens get abroad. It is also important as a matter of comity to the 76 member States of the Berne Convention

wanted us as a member State.

most of which have

One hundred and one years ago, the United States was represented at the Berne Diplomatic Conference only by an observer. Last year in the same room in the Swiss Parliament in which the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property was signed in 1886, the seventy-six

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member States of that convention celebrated its one-hundreth anniversary. The United States, where more copyrighted

materials are produced than in any other nation, was again seated on the sidelines as an observer.

A recent Register of Copyrights, Ms. Barbara Ringer, well-known to this Subcommittee, rightly characterized the role of the United States as "strangers at the feast." Far more than any other country, our nation has benefited and our industries have profited from the sound and fair levels of copyright protection Berne provides. We should remain "strangers at the feast" no longer.

I will address three issues: first, why we strongly support adherence to the treaty; second, why we believe that there can be no serious doubt that the treaty is non-self-executing; and, third, why the advantages of Berne membership far outweigh any perceived disadvantages.

In 1935 Dr. Wallace McClure of the State Department's Office of Treaty Affairs summed up the Department's views on the proposal that the United States should become a member State of the Berne Convention. He said:

"The business of the Department of State is to negotiate treaties. Another function of the Department of State is to

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protect American interests in other

countries, and the reason why the Department

of State has recommended this treaty is

because it believes that, through the

treaty, it can better protect American

interests, so far as copyright is concerned,

in other countries, than through any other

available instrumentality."

Dr. McClure's statement is just as timely today as it was when he made it over a half a century ago.

From the beginning of the Berne Convention a century ago,

the United states has blown hot and cold, or at least warm and cool, about this Convention. We were invited to participate in the 1886 Diplomatic Conference but the Secretary of State declined for the sound reason that foreign works were not protected in the U.S. under our copyright law. The Department pressed for a change in that policy; and, in 1891, Congress enacted the Chace Act which provided for the first time protection of foreign works. From then until the mid-1950's,

the Department of State sought to establish copyright relations with as many States as possible.

concluded with over 30 countries.

Bilateral agreements were

During the 1920's and 1930's increasing use of American copyrighted works led to strong support by private

organizations for the adherence of the United States to Berne.

A good deal of Congressional interest was aroused but Congress took no action.

A basic foreign policy objective of the United States in the international copyright field has continued to be adherence to the Berne Convention. The fact that this country was not a member of the worldwide Berne Convention was the principal reason for the negotiation of the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). During the preparatory work for the UCC, it was clear that the immediate goal was to develop a multilateral copyright agreement to which the U.S. could adhere. It was also clear that, beyond that immediate goal, the principal negotiators regarded the UCC as a "bridge" to the long-established Berne Convention, not an alternative to it.

The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act, enacted under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, shows that one objective of the lengthy and painstaking revision effort was to eliminate major obstacles to U.S. adherence to Berne, for example, the term of protection.

In recent years several developments have re-emphasized the issue of U.S. adherence to Berne. One was the withdrawal of the United States in 1984 from UNESCO, the Secretariat for the Universal Copyright Convention.