paragraph of that canon requests me to do? A man is accused of murder, confesses to me his guilt, and after a careful examination of his confession I am convinced of its truthfulness; I am aware that men accused of crime sometimes confess when they are not guilty. I am satisfied the books will show that men have been tried upon a confession, and it was afterwards found they were innocent; but if I undertake, as his counsel and adviser, as an officer of the court, in the performance of a sworn duty, under moral and legal obligations to the public, to myself and especially to the court, when I say I have examined the evidence in connection with the confession, am I obligated from a moral standpoint to undertake that man's defense? I say no. True morals, proper regard for justice and the execution of the law, ought to teach me to make known to the court the confession that has been made and leave the court to deal with it. I say I should not defend the criminal.

Rome G. Brown, of Minnesota :

The objection of the gentleman who just spoke, to this canon, is upon a wrong assumption as to its provisions. I would call his attention to the fact that this canon does not make it the duty of a lawyer in any case to take up the defense of a person accused of crime. It simply recognizes that he has the right and privilege so to do. It reads: "It is the right of a lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of crime," etc., and furthermore, the very purpose of this canon is not to bring about an acquittal by anything but fair means. The object is, as stated in the canon, " to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law." Any person accused of crime has the right, and this canon emphasizes this proposition, to have a fair trial under the law; and be subjected to conviction only by methods which are consistent with due process of law. We in Minnesota do not understand that it is either the duty of a lawyer, or his privilege, to disclose information which is received in his professional capacity from a man accused of crime. It would be optional with him whether to go on with the case after having become convinced that his client was guilty; but if any lawyer should reveal, or attempt to reveal, either to

the court or to the prosecuting officer any information obtained in his professional capacity, such a lawyer in Minnesota would be subject to disbarment, and I am frank to say that I would see to it that the charge of unprofessional conduct was pressed to the utmost.

The Chairman:

If there is no further discussion of Canon No. 5, the question will be put upon its adoption.

Canon No. 5 was then adopted.

On motions separately made, and voted upon, Canons Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 were adopted.

L. T. Turner, of Washington:

I move to divide the question as to Canon No. 12. I am in favor of the first part, but not in favor of subdivision 2. One of the most serious ills that we have to contend with today in the practice of law is the seeking of business by lawyers, and the constant consideration by them as to whether or not they may find employment in particular cases.

Francis Fisher Kane:

I second that motion. I think that second subdivision would inject into the code a commercial consideration.

The Chairman:

If there is no further discussion, the question will be put on the motion of the gentleman from Washington to adopt Canon No. 12 with the exception of subdivision 2.

The result being in doubt, a division was ordered, whereupon the motion was lost by a vote of 43 to 72.

On motion, Canon No. 12 as printed was then adopted.

T. J. Walsh, of Montana:

Mr. President and gentlemen, I have committed to writing some reflections that I have to make upon Canon No. 13.

Of the excellent Code of Ethics proposed by the Committee of the Association for adoption, one of the canons, No. 13, as originally reported, reads as follows:

"Contingent fees may be contracted for, but they lead to many abuses and should be under the supervision of the court."

The committee appears to be united in its report except as to this particular canon, to which a distinguished member has registered an objection, being opposed to contingent fees under any circumstances. Just how he could discountenance contracts for such fees is not disclosed; whether, for instance, he would advocate the passage of laws invalidating them in the few jurisdictions in which they are considered void as contrary to public policy, providing for the punishment of one or both of the parties entering into them, or for disbarring the guilty attorney; or whether he would content himself with a denunciatory declaration in the Code of Ethics promulgated by this body, trusting that thus the practice would be discontinued by those lawyers who find no ethical wrong in it, but who aspire to gain or to retain the esteem of the most reputable members of the profession, we are not advised.

In view of the somewhat fixed opinions once generally obtaining, but now decadent, in relation to the ethical aspect of contingent fees and judicial rulings touching the public policy of contracts for them, overwhelmed by the more modern trend of the decisions of our courts, it is not difficult to discern that the canon proposed is calculated to cast more or less odium on such contracts, and to divide lawyers into two classes, those who do sometimes contract for contingent fees, and those who do not. Of these, it is obvious the operation of such a rule as that proposed, if indeed it was not its purpose, would be to assign to the last mentioned class the higher position in the scale of professional respectability.

Against this effort thus to set up an arbitrary standard by which the professional life of a lawyer is to be gauged, and his status in the ranks is to be assigned, a very general protest ought to be raised.

To my mind the matter has no ethical aspect whatever, but if it has, I am ready to contend that the lawyer who places his services at the disposal of those who have not a dollar to pay for them save out of the fruits of his labors, deserves better of the profession and of the public than he who refuses to prosecute save for those able to pay, whatever be the outcome of the litigation.

The contrary view, I am entirely convinced, is but the lingering remnant of an idea originating in the English conception of the calling of a lawyer, which assigned to it some position at the fag end of nobility. Speaking of the decisions condemning contracts for contingent fees as having an alien origin, Chief Justice Gibson in Foster vs. Jack, 4 Watts, 334, said:

"The dignity of the robe, instead of any principle of policy, furnishes all the arguments that can be brought to support the English rule."

In Davis vs. Webber, 66 Ark. 199, the court said:

"In Lytle vs. State, 17 Ark. 608, 663, the English rule avoiding such contracts upon the ground of maintenance and champerty, was repudiated as repugnant to our constitution and statutes and the court showed and might have added that such a rule was contrary to the genius of our institutions."

If it is, and concurrence in this view is to be inferred from the general repudiation in this country of the English doctrine, how can it be ethically commendable? Refused recognition by the great majority of our courts, including the highest federal tribunal, as a rule of law, why should it have a refuge in a code of ethics intended as a guide to the professional conduct of the Bar of the whole nation? The courts have not contented themselves with affirming the validity of contracts for contingent fees, but have repeatedly declared them to be unexceptionable upon ethical grounds. "We see no good reason founded on principles, either of justice, public policy or professional propriety, to condemn. such contracts," says the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Allard vs. Lamirande, 29 Wis. 502.

"We are unable to see any immorality or breach of professional ethics in the transaction," is the language of the Supreme Court of Texas in Bentnick vs. Franklin, 38 Texas, 458. In Perry vs. Dicken, 105 Pa. St. 83, the court says:

"It is certainly true, as stated by Judge Lewis in his Abridgment of the Criminal Law, that many of the most upright gentlemen of the Bar have felt no repugnance to this method of compensation; it has been practiced without the slightest censure from gentlemen who have risen to the highest legislative and

judicial stations in the commonwealth, and who have been distinguished ornaments of the profession."

"An action can now be maintained in most, if not all, of the states of the union for contingent fees; the most respectable counsel conduct immense litigations with no other hope of reward,"

is the language of the opinion in Stanton vs. Haskin, 1 McArthurs, 558.

"The propriety of accepting compensation by way of a fee contingent upon the event of the suit, payable out of the things recovered, has been recognized," says the Supreme Court of Ohio in Reece vs. Kyle, 31 N. E. 747, 750.

If the tendency of such contracts were to corrupt instead of to promote justice, they should be condemned by ethical rules, as well as positive law. If they had that tendency they would be held illegal, as the rule is. universal that even those contracts which, though entered into with perfectly innocent purposes, are calculated to pervert justice, are void. It follows that, in the view of the many eminent judges who have repudiated the English doctrine, they have no such tendency. If they have not, upon what basis are they to be condemned on ethical grounds? Apparently, because, as the canon proposed states, they lead to abuses. As much could be said of the salary system.

But before considering the alleged abuses, let attention be given to the merits of the contingent fee system-a feature that has suffered from some neglect in the discussion of the subject.

Prominence is given to contingent fees, because of the prevalence of this method of contracting for compensation in personal injury cases, and actions on account of death by wrongful act. The enormous increase in the use of machinery and mechanical appliances in recent years has caused the rapid multiplication of the number of actions of this character. To the credit of those who have devoted themselves more or less to this line of professional work, it may be said that their success in compelling satisfaction in these cases has been such that it is now rare that one injured or deprived by death of a relative, from whom support was due, under circumstances creating a liability, does not take counsel as to his right to recover.