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statement made by some speaker that if it was a question of taking from the jury of the vicinage the power to decide questions of fact, this should be voted down; but we are undertaking to give a higher sanction to the verdict of a jury.

Everett P. Wheeler:

I understood one of the speakers to inquire why we had not added to this provision some limitation. Let me say that it was considered by the committee whether we ought to do so, and we read the clause in the seventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which says that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of common law, and the committee were unanimous in the opinion that it would be trivial for us to add that to our statute. You need not re-enact the Constitution. This provision is subject, of course, to that provision of the Constitution, just as much as if it were expressed at length.

Charles B. Ames, of Oklahoma :

I am inclined to favor the idea suggested by the committee, which as I understand it is simply this: that it extends existing law so that the court after receiving the verdict of a jury may then exercise its right to render judgment for the other party. I wish to ask the committee with reference to the last clause of the question, whether it is intended to permit, for instance, in a personal injury case, where the jury finds the damages to be a certain amount that the verdict may be entered for some other amount?

Frederick W. Lehmann:
No, not at all.
Charles B. Ames :

Suppose the jury should render a verdict for the defendant. Would the court under this language be permitted to render a judgment for the plaintiff?

Frederick W. Lehmann:

I think your inquiry is answered in this way. The trial judge may submit to the jury the issues of fact upon the pleadings, reserving any questions of law arising in the case; then he may

enter his judgment-manifestly such judgment as is required by the questions of law reserved.

Charles B. Ames :
That answer is satisfactory to my question.
Stephen S. Gregory:

May I ask the Chairman of the committee if they will make the concluding clause read, that any court to which a case shall thereafter be taken on writ of error shall have power to direct such judgment as in its opinion the law requirs.

Frederick W. Lehmann:

I think the court would do that in any event. It seems to the committee that the language as it is here is plainly and necessarily limited to a judgment such as the law requires, notwithstanding the finding of facts by the jury.

Charles W. Burch, of Tennessee:

It occurs to me that this is a very serious and important matter, and I do not think that a matter of this importance, upon which there is such a divergence of sentiment, should be voted on tonight. I think we should devote more consideration to it than it is possible to give the subject at this time.

James 0. Crosby, of Iowa:

I think we should have time to study and digest this matter very thoroughly before we finally pass upon it.

A. A. Freeman, of New Mexico :

I offer this motion, in view of the diversity of opinion among the members of the committee themselves, and among the members of the Association, namely, that this subject be recommitted to the Committee, with directions to report before final adjournment.

Stephen II. Allen, of Kansas :
I will second that motion.
The motion was lost.
Charles W. Burch:

I move that the further consideration of this subject be postponed for another year.

James 0. Crosby:
I second that motion.
Frederick W. Lehmann:

Mr. President, as it is apparent that this amendment would not receive the necessary two-thirds vote at this meeting, I will accept on behalf of the committee, the suggestions that have been made by someone here this evening to refer this section of the report back to the committee until the next annual meeting.

Charles W. Burch:
I will accept the suggestion, and will make that my motion.
Frederick W. Lehmann:
I second the motion.
The motion was adopted.
Charles W. Burch:

I now move that the consideration of all the suggestions made by the committee in its report be postponed to the next annual meeting, and that the entire report be recommitted to the committee.

Frederick W. Lehmann:

I raise the point of order that such a course would not be proper. The first section of this report has already been adopted by this meeting, and by more than a two-thirds vote, and the only thing we have postponed to another year is the second section of the report.

The Chairman :
The Chair thinks the point of order well taken.
Charles W. Burch:

Then, sir, I move that the consideration of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the report be postponed until the next annual meeting.

James 0. Crosby:
I will second that motion.
Frederick W. Lehmann:

I move as a substitute for that motion that Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 be adopted.

Walter George Smith, of Pennsylvania :
I second the motion.
Charles W. Burch :

Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the substitute is not germane to my motion and therefore cannot be entertained.

The Chairman :

The point of order is well taken. The question before the house is on the motion to postpone the consideration of Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 to the next annual meeting, and that in the meantime the same be recommitted to the committee.

A vote was taken and the result being in doubt a division was ordered, whereupon the motion was lost by a vote of 32 to 40.

Frederick W. Lehmann:

The motion of the gentleman from Tennessee having been disposed of, I now renew my motion to adopt Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6.

W. G. Hastings, of Nebraska :

Your proposition in regard to these sections is simply to provide that in criminal trials prejudice must appear before the court will interfere with the verdict.

Frederick W. Lehmann:
Yes, sir.
T. J. Walsh, of Montana :

It seems to me that this is taking a step backwards. I haven't the slightest idea that any legislative body in this country will ever adopt the suggestion, but it seems to me that we ought not

make, except upon the fullest consideration, suggestions in such radical language. I see no reason why we, at a time when England has just enacted a statute providing for appeals, in criminal cases, should practically deny the right of appeal.

James Beatty, of Nebraska :

It seems to me that it is immaterial whether or not we attempt here to formulate an exact bill on this subject. All that we are doing here, or attempting to do, is to call attention of Congress to the changes which we desire in the law. It will be the duty of Congress to formulate such a bill as in its wisdom will accomplish the object aimed at. I believe the report is a move in the right direction.

The Chairman :
Was the motion to adopt Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 seconded ?
Everett P. Wheeler :
I will second the motion.

A vote was taken, and the result being in doubt, a division was ordered, whereupon the motion was carried and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the report adopted by a vote of 60 to 22.

Everett P. Wheeler:

I now move the adoption of the resolution recommended by the committee, appearing on pages 10 and 11 of the report and which authorizes the committee to submit this bill to Congress and urge its passage, and continues the committee for that purpose.

Ernest T. Florance, of Louisiana :
I second that motion.

The question is on the motion made by the gentleman from New York to adopt the resolution recommended by the committee, and printed on pages 10 and 11 of its report.

The motion was adopted.

The Association then adjourned to Thursday, August 27, 1908, at 10 A. M.

THIRD DAY.

Thursday, August 27, 1908, 10 A. M. The President called the meeting to order. L. C. Gilman, of Washington:

Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Association, I have a resolution that I desire to introduce and have referred to the appropriate committee.

The President:

You may read the resolution and it will then be referred to the proper committee.

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