politician who explained to the newly naturalized Frenchman "The Republic, the Republicans, it is the same thing." Perhaps to one who can seriously assert in print that Stammler is the chief exponent of a sociological jurisprudence whose main dogma is that "legal science ought to be founded upon generalizations from a descriptive sociology," the difference between socialphilosophical, sociological, and socialist are as negligible as the difference between Herbert Spencer and Rudolf Stammler. Judge Fowler makes six points against any reception of modern German philosophy of law in this country. The first is that law is one thing in Germany and another in a country subject to the common law, in that in the latter there is always a rule of positive law at hand for the judge who, therefore, merely applies and never creates, whereas in Germany the distinction between legislation and juristic application is not kept clear. According to the commonlaw view, he tells us, the science of law and the science of legislation are wholly distinct, whereas the philosophers would confuse legislation with the administration of law. The orthodox fiction that a rule of the common law is always at hand potentially to meet every case and that the judge does no more than discover it by logical process and apply it had broken down without any assistance from Germany. Austin long ago called it a childish fiction. Professor Gray, whom no one would accuse of any taint of sociological jurisprudence, had asserted boldly that tradition and legislation furnished simply raw materials which were made into law by the courts. Indeed this doctrine came into France and Germany from England, not into English-speaking countries from Continental Europe. It is true, English analytical jurists have uniformly insisted upon the fundamental distinction between the science of law and the science of legislation. This, however, was only a part of the general tendency to excessive specialization in the nineteenth century and abandonment of that narrow view of legal science is a part of the general movement to give up the watertight-compartment theory of learning which has been going on upon every hand. Indeed the movement for unification of the social sciences came from this country, and it might reassure Judge Fowler to remind him that abroad sociology has been known as the American science. The second point made is that for the common-law lawyer a right is something resting upon positive law and hence we need not trouble ourselves with the interests which such legal rights secure or the ethical or philosophical problems which are involved in securing them. As to this, it should be remarked that common-law judges have always concerned themselves with these questions. As Judge Dillon has said, "Ethical considerations can no more be excluded from the administration of justice, which is the end and purpose of all civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from his room and live." 6 In periods in which the law is stable, as in the last half of the nineteenth century, philosophy is not of great moment. But in periods in which the law is formative or is growing, it has always grown under the influence of philosophical ideals. It is of great consequence, therefore, in such periods that juristic and judicial thinking be in touch with the best lay thought of the time. Such was the case in the classical period of American law in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that a straitjacket can be imposed upon our juristic thought in the period of growth upon which we have entered. 5 Fowler, The Future of the Common Law, 13 Col. L. Rev. 595, 605. The third point is that neither Roman nor English legal development has been greatly influenced by philosophy. In the reaction from the metaphysical philosophy of law of the nineteenth century such statements were frequently made. And yet it is a commonplace of the books that the classical Roman law was largely shaped by Greek philosophy. The contact of lawyer and philosopher in a period of growth resulted in liberalization of the law exactly as happened afterward in Continental Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As the vouching of German writers for this proposition might be objected to, it may suffice to cite the leader of English students of the Roman law, Mr. Buckland of the University of Cambridge. He says, "If the primitive Roman law may fairly be called Græco-Roman as being filled with ideas either derived from or held in common with the Greek tribes. . . it may be with no less justice applied to the classical Roman law itself. Not merely were the jurists soaked in Greek philosophy, but that law was in the main the work of men of Greek or at least Oriental origin.” 7 As to our own law, one needs only to look at the law lectures of James Wilson, framer of the Constitution, professor of law in the University of Pennsylvania, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the portion of Kent's Commentaries dealing with public law, or at Story on the Constitution, to perceive how thoroughly our notions of the relation of individual and state, of the law as a system of securing individual interests, of the duty of courts with respect to legislation which infringes natural rights, and our turning of the co mon-law rights of Englishmen into the natural rights of men are the result of contact with the French and Dutch publicists. The fourth point made is that the new philosophy of law assumes that economics and sociology are exact sciences. I know of no modern writer on philosophical jurisprudence who makes such an assumption. Nineteenth century economics might be amenable to such a charge. As to the philosophical jurisprudence of to-day, it would be more correct to say that it doubts whether even the nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurisprudence is the exact science which its votaries have taken it to be. Fifth, the point is made that the social-philosophical jurisprudence is not taken seriously at home where "the theoretical philosophizing of the provincial professors (!) is ignored by the governing classes of Prussia." In other words, Judge Fowler conceives that the social-philosophical jurisprudence, a harmless toy at home where the War Lord and the Prussian bureaucrat see to it that no harm comes to the commonweal, is a most dangerous toy abroad where the American law-teacher, with no originality and no independence of thought, is not held in check by a benevolent despot or a beneficent administrative oligarchy. Possibly he would say that, on the one hand, Austria, where perhaps the foremost representative of sociological jurisprudence lives and teaches, is preserved by the Catholic monarchy and that, on the other hand, France, where not only sociological jurists, but socialist jurists may be found in plenty without check, is on the road to political and juristic perdition. Finally, we are told that the American philosophy of law will be pragmatism. This is not at all a new proposition. I suggested it some years ago in a paper entitled "Mechanical Jurisprudence.' "8 Moreover, I have twice 7 Buckland, Equity in Roman Law, 135. 88 COL. L. REV. 605. See also my paper, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489, 516. 9 endeavored to sketch a juristic treatment of interests (natural rights) from the pragmatist standpoint. But some of our most promising American students of the philosophy of law are to be found in the camp of the neorealists, and there seems no reason to suppose that it would be possible or desirable to have all American jurists in the same philosophical camp. Specifically, Judge Fowler fears two ill results. (1) First he fears that the administration of justice as carried on for centuries in English-speaking countries will be debased in that every common-law judge will be turned into a philosopher of law and so "disregard the law of the land for some vague conception of social economic justice." When contact with the philosophical views of the eighteenth century led English courts in dealing with mercantile questions and in bringing about the absorption of the law merchant into the common law to make what then seemed startling innovations, there were many who were persuaded that the law of the land was lost. Even Thomas Jefferson advocated receiving English law as of the first year of the reign of George III so as "to get rid of Mansfield's innovations." 10 But philosophy has played its part also in periods of stability, as may be shown, for example, by the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals on the subject of liberty of contract which proceeded upon the proposition that that government governs best which governs least and treated due process of law as declaratory of Spencer's Social Statics." The stability of our Anglo-American judicial tradition is threatened not by philosophers, but by circumstances which, as so often in the past, require to some extent a juristic new start and have brought upon us, whether we will or not, a period of growth comparable to the rise of the court of equity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (2) Second, he fears that the new philosophy of law, being a philosophy of socialism, will destroy our constitutions and subvert American legal institutions of which constitutions are the pillars. As to this, perhaps it is enough to say that eminent representatives of the social-philosophical school in Germany, whose writings are much cited by American law-teachers, are so far from being socialists that one of them makes a vigorous philosophical argument for the German monarchy.12 When some ten years ago American law-teachers were so bold as to challenge the state of American procedure and to urge a study of English organization of courts and English procedure, we were told that they were making "drastic attacks upon the American judiciary," and that nothing but ill could result. To-day the profession at large is saying all that they said and more. It may be suspected that ten years hence most of what is dubbed socialism because it is a bit unfamiliar to those steeped in the Anglo-American law reports will appear quite commonplace. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL. Roscoe Pound. • Legislation as a Social Function, Proc. of the Amer. Sociological Soc., VII, 148, 155; The Philosophy of Law in America, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirthschaftsphilosophie, VII, 385, 397. 10 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, I, 265. 11 See the opinion of O'Brien, J., in People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. 1, 14; also the classical statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in the dissenting opinion in Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U. S. 45, 75. 12 Kohler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, § 24. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students. THE HARVARD LEGAL AID BUREAU. The work of the Legal Aid Bureau during its first academic year has ended even more successfully than was anticipated. To insure permanent organization, and at the suggestion of the State Board of Bar Examiners, and of the Bar Association, the Bureau was incorporated this winter as a charitable corporation under the Massachusetts statute. The members now appearing in court do so as agents of the corporation. The work has been constant while varied in its character. From October 1, 1913, to May 1, 1914, one hundred and ninety-one clients called at the Bureau for assistance. Of these one hundred and ninety-one, one hundred and eight were men, and eighty-three women. Although no record was kept of the nationality of the clients, the names would indicate that a majority were American. Practically all were American born. One hundred and forty-seven of the cases handled were for plaintiffs, and forty-four for defendants. The preponderance of plaintiffs' cases in this classification is explained by the grouping under that head of all ex parte matters, as advice, etc. In the arrangement of the cases by the subject-matter, irrespective of the side of the controversy represented, that designated as debt was the largest, with fifty-two. This included all contract claims, wages, assignments, etc. Domestic relation cases were second with twenty-nine. This group covered both marital difficulties and disputes as to children. Property cases were next with twenty-one. This embraced all landlord and tenant troubles, and the Bureau invariably represented the tenant. Eleven cases involved decedents' estates, in five instances instruments were drawn, and in four the claims were against attorneys. Sixty-nine miscellaneous cases included personal injuries, claims under the Workman's Compensation Act, bastardy and criminal cases, and naturalization and civil service problems. Sixteen cases have been tried in court by members of the Bureau. Of these, six were before the Superior Court, four before the Probate Court, and six before the District or Municipal Courts. Fifteen trials were won by the Bureau, and one was settled to avoid defeat. $4,268.13 has either been actually recovered or the payment of it decreed with bonds, in behalf of clients. On page 775 of this COLLECTION OF BRIEFS IN THE LAW LIBRARY. issue of the REVIEW may be found a list of briefs submitted in the Ames Competition during the year 1912-1913. The list referred to in the April issue of this volume was erroneously described as consisting of briefs submitted during the year 1912-1913. It should have been 1911-1912. This list is being published for the first time. THE EFFECT OF FILING A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY CLAUSE WITH THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.- The Supreme Court recently decided (Justice Pitney delivering a dissenting opinion) that, if a railroad has filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission a regulation that its liability on checked baggage will be limited to one hundred dollars unless a greater value is declared by the shipper and excess charges paid, a shipper, though ignorant of the existence of the regulation, who checks baggage without declaring any value can only recover the limited amount. Boston & Maine Railroad v. Hooker,1 34 Sup. Ct. 526. By the settled rule of the federal courts, now the only rule applicable to contracts for interstate shipments, because of the Carmack Amendment as expounded in the Croninger case, the normal shipment is with liability for the entire actual value of the goods. On theory, carriage with limited liability is an exceptional service which exists only when the shipper by shipping on a certain agreed or represented valuation has estopped himself to assert a greater worth.5 This proposition has been recently re-affirmed by the Supreme Court. The 2 - 1 For review of decision in State court see 25 HARV. L. REV. 186. 2 34 U. S. STAT. 595. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148. For review of this case see 26 HARV. L. Rev. 456. 4 Railroad Co. v. Fraloff, 100 Ü. S. 24; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375. Hart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151; Graves v. Adams Express Co., 176 Mass. 280, 57 N. E. 462; Oppenheimer v. U. S. Express Co., 69 Ill. 62; Magnin v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168, 62 N. Y. 35; Earnest v. Express Co., 1 Wood (U. S.) 573; Matter of Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. R. 550. “The ground upon which the validity of a limitation upon a recovery for loss or damage due to negligence depends is that of estoppel." Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 227 U. S. 469, 476, 33 Sup. Ct. 267, 269. "It has therefore become an established rule of the common law, as declared by this court in many cases, that such a carrier may, by a fair, open, just, and reasonable agreement limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in case of loss or damage to an agreed value, made for the |