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Maine, and Iowa, provides that the consent of a divorced parent is not requisite to an adoption. See STIMSON, AMERICAN STATUTE Law, § 6642. The abrogation is valid, therefore, on the statute. The case is interesting as bringing out clearly that the effect of the statute is to create a status, rather than a contractual relation. The relation of parent and child is a status, and by adoption a status is created which approximates this relation. See Sewall v. Roberts, 115 Mass. 262, 276. The tendency of what cases there are on abrogation of adoption has been to minimize the importance of consent of the parties. Unless required by statute, consent of the natural parents is not necessary to adoption. Clarkson v. Hatton, 143 Mo. 47, 54. It must follow that consent would not be essential to an abrogation under such a statute.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE - CONTROL BY STATES - RAILROAD REGULATION: EFFECT OF CARMACK AMENDMENT ON STATE STATUTE REQUIRING CARRIERS TO TRACE SHIPMENTS. A state statute required any carrier, whether initial, intermediate, or terminal, over whose line goods were routed to trace the goods and ascertain on which carrier's line they had been lost or damaged, and report to the shipper within forty days from the time demand was made. For failure so to report it made the carrier liable for the full amount of the damage to the goods, and in addition a penalty of fifty dollars; provided that if the carrier could show that by the exercise of due diligence the information could not be acquired then the carrier should be discharged. The shipper sued the terminal carrier. Held, that the statute is constitutional and is not affected by the Carmack Amendment. Du Pre v. Columbia, etc. R. Co., 79 S. E. 310 (S. C.).

A statute similar to this was held constitutional before the passage of the Carmack Amendment on the ground that it fell within that class of legislation where the jurisdiction of the state is concurrent with the federal government in aid of interstate commerce, until Congress has acted. Skipper v. Seaboard, etc. Ry., 75 S. C. 276, 55 S. E. 454, 7 L. R. A. N. s. 388 and note, s. C. 20 HARV. L. REV. 420. Cf. Atlantic, etc. R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U. S. 122, 30 Sup. Ct. 378; Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. 289. But cf. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Murphey, 196 U. S. 194, 25 Sup. Ct. 218; Venning v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 78 S. C. 42, 58 S. E. 983. See note to Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 55 L. Ed. 167. Although it may be urged that the decisions have gone too far in allowing a state to regulate commerce where one uniform system is possible, it seems clear that in the absence of the Carmack Amendment the statute under discussion would have been held constitutional. The question now arises whether this field is covered by the Carmack Amendment which makes the initial carrier liable to the shipper for damage to or loss of goods shipped, but provides that this shall not deprive the shipper of any remedy which he had under the existing law. Amendment, June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. at LarGE, 595, to Interstate Commerce Act, Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 20, 24 STAT. AT LARGE, 386. This amendment certainly exhibits an intention on the part of Congress to take control of the entire situation and to make the remedies of the shipper against the carrier uniform throughout the United States. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186, 31 Sup. Ct. 164; Galveston, etc. R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 32 Sup. Ct. 205; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, s. c. discussed in 26 HARV. L. REV. 456. Under it a state statute prohibiting a railroad from limiting its liability is held to be superseded. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra. The statute in the principal case is held inoperative so far as it applies to initial carriers. Meetze v. Southern Express Co., 91 S. C. 379, 74 S. E. 823. However, whatever else the proviso in the Carmack Amendment may mean, it would seem to preserve the shipper's remedy against the particular carrier guilty of the wrong. The statute

here makes that right effective. On the whole, then, it would seem that the liability of the terminal carrier under this statute is not affected by the Carmack Amendment, and that the intention of Congress to exclude the state in regard to this right is not sufficiently clear.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS SALES ORDER BY FRIEND WITHIN PROHIBITED TERRITORY. The defendant, at the request of a neighbor, ordered a quantity of beer to be shipped into a dry county, paying for it himself and delivering it upon its arrival to the neighbor, who repaid him. The defendant had no interest in the beer or profit from the enterprise. He was indicted under a local option law making it an offense "to sell, give away, or furnish" intoxicating liquors to anyone in the local-option area. Held, that the defendant may not be convicted. People v. Driver, 20 Detroit Legal News 17 (Mich. Sup. Ct., March 20, 1913).

One may order liquor shipped to him from outside a local-option area without violating the statute. In the absence of evidence of a contrary intention by the parties, delivery of the goods by the seller to a common carrier for shipment to the buyer transfers title and completes the sale. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrick v. Basle Chemical Works, [1898] A. C. 200. Hence there is no sale in the prohibited territory. Frank v. Hoey, 128 Mass. 263; State v. Wingfield, 115 Mo. 428, 22 S. W. 363; Harding v. State, 65 Neb. 238, 91 N. W. 194. There is also no furnishing in the dry county (Southern Express Co. v. State, 107 Ga. 670, 33 S. E. 637), for title has already passed to the purchaser and one cannot "furnish" the owner with his own goods. What one may do himself he may do by an agent, and a sale to the agent is a sale to the principal. So where one acts merely as agent for another in purchasing liquor outside the local-option area and delivering it to his principal, he is not guilty of any act of sale within the county, although he advances his own money and is afterwards repaid by the principal. Whitmore v. State, 72 Ark. 14, 77 S. W. 598; State v. Allen, 161 N. C. 226, 75 S. E. 1082; People v. Tart, 169 Mich. 586, 135 N. W. 307. The principal case is but an application of the above principles. The agent must act, however, bonâ fide as agent for the buyer and not the seller, and without interest in the liquor, or profit from the sale. State v. Gross, 76 N. H. 304, 82 Atl. 533; People v. Tart, supra. See 11 HARV. L. REV. 468; 13 HARV. L. REV. 609.

JURY - VENIRE: MOTION TO QUASH - DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGROES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. - Jury commissioners in making up a general venire of three hundred citizens for jury service in a county in Louisiana selected only white men, although about one quarter of the community was negro. The defendant, a negro, moved to quash the general venire. Held, that the motion was correctly overruled. State v. Turner, 63 So. 169 (La.).

This method of selecting a venire has been uniformly upheld unless it has been affirmatively proved by the appellant that actual discrimination on the ground of color took place. State v. West, 40 So. 920, 116 La. 626; Miller v. Commonwealth, 127 Ky. 387, 105 S. W. 899. On a motion to quash, the burden of proof is normally on the person asking relief, but the difficulty of affirmatively showing actual discrimination in this class of cases is so great that the suggestion of Mr. Justice Harlan to the effect that where, in a community having a large proportion of negroes, it is shown that the venire is by custom composed exclusively of whites, a prima facie case for discrimination should be raised, seems worthy of consideration. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370. But on the other hand one may argue, as did the court in the principal case, that the jury commissioners, all of whom were white, were probably not discriminating against the negroes, but were of necessity confined to the selection of whites since the law required that they should select for service on the jury

men they personally knew to be "competent" for service and "good and true. " The question of the defendant's constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment was not raised in the principal case, but it often is where similar facts are involved. See 17 HARV. L. REV. 351.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND FUNCTIONSRIGHT TO AMUSE CITIZENS. An ordinance passed by the municipal council of the city of Toledo ordered a transfer of one thousand dollars to the department of public service for the establishment of a municipal moving-picture theatre. The city auditor refusing to make the transfer, a proceeding in mandamus was brought against him. Held, that the writ of mandamus be denied. State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Lynch, 102 N. E. 670 (Oh.). See NOTES, p. 162.

- REWARD

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE UNILATERAL CONTRACTS. A reward is offered for the arrest and conviction of a criminal. A. gives information that leads the authorities to B. and C. who identify the criminal. He is arrested and confesses. The offeree pays the money into court and files a bill of interpleader. Held, that the reward be equitably divided between A., B., and C. Bloomfield v. Maloney et al., 20 Detroit Leg. N. 700 (Sup. Ct., Mich., July 18, 1913).

An offer of a reward is an offer to a unilateral contract, to be accepted by performance. It follows that the general principles of the law of contracts apply, and that this performance must comply with the terms of the offer. Williams v. West Chicago St. R. R. Co., 191 Ill. 610. Performance of only part of what is asked for, cannot entitle one to any part of the reward. Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310; Hogan v. Stophlet, 179 Ill. 150, 63 N. E. 604. Similarly if the result asked for has been accomplished, but by the efforts of several people acting independently, each of whom performs only a part, no one of them can claim to have fulfilled the conditions of the offer, and consequently the reward has not been earned. If, however, these people had coöperated in a partnership, the reward would fairly be earned by that partnership for distribution among its members. Kinn v. First Nat. Bank of Mineral Point, 118 Wis. 537, 95 N. W. 969. Although is not absolutely clear from the report of the principal case, it seems that the claimants acted independently, and if this view of the facts is correct the case cannot be supported.

POST-OFFICE WHETHER GOVERNMENT CAN SUE AS BAILEE OF OWNER FOR CONVERSION OF MAIL EFFECT OF OWNER'S FRAUD. The defendant was under contract to carry for the plaintiff (the United States) such foreign and domestic mail as was delivered to it in accordance with the acts of Congress and the regulations of the Post-Office Department. A package of jewelry having a salable value, which was mailed in France and addressed to Havana, via the United States, was lost owing to the defendant's negligence. The postal convention between the plaintiff and the French Republic prohibits the transmission by mail into the United States of any merchandise having a salable value. The Postmaster-General imposed a fine upon the defendant, in accordance with the statute providing such a penalty for delinquencies in the mail service, but the amount of the fine was not determined by the value of the lost articles. Act June 8, 1872, c. 335, § 266, 17 STAT. AT LARGE, 316. This action for the value of the jewelry is brought by the United States as bailee of the owner. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover. United States v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 206 Fed. 190 (Dist. Ct., E. D. N. C.).

Where a railroad carries mails for the government its liability to the government depends upon the special contract between it and the government. Atchi

son, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 640. The court's inference that the summary power of imposing a fine, conferred upon the Postmaster-General by statute, was intended to preclude any recovery under the contract seems unjustified. It is a privilege accorded the Post-Office Department for the promotion of efficient service, and the penalty assessed is a liquidation of damages for the public inconvenience. See Otis v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 61, 72; Parker v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 344, 358. No provision of the statute can be construed as impairing the right of a bailee to recover for the owner's benefit from a converter, even where the conversion involves no wrong for which the bailee would himself be liable before such recovery. The Winkfield, [1902] P. 42. But the principal case may well constitute an exception to what, it is submitted, should be the general rule, for the illegal use of the mails by the party for whose benefit the action is brought is a fraud which should vitiate the right of the nominal plaintiff. Gibson v. Paynter, 4 Burr. 2298; Orange Co. Bank v. Brown, 9 Wendell (N. Y.) 85.

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PROFITS À PRENDRE RIGHT TO SELF-HELP. The defendants had a right to cut heather on the plaintiff's estate. When the land became thickly grown with small trees so as to interfere with gathering the heather, they entered and began cutting down the trees. The plaintiff asked that they be restrained. Held, that the defendants be enjoined from further cutting. Hope v. Osborne, 77 J. P. 317 (Ch. Div.).

It is uncertain how far the holder of a profit à prendre may protect his interest by self-help. One whose property rights have been invaded may certainly in some cases take the law into his own hands, provided the amount of force used is reasonable. The victim of a private nuisance may enter upon the offender's land and forcibly abate it. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Goodale, 46 N. H. 53; Roberts v. Rose, L. R. 1 Exch. 82. But if the land owner was not the original wrongdoer, notice must be given first, except in emergencies. Jones v. Williams, 11 M. & W. 176. The owner of a chattel which is wrongfully being detained from him may in general enter and retake it. Madden v. Brown, 8 N. Y. App. Div. 454, 40 N. Y. Supp. 714. But he may not enter upon the land of one who is not responsible for the chattel's being there, as where a former tenant is claiming a chattel that he left behind. Anthony v. Haney, 8 Bing. 186. The holder of an easement may remove any obstruction placed upon it by the owner of the servient tenement without making a prior request. Quintard v. Bishop, 29 Conn. 366. But if it was put there by a stranger or by the grantor of the servient owner, notice must be given. O'Shaughnessey v. O'Rourke, 36 Misc. (N. Y.) 518, 73 N. Y. Supp. 1070. Lord Coke indicated that the holder of a profit à prendre was justified in breaking down any serious obstruction erected by the land owner. 2 Inst. 88. So it has been held that where the lord has planted hedges a commoner may pull them up. Mason v. Caesar, 2 Mod. 65. But on the analogy of the above cases it would seem that where the landowner, as in the principal case, has been guilty of no misfeasance, but merely of a failure to do something, the holder of a profit à prendre should not have self-help; certainly not without prior request. Where affirmative duties are involved it would seem safer to leave all remedy to the courts.

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SALES BILL OF LADING - CARRIER'S LIABILITY UNDER AN "ORDER" BILL - FORGED BILL. A seller, delivering two carloads of beans to the carrier, took "order" bills of lading on which the buyer was named as both consignor and consignee. By express stipulation in the bills their surrender was to be a prerequisite to delivery of the goods by the carrier. The seller retained possession of the bills as security for the price. The buyer forged other bills, indorsed them in blank, and sold them to a third person who secured delivery

on them from the defendant carrier. Held, that the carrier is not liable to the seller. Nelson Grain Co. v. Ann Arbor R., 140 N. W. 486 (Mich.).

That a "straight" bill is nothing more than a contract under which delivery can be made without taking up the bill may be true. Singer v. Merchants', etc. Co., 191 Mass. 449, 77 N. E. 882. But an "order" bill of lading by its form and frequently by express stipulation represents that it is an indispensable key to the delivery of the goods by the carrier. Goepel v. Hamburg, etc. Co., 191 Fed. 744; Forbes v. Railroad, 133 Mass. 154. When the consignee of an "order" bill of lading, having possession of it, secures delivery of the goods without surrendering the bill, a subsequent holder of the indorsed bill can hold the carrier for conversion. Ratzer v. Burlington, etc. R., 64 Minn. 245, 66 N. W. 988; Chesapeake S. S. Co. v. Merchants' National Bank, 102 Md. 589, 63 Atl. 113. Cf. Ridgway Grain Co. v. Penna. R., 228 Pa. 641, 77 Atl. 1007. By general custom bills may be made out to the order of the buyer and possession of the bills retained by the seller or his agent for the purpose of preventing delivery till the price is paid. See WILLISTON, SALES, § 285. In the principal case, however, the court argues that the carrier had no notice of the right or desire on the part of the plaintiff to prevent delivery, since he was not even named on the bill of lading as consignor. Such an argument might apply to a shipment under a "straight" bill of lading. Its use here fails to observe the essential difference between "straight" and "order" bills which has been pointed out. If, under all circumstances, the courts would require the carrier to take up the "order" bill before delivering the goods, less confusion would result, and a valuable mercantile custom would be recognized and effective. The Uniform Sales Act, recently adopted by Michigan, accentuates the distinction contended for. UNIFORM SALES ACT, § 20 (2 and 3). See WILLISTON, SALES, § 281 ff. In accord with the principal case: St. Louis, etc. R. v. Gilbreath, 144 S. W. 1051 (Tex.). For further discussion of the distinction between "straight" and "order" bills of lading see 22 HARV. L. REV. 534; 23 HARV. L. REV. 146.

SALES SALE OF GOODS ACT - NOTICE OF SHIPMENT BY SEA. -The plaintiff sold goods to the defendant F. O. B. Antwerp, the shipping point. The Sale of Goods Act, § 32 (3), provides that "unless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by a route involving sea transit, under circumstances in which it is usual to insure, the seller must give such notice to the buyer as will enable him to insure, and if he fails, the goods shall be at his risk." No notice was given. The goods were lost uninsured, and an action is brought relying upon this section. Held, that the section had no application to F. O. B. sales. Wimble v. Rosenberg, 57 Sol. J. 392, 784 (K. B. Div.; aff'd Ct. App., July, 1913). This section of the English Sale of Goods Act, followed in the American Uniform Sales Act, § 46 (3), is foreign to the common law, being adopted from the Scotch law, where the rule has long been well settled. Arnot v. Stewart, 6 Paton App. Cas. 289; Fleet v. Morrison, 16 Sess. Cas. 1122. Prior to this case there had been no English or American decision on this section. The present case seems incorrect. No reason appears for excepting F. O. B. sales from the requirements of the section. On the contrary, F. O. B. sales are the very kind in which notice is required; for in the other two kinds of sales common in England, where sea transit is involved, "C. I. F." sales (where the price covers the cost, freight, and insurance), and "ex ship" sales (where the ship is named), obviously notice is immaterial. Moreover, a sale F. O. B. place of shipment is equivalent to an ordinary shipment. To except such a sale from the section is practically cancelling the section. The requirement of notice is reasonable. Title has passed to the buyer, and he should be given the opportunity to insure the goods. The aversion shared in by many courts to recognizing that a statute changes the common law seems here to have been carried to extreme lengths.

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