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able," "Peace is unattainable," "Peace is most certain when preparations for war are greatest," "An Anglo-American alliance would promote peace," "The possibility of war does not retard commercial enterprise," are some of the many forms in which the proposition might be expressed. It should be noted that every one of them provides the basis of a single, definite affirmation or denial.

But the work of preparation is only begun when the writer has decided upon a proposition that to him seems to embody the matters to be argued; he must be sure that his reader also has in mind the same proposition and accepts it as satisfactory. In thus meeting his readers or his opponents on common ground at the outset lies the first great strength of the arguer. The fruitless results of ignoring this fact may be seen in many socalled arguments by curbstone statesmen. One of them says, for example, " You ought to vote for Smith."

"You ought to vote for Jones," the other replies; "for he is the better fitted for the office."

In the discussion that ensues, they do not at any time join issue because they did not have a common starting point. After they have contended until both are weary, one of them takes a parting shot by declaring, "You dodge the issue; anybody knows that Jones is the more upright man."

"But that is not what we are talking about," the other answers; "I have been contending that Smith is a better business man."

In the form of a proposition, the starting point of the first was: "Jones is morally well qualified for office"; that of the second: "Smith has the executive ability to hold office." And in the arguments adduced, each contender has had only his own proposition in mind. Now as we make progress in the study of our subject we shall see that in all argument, whether formal or informal, the one quality which we try to gain ourselves and demand of those who oppose us is definiteness; and we must be content to seek this quality in vain unless we make our initial position not only clear but acceptable to our readers.

B. ANALYZING THE PROPOSITION

1. Defining the terms. After we have given our readers assurance that our proposition is one which reflects fairly the spirit of the question to be argued, we must satisfy them further, even though they be out of sympathy with our views, by explaining or defining all the doubtful terms in the proposition. We saw in our study of exposition how difficult it is to phrase a definition that really defines, and here in the first step in argumentation we encounter the difficulty in its most formidable aspect. What, first of all, is a good definition? When is a definition adequate?

A definition is good, we learned in the preceding chapter, when, to express the matter simply, it gives us information which enables us to discriminate between the term defined and terms which are not the term defined. Usually our first step is to name the class in which the subject of the definition is included, and the next is to point out the specific characteristics which distinguish it from other members of the same class. Furthermore, we must give the connotation of the term, and we must see to it that the definition does not include the term itself or any cognate of it. Ordinarily, too, the definition must be expressed in language more familiar to the reader than the term which designates the subject of the definition. Yet in defining the terms of a proposition, something more is demanded; the context must be taken into consideration. For example, let us look at a proposition that has been discussed frequently during the past few decades, - "Chinese immigration should be prohibited by law." This proposition appears to be simple and direct. Its terms seem to require little definition. Yet not long ago in an intercollegiate debate, when the negative side maintained that the exclusion of the Chinese should be brought about through a treaty with China, and not by a prohibition on the part of the United States, the affirmative side produced definitions of "law" which showed that the term included " treaty," quoted the Constitution in support of their definition, and

maintained that the affirmative side as well as the negative stood for exclusion by treaty. Now, it is true that treaties constitute a part of " the supreme law of the land," yet no one who reads the Article of the Constitution in which "law" is thus used can maintain in good faith that the word carries the same meaning in the proposition under discussion. The total signification of the sentence in Article VI and the total signification of the proposition make clear that "law" as applied to a treaty, which in its nature is an agreement, does not mean the same as law " applied to a statute enacted by the legislative department of one government without the express willingness of another that may be concerned. The maker of artificial definitions of this kind disregards the fact that in bringing an audience to accept our definition of terms, we must strive not merely to make ourselves understood, but to reflect the spirit of the context of the words defined. We must use the words as they have come to be generally accepted in discussions of the question at issue. Our definition must not offend common sense.

2. Finding the chief issues. When we have put our subject in the form of a proposition that will admit of clear, fair, authoritative definition, we should, as the next step, study again the material on both sides of the question, this time in the light The first advantage of

of the proposition we have phrased. this study lies in the fact that it enables us to determine what things are unessential to the proving of the proposition. This work of negative selection is, as we shall see, no less important in argumentation than in the other forms of writing. The one who argues cannot put himself on a more direct road to failure than by ignoring the demands of relevancy in choosing the points which he hopes to prove. Yet many writers and speakers allow their enthusiasm for their subject to control them so completely that they forget this fact, and spend valuable space and time in proving things that have no important bearing on the question in hand. The admirers of an experienced temperance orator still wonder why he failed to enlist sympathy for his cause when, a few years ago, he was invited to address an audience of business

men in a Western city on the commercial advantages of a “dry” town, and spent a large part of his time trying to show that the drinking of alcoholic liquor was responsible for the assassination of Lincoln, Garfield, and McKinley. The emphasis that is placed upon such irrelevant matters not only takes attention from the real questions involved, but invariably causes a reader or hearer to lose confidence in whatever reasoning the arguer may employ in treating matters that really are relevant. The waste is not, therefore, merely an omission, but a step toward positive selfdestruction. If we would avoid it, we must study the material for the purpose of eliminating matter that does not bear on the proposition set for proof.

This study of both sides of the question helps us in another way to begin our argument on firm ground: it makes easily possible the frank setting forth of all matters that we are willing to grant simply for argument's sake or to admit because they have a bearing on the proposition, yet are not harmful to the opinions we hold. Every question that merits support or attack contains matter of this character, and every writer of arguments is called upon frequently, either by his own zeal to be effective or by his opponents in person, to make such admissions. Indeed, one of the marks of the skilled arguer is his willingness to grant or admit many things. Such an attitude suggests fair-mindedness and full knowledge. Yet when it is remembered that a single admission made unnecessarily may prove disastrous to one's argument, we may see at once how important it is that one know what to admit. The only reliable method to follow is that of really gaining full knowledge. In other words, if we desire to win the esteem which comes to the experienced arguer because of his frank admissions, we must emulate the patience and thoroughness which make his admissions safe.

Through these processes of exclusion and admission we come logically to the chief issues, the questions which must be settled in order to prove or disprove the proposition. Usually it is wise for the writer to enumerate these issues, clearly just what he hopes to prove, since such a course will

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give the readers the framework of the argument at the beginning and thereby enable them to follow the writer easily. If, however, the desire to produce a climactic effect should seem to demand that the full statement of the issues be withheld and that they be taken up one by one in the argument itself, it is none the less important that the writer have them clearly phrased for his own guidance. If he has before him in definite language the points he must prove, he will save himself the humiliation of failing to cover the ground completely, or, on the other hand, of having the divisions of his argument overlap. Moreover, he will know for a certainty whether the climax toward which he strives is in reality a climax. Finally, he will be prepared to anticipate much of the argument that will quite certainly be engendered in the minds of unfriendly readers.

C. PROVING THE PROPOSITION

1. The nature of proof. Throughout the discussion of the preliminary steps in argument we have observed how important it is that we make it easy for our readers to see from their own point of view, or from a point of view not very different from their own, the things we desire to have them accept. We must not ask them to give up immediately and completely the fruits of a life of training and experience which has been different from ours, but instead, we must bring them to see that they ought to be receptive to a new interpretation of this training and this experience. Now, this careful regard for the attitude of our audience is even more important in the actual proving of the proposition than it is in the preliminary steps. "Proof," a much-respected writer has said, "is the sufficient reason for assenting to a proposition as true." If we hope, then, to make progress in our efforts to convince others, we must study patiently the means of making it easy for them to assent. The experience of giving up their opinions must make as little trouble for them as possible.

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1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 3.

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