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the enforcement of the pledge as were possessed by his assignor.1 Owner of Property Wrongfully Pledged by Agent. Where an agent or factor has wrongfully pledged property belonging to another, the owner may maintain trover against the pledgee without deducting the amount of the debt which the pledge was given to secure; or if in such a case the pledgee has sold the property the owner may waive the tort and sue for money had and received.3

of the debt and a refusal to return the property. Southworth Co. v. Lamb, 82 Mo. 242.

1. Indorsee of Negotiable Paper. The payee of a negotiable note who has pledged it to secure a debt can still negotiate it to a third person, and this third person may maintain an action in his own name as indorsee. If the lien of the pledgee is satisfied before judgment, and the pledgee makes no objection, the pledgor cannot plead the pledgee's rights as a defense to the action. Fisher v. Bradford, 7 Me. 28.

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Right to Delivery of Pledge. A pledgor having assigned his rights in the pledge, the pledgee cannot refuse to deliver the pledge to such assignee after a sufficient tender of the debt, on the ground that it has been attached by a third party, with whom the assignee has no privity. Loughborough v. McNevin, 74 Cal. 250.

2. Jones v. Farley, 6 Me. 226; Henry v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 71; Farwell v. Importers', etc., Nat. Bank,

47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 409; Gallaher v. Cohen, I Browne (Pa.) 43; M'Combie v. Davies, 7 East 5; Fletcher v. Heath, 1 M. & R. 335; Daubigny v. Duval, 5 T. R. 604. See also Lamb v. Attenborough, i B. & S. 831, 101 E. C. L. 831: Sheppard v. Union Bank, 7 H. & N. 661.

Property of Wife Pledged by Husband. - Where one pledges a note which belongs to his wife, to secure his own debt, and the pledgee converts the note, the wife may maintain a bill in equity against the maker of the note and the pledgee, to hold the latter liable for the amount thereof, and if the note is her own separate property her husband need not be made a party to the suit. Clark v. Cullom, (Tenn. 1897) 44 S. W. Rep. 204.

Excess of Authority Conferred on Husband. If a wife loans a note and mortgage to her husband, to be pledged by him to secure his debt for a certain sum, a pledge to secure a greater amount or for another purpose is invalid, and she may recover in equity from the pledgee any amount which he has collected on the note and mortgage above the amount for which she authorized them to be pledged. Farnham v. Fox, 62 N. H. 673.

652

3. Henry v. Marvin, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 71.

Volume XVI.

PLENE ADMINISTRAVIT.

See article EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, vol. 8,

p. 686.

POINTING FIREARMS.

By the Statutes of Several States it is made a criminal offense intentionally to point a firearm at another person either with malice or in sport.

The Indictment. The crime being entirely statutory the indictment should follow the form of the statute; 2 and it is not necessary to allege that the act was done with malice, nor that the weapon was loaded.3

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Indiana. Supp., § 342).

Oklahoma.-Laws of 1893, § 504. And see Davenport v. State, 112 Ala. 49; Sutton v. Bonnett, 114 Ind. 243; Lange v. State, 95 Ind. 114; Skinner v. State, 98 Ga. 127.

2. So held in People v. Chappell, 27 Mich. 486, which was an indictment under a statute designed to prevent the careless use of firearms. Since this statute applied only to the careless use of firearms, without malice, it was held that a conviction could not be had where the evidence clearly showed malice on the part of the defendant, and that in such a case the court must direct a nolle prosequi to be entered.

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Drawing Dangerous Weapon. In Indiana it has been held unnecessary in an indictment for drawing a dangerous weapon under 2 Rev. Stat. 1876, p. 459, to negative the exception contained in the proviso to said act. State v. Maddox, 74 Ind. 105.

In Kentucky, under the statutes of 1894, § 1308, drawing a deadly weapon, and pointing such weapon at another, are distinct offenses, and an indictment which alleges that the accused drew and pointed a pistol at another charges two different offenses, and is demur

rable; but if it is not demurred to the defect is waived. Sturgeon v. Com., (Ky. 1896) 37 S. W. Rep. 679.

In Mississippi the code prescribes a certain punishment for a person who having or carrying a deadly weapon shall exhibit the same in a rude, angry, or threatening manner." An indictment under this statute alleged concerning the defendant, that having a pistol he did then and there" exhibit the same in a rude, angry, or threatening, in the presence of three or more persons." It was held that the omission of the word "manner" was a mere formal defect, and the indictment might be amended under the statute. And it was also unnecessary to charge in the indictment that the defendant was carrying a weapon. Gamblin v. State, 45 Miss. 658.

3. Graham v. State, 8 Ind. App. 497; Gamblin v. State, 45 Miss. 658.

In Graham v. State, 8 Ind. App. 497, the court said: "Appellant asserts that the indictment fails to charge a public offense, because there is no allegation to show whether the pointing was done with or without malice, and that there is no allegation to show whether the revolver was loaded or empty. This contention cannot prevail. To constitute an offense, the pointing must be purposely done. The statute recognizes

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Conviction of Lesser Offense.

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There may be a conviction of this minor offense under an indictment charging assault with intent to murder by pointing and discharging a pistol at another person.1

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law the wilful pointing of a firearm at another. The motive that actuates the person, or the kind of firearm, whether loaded or empty, are but incidental matters. The indictment charges a

two classes of persons who may commit the offense those who are actuated by malice and those who are actuated by foolish and mischievous motives. It also recognizes two kinds of firearms that may be pointed-wilful pointing of a firearm at anthose that are loaded and those that are other. These facts constitute a public empty. The evident purpose of the offense." statute is to bring under the ban of the 654

1. Jenkins v. State, 92 Ga. 470.
Volume XVI.

POINT RESERVED.

See article CERTIFIED CASES, vol. 3, p. 918.

POINTS.

See article BRIEFS, vol. 3, p. 710.

POLICY.

See article INSURANCE, vol. 11, p. 375.

POLLING JURY.

See article VERDICT.

POLYGAMY.

CROSS-REFERENCE.

See in general article BIGAMY, vol. 3, p. 322.

In an Indictment under the Act of Congress, March 2, 1882, prohibiting polygamy in the territories, it is not necessary to aver that the defendant is a male person, nor that either marriage was followed by cohabitation.2

1. U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161; U. S. v. Cannon, 4 Utah 122.

2. U. S. v. Tenney, (Arizona 1886) II Pac. Rep. 472.

Under the Act of Congress Prohibiting Polygamy in the territories, a complaint before a commission of the Supreme Court of Utah charging a person on information and belief with unlawfully cohabiting with more than one woman as his wife, is sufficient to justify his arrest for preliminary examination; and in such a case the commission has authority to take bail. Where the offense has been committed by one man with the same woman continuously and uninterruptedly, he can be prosecuted

but once, except that when it is continued after the first indictment there may be a subsequent prosecution although the unlawful cohabitation may have continued from a time previous to the first indictment. U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 Utah 161.

The offense created by the act of congress prohibiting polygamy is necessarily a continuous offense. It cannot be divided into distinct parts, and indictments found for each part; nor can the court inflict punishment for each part separately. If this is attempted, the defendant can be released on habeas corpus. In re Snow, 120 U. S. 274.

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POOR AND POOR LAWS.

BY ARCHIBALD C. BOYD.

L. DEFINITION AND TERMINOLOGY, 657.

II. ACTION BY ONE POOR DISTRICT AGAINST ANOTHER, 658.

1. Jurisdiction, 658.

2. Form of Action, 658.

3. Venue, 658.

4. Parties, 658.

5. Pleading, 659.

III. ACTION BY INDIVIDUAL AGAINST POOR DISTRICT, 660.

IV. PROCEDURE AGAINST KINDRED OF PAUPER, 661.

1. Form of Remedy, 661.

2. Who May Institute Proceedings, 661.

3. Notice, 662.

4. Demand, 662.

5. Petition or Complaint, 662.

6. Order to Support, 662.

a. Requisites of Order, 662.

b. Security for Performance of Order, 663.
c. Modification of Order, 663.

7. Costs, 663.

8. Appeal, 663.

V. VIOLATION OF POOR LAWS, 664.

1. Form of Remedy, 664.

2. Who May Maintain Action, 664..

3. Pleading, 664.

a. Declaration or Complaint, 664.

b. Plea, 664.

4. Question for Fury, 664.

5. Successive Actions, 665.

VI. PROCEDURE AGAINST POOR OFFICERS, 665.

1. Form of Remedy, 665.

2. Indictment, 665.

VII. REMOVAL OF PAUPER, 665.

1. In General, 665.

2. Furisdiction, 665.

3. Notice to Pauper, 666.

4. Complaint, 666.

5. Order of Removal, 667.

a. Requisites of Order, 667.
b. Amendment of Order, 668.

c. Service of Order, 668.

d. Enforcement of Order, 669.

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