PIRACY. CROSS-REFERENCES. As to matters of Substantive Law and Evidence, consult the title PIRACY, AM. AND ENG. ENCYC. OF LAW. Definition. Piracy may be defined as robbery upon the high seas, or as it has sometimes been expressed, robbery within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.1 United States Statute. By the Revised Statutes of the United States, section 5368, every person who on the high seas commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterward brought into or found in the United States, shall suffer death." 2 Jurisdiction of United States Courts. In the United States piracy is. only cognizable in the federal courts in cases where it is committed outside of the criminal jurisdiction of the state courts.3 The Indictment. In the common law form of indictment 4 it was necessary to charge that the offense was committed piratically and feloniously, and within the jurisdiction of the admiralty." 1. Glenn's International Law, p. 97; Wharton Crim. Law, vol. 2, § 1860; Bouv. Law Dict., vol. 2, p. 414; Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, vol, 18, title Piracy. 2. Forfeiture of Offending Vessel. The offending vessel may be condemned and sold, the proceeds being divided between the United States and the captors, at the discretion of the court. The costs of such a proceeding of forfeiture are not chargeable on the cargo of the vessel when the owner of said cargo has not taken part in the piracy, or sanctioned it. Such costs are chargeable upon the proceeds of the vessel. Harmony v. U. S., 2 How. (U. S.) 210. 3. Ballinger v. Nowland, 5 Hughes (U. S.) 387, holding that robbery committed on a ferryboat running between Washington, D. C., and Alexandria, Va., is not piracy within the jurisdiction of a United States District Court. American ship, although at the time when the crime was committed, the ship was lying in an open roadstead, adjacent to a foreign territory, and within half a mile of the shore. But a Circuit Court of the United States does not have jurisdiction of robbery and piracy committed on the high seas, on board a foreign vessel belonging exclusively to foreign owners and sailing under a foreign flag. U. S. v. Kessler, 1 Baldw. (U. Š.) 15. The Courts of What Nation. -"Prima facie all piracies and trespasses committed against the general law of nations are inquirable and may be proceeded against in any nation where no special exemption can be maintained, either by the general law of nations, or by some treaty which forbids or restrains it." Per Iredell, J., in Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall. (U. S.) 160. 4. General Form of Indictments for Piracy.2 Chitty Crim. Law 1093; 2 Arch. Crim. Pr. & Pl. 1446; U. S. v. Baker, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 6; U. S. v. Peterson, I Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 305. 5. 2 East P. C. 805; 1 Hawk. c. 37, §§ 6 and 10. In the United States the indictment usually charges piracy to have taken place upon the high seas within the admiralty and marine jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular state.1 In an Indictment for a Piratical Murder it is not necessary to allege that the accused is a citizen of the United States, or that the crime was committed on board of a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States. An averment that it was committed from by a mariner sailing on board of said ves on board such a vessel sel is sufficient.2 But in Reg. v. Jones, 2 C. & K. 165, 61 E. C. L. 165, it was held unnecessary to charge that the piracy was committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. 1. Allegation of Place. In U. S. v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 85, the court said: The first objection is that no venue is laid in the indictment; that is, no particular place is stated on the high seas at which the robbery was committed, but it is only alleged that it was committed on the high seas. And reference has been made to some indictments in cases of piracy, where the offense is stated with more particularity of place, for example, on the high seas in a certain place distant about ten leagues from Cursheen, etc.,' and' on the high seas about a half league distant from Leghorn, etc.' But there certainly are precedents which contain no such specification of place, and in all the indictments for piracy in this district, * * our researches have not detected a single one in which such locality of place is to be found. * * The reason of the common law for laying the venue so particularly in offenses on land, does not in any manner apply to offenses on the high seas. The alle gation that the offense was committed on the high seas is sufficient of itself to found the jurisdiction, and all the incidents of the trial and judgment. But if it were otherwise at the common law, we are to consider that, in the jurisprudence of the United States, the present is a statute offense; and that the jurisdiction is given also by statute; and if the offense is so laid in the indictment as to bring the case within the language of the statute in point of jurisdiction and certainty of description, that is all which can properly be required in our country. * * There is in reality nothing upon which to suspend a legal doubt as to the * sufficiency of the indictment in this respect.' An Indictment Which Follows the Words of the Statute (Rev. Stat. U. S., 5367) in charging the offense of wilfully setting fire to a ship at sea with intent to burn her, need not allege that the offense was committed feloniously. U. S. v. McAvoy, 4 Blatchf. (U. Š.) 418. Ownership of Property Taken. — An indictment is not bad which alleges that the names of the owners of the property taken by the pirates are unknown to the grand jury, although it is shown on the trial that the grand jury in fact knew the names of some of said owners. U. S. v. Stetson, 3 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 167. 2. U. S. v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 184. Place Where Offense Was Committed. — In U. S. v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. (C. C.) 1, the indictment contained two counts as follows: the first count charged that the accused" cast F. A. from a vessel belonging," etc., whose name was unknown. The other count charged that the accused cast F. A. from the long boat of the ship W. B. belonging," etc. It was held that the locality of the offense was sufficiently expressed since under the peculiar circumstances of the case it could not be charged with greater precision. 44 General Verdict — Two Counts in Indictment. In U. S. v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 184, it was held that a general verdict of guilty can be had on an indictment which charges the offense in two counts; the first count alleging the offense to have been committed on the high seas, the other count in a haven, basin, or bay. Each of these counts is a distinct substantive charge. Internal repugnancy in any one is a good exception, but this does not follow as to the whole, taken severally, but each may be for a distinct offense. PLACE OF TRIAL. See articles CHANGE OF VENUE, vol. 4, p. 373; TRIAL; VENUE. PLEAS AT LAW. BY JOHN LEHMAN. I. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION, 541. II. PLEAS TO THE ACTION, 541. 1. Nature, 541. 2. Traverse or Confession and Avoidance, 542. b. Nature of Traverse, 542. c. Specific Traverse, 542. d. General Traverse or General Issue, 542. (1) Nature, 542. 383 (2) Form and Nature of General Issue in Par ticular Actions, 543 (a) In General, 543. (b) Non Cepit, 544- (d) Not Guilty, 544. (f) Nil Debet, 545. Nul Tiel Record, 545. (h) Non Est Factum, 545. (3) Plea Must Be Appropriate to Action, 546. e. Special Traverse - Absque Hoc, 547 f. Confession and Avoidance-Special Pleading, 548. g. Special Plea Amounting to General Issue, 549. (1) Rule Against, 549. (2) Matters in Mitigation, 552. (3) Manner of Raising Objection, 552. III. FORM OF PLEA, 553 1. General Division, 553. 2. Commencement and Prayer, 553. a. Fixed Forms Dependent upon Character of Matter, 553b. Matters in Bar or Abatement, 554. c. Effect of Improper Prayer or Commencement, 556. d. Protestation, 556. 3. Tender of Issue-Conclusion to Country or with Verifi cation, 556. a. To Country, 556. b. Verification, 557. c. Effect of Wrong Conclusion, 559. 4. Short Pleas, 559. IV. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF PLEAS, 561. 1. In General-Traverse or Confession and Avoidance, 561. 2. Complete Defense, 561. a. In General, 561. b. Each of Several Pleas Must Stand Alone, 561. 3. Definiteness and Certainty, 562. 4. Necessity of Pleading Facts, 564. 5. Argumentativeness, 564. 6. Repugnancy, 564.. 8. Materiality, 565. 9. Matter of Record, 565. 10. Matter Which Should Come from Plaintiff, 566. 11. Plea to Damages, 566. 12. Fustification of Matters in Aggravation, 566. 14. Admission by Failure to Deny, 567. a. General Rule, 567. b. Exceptions, 567. 15. Statutory Defense, 568. V. DOUBLE PLEADING, 569. 1. The Right to File, 569. 2. Consistency, 570. 3. Discretion in Permitting the Filing, 571. VI. PLEAS TO DISTINCT PARTS OF DECLARATION, 574. 1. In General, 574. 2. Plea to Part of Cause or Count, 574. 3. Plea Too Broad-Specific Direction to Part Covered, 577- VII. JOINT AND SEVERAL PLEAS, 579. VIII. AIDER BY PLEA, 580. IX. OBJECTIONS DEMURRER OR MOTION TO STRIKE, 582. 1. Propriety of Motion or Demurrer, 582. 2. Harmless Error in Striking Out or Sustaining Demurrer to Plea, 584. CROSS-REFERENCES. As to Pleas in Suits in Equity, see article PLEAS IN EQUITY, post. Pleas in Particular Actions at Law, see specific titles throughout this work, and consult the General Index. Answers, see article ANSWERS IN CODE PLEADING, Affidavit of Defense, see article AFFIDAVITS OF MERITS Notice or Brief Statement of Defense, see that title, vol. 14, p. 1074. Confession and Avoidance, see that title, vol. 4, p. 664. Set-off and Counterclaim, see that title. Pleas in Criminal Cases, see article ARRAIGNMENT AND Time to Plead, see that title. - Definition. I. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION A plea, as the term is used in this article, is the first pleading interposed by the defendant in an action at law; an answer which the defendant makes why the plaintiff should not recover or why the action. should not proceed.1 Classification. — Pleas are classified, in general, into dilatory and peremptory pleas, the former embracing pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, in suspension of the action, and in abatement of the writ, and the latter embracing pleas in bar of the action.2 IL PLEAS TO THE ACTION—1. Nature. A plea in bar of the whole action goes to the merits and denies that the plaintiff has 1. 3 Black. Com. 303; 1 Burr. Pr. 162. 2. Stephen's Pl. (Tyler's ed.) 84. Order of Pleading. The weight of authority has long designated the following order of pleading: 1. To the jurisdiction of the court. 2. To the disability of the person, (a) of the plaintiff, (b) of the defendant. 3. To the count or declaration. 4. To the writ, (a) to the form of the writ, (1) matter apparent on its face, (2) matter dehors; (b) to the action of the writ. I Chitty's Pl. (16th Am. ed.) 456. Necessity of Pleading in Particular Order. Matters falling under the particular classification of pleas as above indicated must be pleaded in their regular order, as to plead out of order is to waive matter properly pleadable at an earlier stage. Thus, a plea to the jurisdiction, being the first in regular order, and analogous to a plea in abatement, is waived if a plea to the merits, as the general issue, is filed. Lyman. Central Vermont R. Co., 59 Vt. 167; Webb v. Mann, 3 Mich. 139. See also article JURISDICTION, vol. 12, P. 114. Matter in Abatement Is Waived by Pleading in Bar. - Robertson v. Lea, I Stew. (Ala.) 141; Cleveland v. Chandler, Stew. (Ala.) 489; Hamilton v. James A. Cushman Mfg. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 338; Martin v. Com., I Mass. 358. A plea in abatement cannot be pleaded at the same time with a plea in bar. Douglass v. Belcher, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.) 105. Half and Full Defenses. "It has been laid down as a rule of pleading that a defendant cannot plead in abatement after making full defense (Alexander v. Mawman, Willes 41), for the nature of which see Co. Litt. 1276; 1 Chitty's Pl. (3d Am. ed.) 413. But it is settled that going no farther than de fending the force and injury, when, etc., will be considered as only half defense where such a defense should be made, and as full defense when the latter is necessary. Foxwist v Tremaine, 2 Saund. 209; Alexander v. Mawman, Willes 41; Wilkes v. Williams, 8 T. R. 633, 3 B. & P. 9, note a; I Chitty's Pl. 413. And in 2 Chitty's Pl. 455, note a, it is stated, as a consequence of this doctrine, that the distinctions between half and full defense are now obsolete." Lyman v. Dodge, 13 N. H. 197. Scope of Article. The general principles of pleas falling under the first classification above mentioned, i. e., dilatory pleas, have been treated in preceding articles. Thus, see articles ABATEMENT IN PLEADING, vol. I, p. 1; DILATORY PLEAS, vol. 6, p. 665. More particular applications of the rules of pleading relating to such pleas will be found in particular articles, as ANOTHER SUIT PENDING, vol. 1, p. 770; JURISDICTION, vol. 12, p. 114; NAMES, vol. 14, p. 270. See also articles AMENDMENTS, vol. 1, pp. 519, 701; CARRIERS, vol. 3, p. 857; DEMURRERS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE CODES, vol. 6, pp. 332, 354; DowER, vol. 7, p. 164; EQUITABLE ATTACHMENT, vol. 7, p. 796; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, vol. 8, p. 713; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, vol. 9. p. 64. For general denial as plea in abatement, see article ANSWERS IN CODE PLEADING, vol. 1, p. 827; for joinder of defenses, see article ANSWERS IN CODE PLEADING, vol. 1, p. 854; for nul tiel corporation see article CORPORATIONS, vol. 5, p. 83. Pleas falling under the second classi. fication, i. e., pleas in bar, in so far as the questions connected therewith refer to the sufficiency of such pleas in particular actions, are the proper subjects |