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ments. In case of a foreign war you cannot hold this continent together without rapid communication across it. Look at its configuration. You see two great empires, one on the east, bordered by an ocean washing the shores of Europe; one on the west, looking out on the wastes of the Pacific and on Asia. Between these empires you have no link of communication. Two ranges of mountains divide us, and wide deserts, with little water or grass, occupying nearly two thousand miles of intervening space. The history of the world rebukes the idea that such empires can be permanently united without an annihilation of the intervening barriers. Sir, there has been no instance in history where a country has maintained the integrity of its territory if that territory was riven by a chain of mountains. Napoleon's armies overran the Alps and the Pyrenees, yet France fell back to the base line of those mountains-its old limits. The homogeneous character of our people, the devoted love which our Californians have for the Union, has led them and will lead them to cling to that Union even if they are compelled to seek a tropical passage back here to the seat of their Government, which is at the same time the cradle of the liberties that make the name of American illustrious, and which name they proudly share. But a war must change all this. Your intervening mountains and desert plains cut them off from aid to repel a foreign foe. Your only communication by water would be cut off, and they would fall a prey to the adversary. Modern science has furnished us the means of reversing the lessons of history. The rapidly growing empires of Asia and Europe, expanding as they followed the wheels of a conqueror's car, and then breaking into fragments across mountain chains, need not be the type of this confederacy. By means of the iron bands of a railroad track, and the swift moving car, we may conquer the obstacles of nature, and bind together the continent. Then the question presents itself, shall we share the fate, which history points to, of all nations which preceded us? Shall we allow our territory to be divided? Shall we idly doze in security until we lose our rich Pacific possessions, or avail ourselves of the aids of science to make our country indivisible?

Gentlemen may say California can protect itself, and if it succeeds in so doing, will remain in the Union. Sir, I will not discuss the question whether this is a fair argument; whether a Constitution that was made for the common defense does not require us to provide means so that common defense can be secured. Neither will I attempt to express any opinion upon the question involved in the proposition, that any State left to struggle alone through a fearful war, if it succeeds in self-preservation, can be expected to subject itself to a renewal of such disasters by adhering to a Government whose policy occasions them, and whose regard for it seems to be in inverse ratio to the squares of intervening distance. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. I shall be better prepared to discuss that question with my people when we emerge successfully from a foreign war, unaided by the Government. I prefer now to confine my observations upon our capacities for self-defense.

When, in January last, I addressed the Committee of the Whole House, I particularly sought to show the difficulties in the way of a successful defense of California in the event of a foreign war. I showed that we are not situated as are the States of the Atlantic slope. That the eastern States possess within themselves elements of power and self-reliance; their coal and iron fields developed,

their manufacturing establishments extensive and varied, with the West as a vast storehouse to supply their necessities, and a network of railroads and canals extending to all parts of the country, affording facilities for the transportation of public and private stores and goods, and available for rapidly concentrating troops at any required point. But with us, as I sought to show, it is far different. We are more distant from the Atlantic States than India is from the British isles. Our Isthmus route would be soon closed. We could only be reached by a voyage of fifteen thousand miles around Cape Horn-a route assailable by the enemy's cruisers its whole length; and even if a transport should escape the enemy's vessels, which could lie in wait for it in all the numerous South American ports, it would have to run the enemy's blockading fleet. I also referred to the physical formation of our State-the ease with which it might be closed by blockade; its harbor of San Francisco seized; that the whole agricultural district of the State was at the mercy of the invader, so that he could starve our people into submission. I also dwelt upon the inducements for a campaign for conquest-the riches of our soil in minerals, our noble bay and city, our navyyard, arsenal, dry dock, and other appliances, ready fitted to the hand of an enemy, and the very means he needs to strengthen his position.

I do not desire to recapitulate my statements and arguments upon these topics. I trust gentlemen have given to these matters their due weight, and that they will show their appreciation of them by their action upon this bill. But I will say that a formidable fleet, such as that the English Government now maintains in the Pacific, can wrest San Francisco at any time from the Government, take possession of the fortifications, navy-yard, dry dock, and arsenal, and hold command of the inland navigation of the State.

I know the fact to be that during the pendency of the Trent difficulty warning was sent by an eminent Californian, then in England, that orders had gone out to the British Pacific fleet to strike at San Francisco as soon as news arrived of the commencement of hostilities. England desires California more than we seem to prize it, if our care for it may be estimated by our efforts to retain it. We anticipated England but a very little in its acquisition, according to Mr. Webster's testimony, and if we are unwise we may yet yield it up to her. I have here a list of British and French ships of war now in the Pacific, with their class, guns, tonnage, and horse-power. A majority of the fleet consists of powerful steamers, carrying guns of heavy caliber, and of the most improved invention:

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Against such fleets the United States have but seven vessels, three propelled by steam, one an old store ship, and one of them recently condemned in China, but, all enumerated, with less guns than are carried by the French ships alone. The few vessels we have there are scattered in neutral ports, as Acapulco and Panama, and in event of a war would be compelled to remain in such refuge, or be swept from the sea by the overwhelming force of the enemy. England has in the Pacific more than two ships to our one, four steam vessels to our one, three guns to our one. Our fleet would be, therefore, no protection to our Pacific possessions. It now serves as a police force at the principal points touched by our shipping in the Pacific; but could no more preserve our rights and territory there against the squadron of England than a body of policemen could repel an army. In the event of a maritime war the people of California would be left to their own resources, with a powerful and covetous enemy to contend against. England desires to absorb a part of Maine to gain a highway to its Canadian cities. Would it be just to leave Maine to protect itself? Yet you leave California to do so, with greater temptations to an enemy than exist in the case of [ Maine. I have shown that our fleet could not protect us-that San Francisco and the agricultural valleys, with the undefended navy-yard and arsenal, are open to seizure. What could the people of California do without cannon or ammunition, and without the means of procuring them? How could they protect themselves? They are a gallant people, and will fight; but how shall they fight without means? I do not ask for a standing army for California, aside from small trained garrisons for the forts, and these she furnishes from her own people at the present time; but I do ask for the means of war, to prevent her people being driven back and starved out, and thus her subjugation be accomplished.

Sir, how are these means of war to be furnished? You will not accumulate vast stores of the material of war to corrode and perish during years of peace, for the expense of storehouses, depots, and fortifications would necessarily be on the largest scale, and the deterioration in many articles necessary to be stored would forbid it. By such a system you would waste millions for a questionP able advantage. I have shown that sea communication could not be relied upon unless you have a Navy, equal to that which England could em. ploy to assail us, to convoy your transport ships, a system of supply the cost of which in a single year of war would equal the entire expense of a railroad to the Pacific. Equally vain would be any attempt to transport overland the amount of supplies requisite for the defense of the Pacific frontier. By an official estimate the cost of land transportation for the annual supplies of provisions, clothing, camp equipage, and ammunition for such an army as it would be necessary to maintain there would exceed at peace prices $20,000,000. In time of war the expense is estimated to be six times that amount. The journey across the plains would take from four to six months. But, in point of fact, supplies for an army could not be transported across the continent. On

the arid and barren belts to be crossed the supply of grass and water is limited and would soon be exhausted, and forage could not be transported for such numerous draught animals over such dis tances. Transportation by sea and land are alike impossible in event of a war with a powerful mar. itime nation, and California and your whole Pacific possessions wou necessarily be left to their fate. What that fate is I have endeavored to make apparent.

One other consideration before I address myself to the merits of the bill under consideration. The loss of California would not be merely a disgrace, it would be the first step downward in the career of the Republic. Whenever a nation commences to lose its territory, its history draws to an end; henceforth the seal of fate is set upon its brow, and it falls never to rise again. But, even supposing we can escape this law of decay, illustrated in all ancient nations, and the Union, bounded on the west by the Rocky mountains, continues to exist, how would your markets endure the deprivation of our gold? The loss of a single vessel, a few years since, that sunk in the stormy Atlantic, with a million of treasure, caused extensive bankruptcy over the Atlantic and western States. Your manufactories now find a profitable market on the Pacific, with gold-paying customers and tariff discriminations in your favor. Let those discriminations be against you, as they would be if California was in the hands of a foreign Power, and your commercial prosperity would be seriously impaired. You consult not alone the interests of the Pacific coast in the passage of the measure. You foster the general good, as well as provide the means to protect the honor and prestige of the nation.

These considerations are more fully developed by reference to the commercial advantages accruing from the completion of the work; but I have not time now to discuss them.

The construction of this road was a necessary consequence of the acquisition by the American people of territory upon the Pacific ocean. The moment that we annexed those vast regions, extending as far along the Pacific as our eastern sea-board extends along the Atlantic, we assumed an obligation to provide an internal communication by railroad across the continent. By this means only can we bind together these distant regions, provide for the common defense, and develop the resources of the country. By obtaining that territory we acquiesced in this measure; for by no other means can we maintain and hold the country together. We have trifled with these obligations in the past; but they are not the less imperative. I grant, sir, it has not been the fault of this House; and I do not believe it will be our fault now if this work is not inaugurated.

If the considerations I have presented are correct, namely, that this work is a military necessity, and deserves present attention, all differences about rival routes and local interests that do not facilitate the great work, are injurious. It may be convenient for one or two of the extreme northwestern States to have a railroad from some point on their borders to end in the north Pacific, proIvided they are not deceived in the capacities of that extreme northern section upon the Pacific side of the continent. Were the men now in their seats, who a few years ago contended that the route should be laid down from Texas to Guaymas, they might again vote against any other project. But the great object now to be secured, as is obvious by the lessons forced upon our notice, is the construction of a road by the shortest end

most direct route to our principal port upon the Pacific, to protect our possessions there from a foreign enemy. I trust, sir, that a proper appreciation of this fact will be seen in the votes upon the pending measure. Yet, sir, while the committee have provided such termini to the route contemplated in this bill that that road must be constructed between the thirty-ninth and fortythird parallels of latitude, and upon the most direct, central, and practicable route between those parallels, due regard has been had to commercial considerations and a connection with the great lines of railroad communication now existing. Thus, the fork of the road starting from the western boundary of Iowa, with the Hannibal and St. Joseph connection, connects with the lines of road running through Springfield, Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, all the cities on the lines of the lakes and in central New York, as well as the New England States. The connection at Kansas City takes in St. Louis, Vincennes, Cincinnati, Louisville, Indianapolis, Columbus, Pittsburg, Wheeling, Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, &c. Liberal grants of land have already been made to roads through Minnesota, and the road already projected under those grants, from St. Paul to Sioux City, will bring Minnesota into connection with the Pacific railroad; while Wisconsin is already partially supplied with railroads that connect with the system of lake railroads to which I have adverted. sir, notwithstanding these ready and equitable connections with the great railroad systems of the country, and all parts of it, the branches proposed in the bill to effect these connections are short and simple, and obtained at a less cost than any which have heretofore been considered by Congress. Such connections are necessary, not only to yield the highest commercial advantages to the country, but as feeders over which materials shall be transported to construct the main road.


The theory upon which this bill proceeds, that aid must be granted by the General Government, will not be questioned by any gentleman who expects to see this work completed during this generation. You cannot organize a company to undertake this work without substantial aid from the Government. By a communication laid upon our tables from the President, in response to an inquiry of the Senate, giving information upon the railway systems in France, we learn that the Government extends its aid by the issue of bonds for railroads, and has thus developed a vast network of roads, traversing the whole empire, which roads pay well upon the investment, reimburse the Government, and develop the resources and business of the regions they traverse. In my former remarks, I called the attention of the House to the extensive system of railroads being built in Russia and British India by Government aid, making the power of those Governments impreg nable against foreign aggression or internal discontent. Our Government only, with territory equally extensive and exposed with that of Russia or the British Indies, and far more than that of France, seems indifferent to the future, either as bearing upon the increase of our national wealth or defense; for it has these many years neglected to use the obvious means to increase that wealth or to provide for the national defense. Is distant India more important to England, or the Crimea to Russia, than our Pacific possessions are to us?

I will here remark, by way of parenthesis, that our minister at the Court of St. James says, in a dispatch accompanying the information concerning the French system of railways, that

"We shall find at the close of this war one half of our

cotton business has been transferred to India. Soon, too, Russian roads will be opened through the whole region of the Terre Norre, from the Black sea to the Baltic, which, from its rich bottomless soils, will yield incalculable quantities of food now inaccessible. France is pushing her railway system down into Spain, and in concert with that Government is opening up vast regions hitherto uncultivated, which would grow wheat enough to teed all Europe. In these ways our export trade is seriously threatened, and can only be preserved by a railway system proportioned to the magnitude of our territory and its natural resources, by which everything that the industry of the country can produce can have its market. The union of the Pacific and sea-board States by an iron read never appeared so clearly a national necessity as it has since the recent threatened rupture with England. The first and inevitable result of a war with any great naval Power would be the loss of our Calfornia possessions.

"Whatever may have been the traditional policy of the Government heretofore, some easy, sure, and rapid communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific is now a subject of such direct national concern that the Government must charge itself with the execution of it without much delay,"

thereby announcing the views I have endeavored to enforce upon this floor. I ask gentlemen but to glance at the railway policy of the English Government in July and of the Russian Government within its dominions, where thousands of miles of railroad have been constructed by the aid of those Governments, to cement their vast empires, and develop the commercial capacities of their dominions. We ask nothing novel when we claim Government aid in an enterprise that will add to the stability of the Government, settle up its unproductive lands, develop the resources of the country, and enable it to defend the integrity of its territory. The only question that can arise is as to the best method of granting the aid that it is the interest and duty of the Government to furnish. It has been decided by the votes of many gentlemen before me that the proper method is by the issuance of bonds of the Government, bearing a reasonable interest, and payable sufficiently far in the future to insure the completion of the road before their maturity. I believe, sir, that aid extended in that manner will construct the road. By this bill we provide for the issuance of bondsnot enough, it is true, to build the road-but graduated in amount per mile to the character of the country over which the road passes, so that the aid is small where the work is comparatively easy, and larger where mountain ranges must be subdued, and we provide for security to the Government for its expenditures and for a repayment by transportation of mails, troops, and munitions of war, and also by dedicating a portion of the net earnings of the road. I say we do not appropri ate enough to construct the road, for $60,000,000 will not build such a road. But we make it an object for capitalists to embark their own means in the undertaking by the aid we furnish. We insure a proper application of the national funds by requiring a section of a given number of miles to be fully completed, and furnished in every respect, before we issue any bonds or furnish any aid whatever; and so on until the road is completed. Capitalists who build the road do not, under this bill, have the funds of the Government to speculate upon. They must use their own money to build the road, and are paid only as sections are fully completed. It matters not what any given section may cost, the aid the Government will furnish is limited in the bill. Such a system guards against abuses and jobs. It insures a speedy and economical construction of the road. I call attention to another feature of this bill, as bearing upon the present capacity of the Government to embark in this enterprise. Gentlemen have sometimes talked as if we designed to put our hands into the Treasury, now that it is de

pleted by an expensive conflict, and abstract there from fifty or sixty millions of dollars. We design to do nothing of the id, and such will not be the operation of this bill In the first place, no payment of the principal of these bonds will be required roder thirty or forty years, when the country will have swelled in population to a hundred millions, and our wealth will be fourfold what it now is; when this road will have been twenty years in operation, and have created half a dozen new States where uninhabited wilds now occupy our territories, and when the trade of Asia poured into our lap, and widely-extended commerce, by its means, will have far repaid the expenditures, even if the companies constructing the road shall not, before that time, have paid up the loan by the means provided in the bill." And it is also an error to suppose that the interest upon this amount is to be paid now or presently. The bonds will be issued slowly, few at a time, as the work progresses. It will be probably two years before any bonds will be issued, for surveys have to be made, and preparations for work, and part of the road constructed, before any will be due. The whole amount of interest to be paid up to 1866 will be but $168,000, and up to 1867 but $504,000; and when the road is fully completed, and we are experiencing all the security and commercial advantages which it will afford, the annual interest will be less than $4,000,000, and that sum will be but gradually reached year after year. The War Department has paid out, on an average, $5,000,000 per year, for the past five years, for transportation to the Pacific coast, and the mails cost $1,000,000 more at their present reduced rates. The saving of the Government would be two millions per year on these items alone. I beg gentlemen who talk of the exigencies of the times to observe that we ask nothing of the Government for two or three years to come, and how very little we ask at the expiration of that time. As this road progresses west from the Mississippi, and east from California, it will be available to the Government for transpoon; and I have no doubt that the services it wil render will very soon absorb the in terest money to be paid under this bill.

If gentlemen will take into consideration the immense outlays by the Government for want of railroad facilities across the Territories, they would better appreciate the propriety of these moderate expenditures we now require. The Mormon war cost millions to the Government-probably one third the amount contemplated by this bill; and a very large proportion of that cost was in the item of transportation, and much of it on account of the necessary delay in military movements without railroads over such distances. That war never could have occurred with a railroad across the continent. With such a road you would avoid Indian wars, which cost millions to the Government, through the territories traversed by it. You would save the lives of citizens who now take their weary way across those territories, falling victims often to savage onslaught. Sir, you can follow the emigrant trail from Missouri to California, and never lose your way, for the route is broadly marked with the bones of men and beasts, of broken wagons and abandoned property.

To illustrate my views fully upon the financial workings of this bill, I have prepared a table of the amount of bonds to be issued each year, until the entire road is completed. It will be observed that no payment of these bonds is to be made under thirty years from their date, only the interest upon them, as it accrues; and that their issuance is in fact, aside from their interest, a mere loan of the credit of the Government. As they

are issued only for completed sections, which have already been paid for by the cash of the companies, the Government is not interested in the ques tion whether they are worth in the hands of the holders their face or a less amount. It is not compelled to make good any deficiency, and it is secured to the full amount of the face and interest by a first mortgage upon the road, which will have cost upon the average double the amount of the bonds issued.

In the absence of positive information with regard to the cost of the road through the Territories, the Curtis bill, without recognizing the absolute difference in expense of respective sections of the line, considered the work as being of equal cost per mile, adding thereto a certain amount at the crossing of each degree of longitude as compensation for the increased outlay for transporting iron, ties, and materials for construction, as the road progressed from the two ends towards the interior, thus: commencing at the eastern end with $12,000 per mile, and increasing the amount $3,000 per mile until the one hundred and ninth meridian of longitude was reached. This made the appropriation for the last degree of longitude $48,000 per mile. It is well known that for the first six hundred miles the line passes over a comparatively smooth, level country, the real difficulties of the work only commencing when the Rocky mountains are reached. So, upon the western end, the real difficulties of the work commence at the western base of the Sierra Nevada mountains in California, the passage of which comprehends the most difficult and expensive portion of the whole road. In fact, the cost of crossing these mountains has, until recently, been a matter of speculation. Recent surveys, however, have demonstrated, not only their feasibility at reduced grades, but have furnished data for a correct estimate of the cost of the same, all of which has been taken into consideration in determining the relative amounts of appropriations per mile..

Under the provisions of this bill, the amount of bonds proposed to be issued are $16,000 per mile. Upon reaching the base of the Rocky mountains from the east, and the base of the Sierra Nevadas from the west, this amount is trebled for one hundred and fifty miles, making $48,000 per mile for that distance, which includes the most difficult and expensive portion of the road.

Between these two points, and through the interior or great basin, where the line passes over a rolling, hilly country, intersected by numerous streams, this first-named amount is doubled, making $32,000 per mile.

It is believed that this apportionment of appropriations conforms more closely to the absolute cost of the different sections of the line than that of the Curtis bill, and will amount to about one half of the cost of the road upon the average of the work.

The total amount of aid thus extended by the Government for the construction of the road will be as follows:

Miles. Per mile.

From Sacramento to western
base Sierra Nevada.....
From western base of Sierra








Through Great Basin........ 890 Through Rocky mountains... 150 Thence to Kansas line........ 200 Thence to Missouri line..... 450



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Or a total of miles........1.810

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.$7,200,000 31,200,000 9.360,000 5,920,000

In 1865... In 1866.. In 1867..


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In 1868. In 1869.. In 1870...

$168.000 In 1871...... .$2.363.000 504.000 In 1872.......... 2.699.000 3.035.000

804.000 In 1873....


1,283,000 In 1874.......... 3.371.000 1,787,000 In 1875.. ..2,075,000

Thus the highest rate of interest upon a com. pleted road will be less than four millions of dollars, and our yearly expenses are over six millions of dollars for mails and transportation. True economy calls for this expenditure, as well as considerations of convenience, safety, and commercial advantage.

It will be seen by the provisions of the bill that the work of construction is assigned to companies already organized at either end, while about one thousand miles of the center are assigned to corporators named in the bill, which is in that respect similar to the Curtis bill.

It is believed that this disposition of the work will operate advantageously, and insure the more rapid prosecution of the road. The length of the entire line from the Missouri river to the navi gable waters of the Sacramento river will be eighteen hundred and sixty-five miles. The propor tion assigned to the California company on the western end is one hundred and forty miles; to the Nevada company is two hundred and seventyfive miles, or a total of four hundred and fifteen miles; while upon the eastern end the portion assigned to the Kansas company includes four hundred and fifty miles. The total amount of bonds contemplated to be issued on the main line is fifty thousand, or about one half the cost of the entire road. It is well known that the work of construction of this road must progress from the two ends, which must be located on navigable waters, or at the terminus of some railroad already constructed, where iron, &c., can be had, and must progress with rapidity towards the center. Upon the western end is immediately encountered the passage of the Sierra Nevada mountains, comprising the heaviest and most difficult portion of the whole road. Recognizing the great difficulty and cost of crossing these mountains upon the line surveyed by the Government through California, attention was directed to the importance of a shorter route through central California; and the result of extensive explorations was the discovery of a route which effected a saving of one hundred and eighty miles in distance, with less grades, to a common point on the Beckwith survey. And I will remark, in passing, that it is my impression, from my knowledge of the intermediate country to the Missouri, that proper railroad surveys will reduce the distances far below the estimates I have adopted in this discussion. A company has been organized in my State, and a railroad survey made under its auspices, at great cost, entirely across the Sierra Nevadas, which successfully overcomes the difficulties of this portion of the route. As this company is named in the bill as one of the agents

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