Certain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sum. 589; Marcadier v. Chesapeake Ins. Co. 8 Cr. 49; Palmer v. Gracie, 4 Wash. C. C. 110, 122-3; S. C. 8 Wh. 605, 641; McIntyre v. Bowne, 1 Johns. 229; Clarkson v. Edes, 4 Cow. 470; Holmes v. Pavenstedt, 5 Sandf. 97; 3 Kent's Com. 138; 1 Pars. Cont. 657. or Great Britain at their option. The time for her employment was to extend to the full term of fifteen months, with a privilege to the charterers to extend it to twenty-four months. The charterers engaged to furnish the [*58 ship with a full cargo-bills of lading to be signed for it without prejudice to the charter If, upon the whole instrument, it be doubt--and they contracted to pay to the owner of ful what was intended, the general owner continue such during the term; his rights can only be displaced by a clear and determinate transfer of them. Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sum. 589. Second. The ship owner has a lien upon the cargo for the freight of its transportation, unless it has been waived or abandoned by agreement. Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wh. 605, 641; S. C. 4 Wash. C. C. 110-123; Clarkson v. Edes, 4 Cow. 481, per Savage, Ch. J.; The Volunteer, 1 Sum. 551; Ruggles v. Bucknor, 1 Paine, 358; Drinkwater v. Brig Spartan, 1 Ware, 156; " Holmes v. Pavenstledt, 5 Sandf. 97; Small v. Moates, 9 Bing. 574, Gledstanes v. Allen, 12 Com. Bench, 202; Gledstanes v. Allen, 22 Eng. Law and Eq. 382; Angel on Car. secs. 385, 386; Abbott on Ship. 287, 288, 299. Third. The stipulation that the charter money should be paid in New York semi-annually, is not a waiver of, nor is it incompatible with the right of lien for freight money due and unpaid. Saville v. Campion, 2 Barn. & Ald. 503; The Volunteer, 1 Sum. 551; Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sum. 589; Campion v. Colvin, 3 Bing. N. C. 17. (a). It had no other effect than to fix the periods of payment, and to suspend the right to enforce a lien upon the cargo, until default of payment. New v. Swain, 1 Dan. & Lloyd, 193. (b.) Default was made in the payment of the freight money due at the end of the six months; and the ship owner was thereupon at liberty to proceed and enforce his lien. New v. Swain, 1 Danson & Lloyd, Merc. Cases, 193; Dixon v. Yates, 2 Nev. & Man. 177; Saville v. Campion, 2 B. & A. 503, 513; Abbott on Ship. 289. Mr. Justice Wayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from the district court for the northern district of California. The suit was brought by a libel in the admiralty against 844 tons of coal (of which Raymond was the claimant) on board the ship Orphan, of which Tyson the libellant, was a part owner. Its object was to enforce an alleged lien on the coal claimed under a charterparty between Tyson and J. Howard & Son, of New York, charterers. The charter-party was made at New York on the 1st February, 1850, the ship at the time being on her voyage to London. The whole ship, with the exception of the deck, cabin, and necessary room for the crew and stowage of provisions, sails, and cables, was chartered by the owner to J. Howard & Son, for a voyage from London direct, or from thence to Cardiff in Wales (if required), to load for a port or ports on the Pacific, where she was to be employed between such ports as the charterers might elect; thence to be returned back either to New York the ship or his agent, for the use of the vessel, at the rate of $2,000 per month, commencing in London, if she proceeds thence direct to the Pacific, when ready to load, and notice of the same was given to the charterers or their agent. But if the vessel shall be ordered to Cardiff to load, then the charter was to commence from the time she might be ballasted, and be ready for sea, in London. In that case the ship is to be allowed ten days from the time she is ready to sail from London until her arrival at Cardiff, and only that time, for which the charterers were to pay, should the ship be a longer or shorter time in making the passage to Cardiff. It is agreed between the owner and the charterers that the charter should be payable in New York semiannually; the first payment to be made six months from the commencement of the same, and so every six months during the continuance of the charter, before the arrival of the ship and her being delivered back to the owner, in New York or Great Britain; or upon satisfactory proof of total loss of the ship, all moneys in arrears and due up to the time of the loss were to be paid on demand. Should the vessel be ordered to California, the charterers agree to pay the expense of victualling and manning her, attendant upon the Califor nia voyage and the charter money for any detention caused by desertion of the crew. charterers agreed also to pay all port charg ers of the ship incident to her employment, except victualling, manning and repairs, and to advance funds for the ordinary expenses of the ship after she left Europe, which were to be deducted from the charter payments on vouchers from the captain. The The ship sailed for Cardiff, on the 1st April, 1850, and arrived there on the 14th April. She there took on board from Branson, Sands & Co., the agents of the charterers, a cargo of 844 tons of coal, the property of the charter. ers. For this cargo a bill of lading was signed May 4, 1850, at Cardiff, expressing that the ship was bound to Panama, for orders, to be delivered to order or assigns, he or they pay. ing freight, as per charter-party. The bill of lading is as follows: Bill of lading. Shipped in good order and condition, by Branson, Sands & Co., of Liverpool, in and upon the good ship or vessel called "The Orphan," whereof R. C. Williams is master for this present voyage, and now ly844 tons of "Nixon's ing in the port of Cardiff, Merthyr and Car- and bound for Panama for diff steam coal." orders, eight hundred and forty-four tons of Nixon's Merthyr and Cardiff steam coal," being marked and numbered as per margin, and are to be delivered in the like good order and condition at the port, [*59 according to orders, (all and every the dangers and accidents of the seas, and navigation of whatsoever nature or kind, excepted) unto "order," or to assigns; he or they paying for The ship proceeded to Panama with her cargo, and thence, by orders of the charterers, to San Francisco. She arrived at San Francisco, December 2d, 1850, and the cargo was retained on board by her captain, to preserve an alleged lien upon it for freight. The libelant avers that $12,000 was due for charter money, on the 1st October, and that it had not been paid by the charterers; and that they had not furnished funds for the ships expenses after she left Europe; and for the money due he claims a lien upon the coal. Raymond, the claimant, answers, that the bill of lading of the coal had been transferred to him at the time of its shipment by J. Howard & Son, for a valuable consideration paid; and this is not denied in the case. That he thereby became owner of the coal, and has ever since continued to be so, free from any lien or claim in favor of the owners of the ship, or any other persons; that he had demanded the coal, but that the master refused to deliver it. After the libel was issued and the answer had been put in, the master of the ship petitioned for an order for the sale of the coal, as a perishable commodity. The order was granted, the coal was sold, and the proceeds were adjudged to be liable to a lien for the sum due upon the charter-party on the 1st October. We shall give our judgment upon the foregoing statement, without considering in detail the general principles governing contracts of affreightment. But we will state two of them, because they have a decisive bearing upon the charter-party, under which this controversy has arisen. First, it must be remembered, that a charterparty is an informal instrument as often as otherwise, having inaccurate clauses, and that on this account they must have a liberal construction, such as mercantile contracts usually receive, in furtherance of the real intention of the parties and usage of trade. So Lord Mansfield said a long time since. Abbott, in his treatise relative to merchant ships and seaman, Story's edition, 188, gives the rule of construction very much in the same words, but perhaps with more precision. "The general rule which our courts of law have adopted, in the construction of this as well as other mercantile instruments, is, that the construction should be liberal, agreeable to the real intention of the parties, and conformable to the usage of trade in general, and of the particular trade to which the contract relates." Chancellor Kent, in his 60] 47th chapter on the contract of Af freightment, cites the rule approvingly. The late Mr. Justice Thompson, of this court, asserts it in Ruggles v. Bucknor, 1 Paine, 358. Judge Story acted upon it ten years afterwards, in the case of The Volunteer, 1 Sumner, 550; and again in another case, 2 Sumner, 589. The first says: "It was pressed upon me by the defendant's counsel, that I should decide this abstract question, and lay down some general rules as to the lien on the cargo for the freight, when the voyage is performed under a charterparty. This I do not feel disposed to do, especially as it would and ought to be considered as a mere obiter opinion, if not required by the facts of the case. And, indeed, it is impracticable to lay down any general rules to meet the great variety of cases that must necessarily arise in commercial transactions. Each case must depend, in a great measure, upon its own circumstances. Parties are not bound to any fixed and precise stipulations to be embraced in a charter-party." In the case of The Volunteer and cargo, the most difficult question was, whether there was, under the charter party a lien on the homeward cargo for the freight. Judge Story says: "In general, it is well known that by the common law there is a lien on the goods shipped for the freight thereon; whether it arise under a common bill of lading, or under a charter-party. But then this lien may be waived by consent; and in cases of charterparties, it often becomes a question whether the stipulations are or are not inconsistent with the lien." The other case mentioned in 2 Sumner, 589, Certain Logs of Mahogany v. Richardson, was one which was decided upon the inaccurate and inconsistent stipulations of a charter-party by a liberal construction of them, in furtherance of the real intention of the parties and the usage of trade. In Gracie v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 605, 634, this court has said: "That the contract of affreightment, like any other contract, is the creature of the will of the parties. It may be varied to infinity, and easily adapted to the exigencies of either party or of any trade. It is only where the express contract is silent, that the implied contract can arise." These authorities are sufficient, without citing others, to establish the general rule for the construction of charter-parties. The next rule for the construction of charter-parties, deduced by us from an examination of all the leading cases in the English and American Reports, including those cited in the argument of the counsel of the appellee, is this: that though the owner of a ship, of which the charterer is not the lessee, but freighter only, has a lien upon the cargo for freight properly so called, and also for a sum agreed to be paid for the use and hire of the ship, his lien may be considered as having been waived, without express words to that effect, if there are stipulations in the charter-party *in- [*61 consistent with the exercise of the lien, or when it can fairly be inferred that the owner meant to trust to the personal responsibility of the charterer. In Ruggles v. Buchnor, Paine, 363, Mr. Justice Thompson said; “There can be no doubt that a ship owner may by express stipulations as to payment of freight, incompatible with a claim upon the cargo for the same, be deemed to have waived his lien, as if he should by the charter-party, or otherwise, agree to receive his freight at a time and place having no reference to the delivery of the cargo, or a variance with such time and place. But, as by the general rules of law the cargo is liable for the freight, it should be satisfactorily shown that the claim has been relinquished before the ship owner can be required to part with the cargo without payment of the freight." As early as the year 1820, Chief Justice Spencer had ruled the same in the case of Chandler v. Belden, 18 Johns. 157, 162. His language is: "The right to retain the cargo for the freight has grown out of the usage of trade; and it does not exist, nor can it be enforced, when the parties have expressly regulated the time and manner of paying the freight by stipulations in a charter-party, and especially if the cargo is deliverable before the arrival of the periods of payment. Such an agreement is an express renunciation of the right to insist on freight before the cargo is delivered. it was expressly agreed that the ship during the continuance of the voyage, should remain firmly and fully vested in the owner, and that he should at all times during the voyage and service have a complete lien upon the lading of the ship. It was ruled that he had a lien upon the goods of the charterer, and against his indorsee of the bill of lading. The grounds upon which the indorsee contended against the lien need not be stated here, as they have no relation to any controversy in this case. Saville v. Campion, much relied upon in 2 B. & A. 503, 512, decided by Chief Justice Abbott, does not interfere in any way with the rules of construction which we have stated to be applicable to charter-parties. The point ruled in that case was, that as there were no express words of demise of the ship itself in the charter-party, the freighter did not thereby become the owner for the voyage, and that the possession continued in the owner, and that he had therefore a lien upon the cargo for freight. But the lien on the goods, for the stipulated hire of the ship is expressly put upon the Judge Story says, in the case of The Volunteer, "But then this lien may be waived by consent, and in charter-parties it often becomes a question whether the stipulations are or are not inconsistent with the existence of the lien. For instance, if the delivery of the goods is by the charter-party to precede the payment or security of payment of freight, such a stipulation furnishes a clear dispensation with the lien for freight, for it is repugnant to it, and incompatible with it." Judge Story had had occasion to consider this point five years before he gave his opinion in the case of The Volunteer. We find in his note to his edition of Abbott on Shipping, printed by Hilliard, Gray, Little & Wilkins, at Boston, in 1829, page 178, a citation of the case of Chand-ground "that there was nothing to show that ler v. Belden, 18 Johns. 157, with this commentary: "That part of the language which seems to deny the right to retain, where there is an express stipulation of the time and manner of paying the freight, if it means that that fact alone overturns the lien, whether the stipulation be or be not inconsistent with such lien, admits of much question, and seems inconsistent with the doctrine of the cases cited in the text, as well as with that in Chase v. Westmore, 6 M. & Sel. 180, and Crawshawy Homfray, 4 B. & A. 50." In Lucas v. Nockell, 4 Bing. 729, it was said: "It may distinctly appear from the charter-par62*] ty, that the owner has been *content to trust to the personal responsibility of the merchant, and fixing a specific time of payment, before or after delivery has waived his right to a lien. In Lowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. 275; Chase v. Westmore, 5 M. & Sel. 180; and in Crawshawy v. Homfray, B. & A. 52, it was ruled, if there be a specific contract for a particular time and mode of payment, and that contract is inconsistent with the right to retain, it will of course defeat a claim to exercise it." Nothing can be found in the cases cited by the counsel for the appellee in conflict with the extracts just given: on the contrary, most of them admit the principles expressed in those extracts. Gracie v. Palmer, in 8 Wh., the same case upon appeal to this court, decided by Mr. Jus tice Washington, in 4 Wash. C. C. Reports, af firms what no one will deny: if the ship owner retains the possession of the ship, and the charterer is merely the freighter-that the former has a lien upon the cargo for freight. Other points were ruled in that case but they have no bearing upon this, and especially none upon what shall be considered a waiver of a lien for freight. Clarkson v. Edes, in 4 Cowen, is to the same point; but both Chief Justice Savage and Mr. Justice Woodworth decided that case from the intention of the parties, as that could be inferred from the charter-party. Small v. Moates, in 9 Bingham, 574, decided by Chief Justice Tindal, was a case in which the delivery of the goods was to precede the payment of that hire, in cash and bills, as provided for by the deed. The case of [*63 Campion v. Colvin, 3 Bing. N. C. 17, involved, first, the inquiry whether or not the owner of the ship did not retain the possession of her, and that the charterer was only freighter. It was ruled that the owner was left in possession, the charter-party being the same on which the court of King's Bench decided, in Saville v. Campion. Next, whether it was the intention of the parties that the ship owner meant to insist on the delivery of the bills which were to be given on London before the delivery of the cargo; it was decided that he did, but that the decision was given upon the ground of the special agreement, and not on the general right of lien, is obvious from the language of the Chief Justice: "Looking to the intent of the parties, it is clear the ship owner meant to insist upon the delivery of the bills before the delivery of the cargo, so that, with respect to the time at which the freight was payable, there was no difference between that and the preceding cases." And lastly, whether or not the assignees of the charterer stood in a different relation to the owner from that of the charterer; it was ruled that he did not. The opinion given by Chief Justice Tindal in this case is manifestly not reported with accuracy as to the statement, and is apt to mislead in respect to the second ruling of that learned judge. It appears that neither the case of Saville v. Campion, nor that of Campion v. Colvin, 3 Bing. N. C. 17, contains anything against the second rule of construction which we have stated. There was not in either of the charter-parties of those places, though London had been fixed upon for the place of payment, anything incompatible with the lien upon the cargo, or at a variance with the time and place which had been agreed upon for its delivery. Upon the authorities cited, we consider the rule to be, that though the owner of a ship who retains possession of her has a lien for freight upon the cargo of the freighter, the lien may be adjudged to have been waived without an express agreement or words to that effect, if | tial part of any contract to pay it there. It there are stipulations in the charter-party, inconsistent with the exercise of such lien or when it can be fairly inferred, from the lanquage of the instrument, that the owner meant to trust to the personal responsibility of the charterer for the freight or hire of the ship. can be insisted upon by him who is to receive it, and cannot be rightfully refused or omitted by him who has it to pay. A broken promise of that kind gives to the creditor a right of action against the debtor for its recovery. Why upon principle should a promise to pay freight at a The limitation upon such construction and particular time, and at a place other inference is as well expressed as it can be, in than that where the owner of the ship [*65 the language of Judge Story, in the case of Cer- has undertaken to deliver the cargo, be required tain Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumn. 597. It is to be paid elsewhere? It is the payer's privi"Let us now proceed to the consideration of lege to pay it there. And, should it not be the terms of the present charter-party, in order paid, why should the owner have more than a to ascertain what is their true meaning and in- right of action for its recovery, or larger remeterpretation. If, upon comparing the various dies by suit, than are given in any other conclauses, we are led to the conclusion that it is tract? We confess we do not see why. Place doubtful whether the charterer was intended to for the payment of freight, other than that for 64*] have the sole possession and control of which the cargo is shipped and discharged, the brig during the voyage, or to be constituted amounts to a stipulation that freight will owner for the voyage, then the general owner not be demanded at the last as a condition for must be deemed such, for his rights and au- the cargo's delivery. All of the authorities conthorities over the voyage must continue, unless cur in this, that place for the payment of displaced by some clear and determined trans- freight is a waiver of a lien upon the cargo unfer of them." So we now say, if it be only less there are already circumstances or stipuladoubtful in the construction of a charter-party tions to show that it could not have been whether the owner has waived his lien upon meant. It is so, because it is at variance with the cargo, he must have the benefit of that the enforcement of such a lien according to the loubt; his lien being given by the force of usage of trade; and it is so, because, when parthe common law, which cannot be taken from ties to a charter-party depart from that usage him, "though there is a special contract, un- by agreeing to pay and receive freight at anothless there is something in that contract incon-er place than that where the common law gives sistent with that lien, or unless it is waived by fair implication." Williams, Justice, Pinney v. Wells, 10 Ct. 104, 115. to an owner of a ship a lien to enforce payment, it must be regarded that the owner had some sufficient reason for not insisting upon his right according to the common law. But it was urged by the counsel for the appellee, with earnestness and ingenious ability, that it might be shown that the time and place fixed for the payment, under the charter, was not meant by the owner to be a waiving of a lien. That it had no other effect than to fix the periods of payment, and to suspend the right to enforce a lien upon the cargo until default of payment. Time only might do that, but place connected with time for payment does not. We will now turn to the charter-party in this case, and form our judgment accordingly as the two rules of construction which have been stated shall bear upon it. In the first place, it is not for the carriage of a single cargo or for a voyage, but for a voyage from London direct, or from Cardiff, in Wales, to load for a port or ports in the Pacific, where the ship is to be employed between such ports as the charterers may elect; the time of employment in that way being for fifteen months certain, with the right of the charterers to extend it to twentyfour months. For such employment the char- It was said that the cargo which the charterers agree to pay to the owner or his agent, at terers agreed to furnish the ship, and which was the rate of two thousand dollars per month, put on board of her, to be carried from Cardiff payable in New York semi-annually, and so on to the Pacific, and that the clause in the charevery six months during the continuance of the ter, that bills of lading were to be signed withcharter. Now, if there be not something else out prejudice to it, in connection with the fact in the charter to control the meaning of the that, according to the ordinary length of such words designating time and place for payment, a passage, the ship could not have made it beit cannot be doubted that it was the intention fore the first payment would have become due, of the owner and charterers to make time and indicated the owners' intention to retain a lien place substantial parts of their contract. This upon the cargo as an additional security for is not an inference of intention, but a declara- the first payment. It may have been that the tion of it in words too intelligible for the use owners had such a purpose in view, apart from of interpretation. They have a fixed meaning, the changed condition of the charterers, when and cannot, of themselves, have any other mean- payment was not made in New York; but we ing. That meaning, then, is the contract be- are sure, from its inconsistency with the chartween the parties; precisely with the same ob- tered employment of the ship, that the charterligation upon them as another stipulation ers never contemplated it. The ship was to would have, for the payment of money at a load with a full cargo at London or Cardiff, given time and place, in any other analogous for a port or ports in the Pacific, to be emmercantile contract. There are no qualifying ployed between such ports as the charterers words of those used to make them doubtful; might elect. She was not loaded for a specific nothing in the charter which can be applied to voyage to any particular port where the cargo make them so. No fact could happen, from was to be discharged, but it was to be discharged any stipulation in it, to make the time and at one or more ports, as it *might have [*66 place agreed upon for payment uncertain. been their interest to direct. The ship sailed Place for the payment of money is a substan-' from Cardiff to Panama, for orders, with a cargo to be delivered "according to orders." Such is the language of the bill of lading (exactly in conformity with the charter-party), signed at Cardiff on the 4th May, 1850, thirty-four days after the ship's hire is said to have commenced. When she arrived at Panama is not shown, but when she arrived at San Francisco the first payment had become due; and when it was learned there that it had not been paid in New York, her captain refused to discharge the cargo according to orders, unless payment was made, or security had been given for the freight; in that way demanding money at San Francisco which was only payable in New York, or that security should be given for it; neither of which had been provided for in the charterparty in the event of a default of the first payment. By doing so, he took the ship out of her employment, which had then seven months to run, and disabled the charterers from using her in the only way for which she was chartered. It is no answer to say that his act and its consequences were occasioned by the default of the charterers to make the first semiannual payment. They had at that time rights for a longer service of the ship, and it had not been agreed that their default should either interrupt or terminate them. The lien as claimed and enforced, raised uncertainties in the relations of the parties not anticipated by either, and at variance with the rights of both. If it had been meant that such a lien should be enforced, it certainly had not been provided upon which of them the loss should fall for the time that the ship would be withheld from her employment; whether or not the owner should make an allowance for it out of the monthly hire of the ship, or that the charterers should continue to pay it whilst she was not in their use or under their control. Such uncertainties, changes of relations between the parties, and consequences are stronger against the lien claimed than any inferences can be in its favor, which are made from the engagement of the charterers to furnish a cargo or from the clause in the charter that bills of lading were to be signed without prejudice to it, or from the fact asserted that the ship could not arrive until after the first payment had become due. Whether or not the delay in her arrival I would have been as it is said the owner anticipated it would be we do not know; but we do know that the bill of lading was signed on the 4th of May, 1850; that there were then one hundred and forty-six days before the first payment would become due for her to make the passage, and it is not so certain that it might not have been done, as that the contrary can be assumed to give any force to the suggestion that the cargo had been stipulated for and furnished 67*] *to give additional security to the owner by a lien, should there be a failure to make the first semi-annual payment. There is too much of indirectness and covert intention in such an anticipation for us to countenance it. The cargo was obviously put on board as an adventure for profit. Without it, the time it would have taken to make the passage to the locality of the ship's principal employment, for which the charterer was paying at the rate of two thous and dollars per month, would have been a dead loss at least of five months of the time of her charter, or of ten thousand dollars. It cannot be supposed that the charterers were so blind to their interest as to permit that, or that it was not their own interest which prompted them to furnish the cargo without any intention of giv ing to the owner an opportunity to assert a lien for securing money which they had prom ised to pay in New York. Further, the declaration that the time and place fixed for payment was a suspension of the lien, is an admission, if the ship had arrived from Cardiff in time for the discharge of the cargo before the first payment became due, that the owner meant it should be done without being subject to a lien for freight. It was certainly meant that the cargoes which the ship might have carried from port to port in the Pacific, between the intervals when payments were to be made, were to be discharged and delivered without being subject to a lien for freight. It must have been then the owner's intention that all of the cargoes which the ship might carry were to be exempt from a lien, except that which she might have on board when the payment occurred. There is not in the charter any such distinction between them or anything looking like the reservation of such a right. Unless that can be made to appear, the engagement of the owner to release a lien upon all other cargoes, and that they were to be discharged before the payment of freight, does not permit the exception of any one of them from that engagement. All of the authorities declare that the owner's consent to receive freight before the cargo is delivered, whether it shall be paid or not, is a waiver of a lien upon the cargo; and that such a waiver may be inferred from a time and place having been agreed upon for the payment of freight, which has no reference to the place where the cargo is to be discharged. It But we will take the case as it was; that the ship did not arrive until after the time fixed for the first payment, that it was not paid, and that on such account the lien was claimed. does not make the claim stronger. Had it been meant that non-payment should give the lien, it should have been so stipulated. The non-arrival of the ship cannot give to the default any additional support for a lien. The lien here was asserted, not *in virtue of the law [*68 giving a lien upon cargo, but upon incidents out of the charter, which it is said gave to the owner a lien upon the contingency of their happening. Such a contingent or conditional lien may be agreed for by the owner and the charterer of a ship-but it must be done in terms leaving no doubt about it; or it must be a clear case of inference, to prevail against time fixed for the payment of freight at a place where the cargo is not to be discharged. The charter-party is to be construed liberally, for the purpose of preserving a lien given by the law, if the matter of it shall be only a matter of doubt. But that doubt cannot be helped by contingencies outside of the charter-party not plainly anticipated or growing out of one of its stipulations. Charter-parties are so frequently inaptly and incautiously drawn, that they may be said almost to have the indefinite |