process to be to mix pulverized anthracite coal with the clay before mould-
ing it, in certain proportions, varying, however, within defined limits with
the quality of the clay used, this was held not to be such vagueness and un-
certainty as to justify the Court in declaring the patent void. Ib.

23. The Court should have left it to the jury to find upon the evidence of per-
sons skilled in the art, whether the description was clear and exact enough
to enable such persons to compound and use the invention. Ib.

24. It is not only necessary to describe the thing patented, but to distinguish
what part of it, or what combination or what improvement, is new; and this
must be done in clear, certain, and intelligible terms, although not required
to be in technical language, or with so great accuracy as was formerly ex-
acted, yet it must be with reasonable certainty and clearness. This may be
done in the summary, or with that in connection with other parts of the
specification, referred to either in terms or by implication, and in such case
they are to be taken as a part of the summary for this purpose. Hovey v.
Stevens, II. 479; Smith v. Pearce, II. 13.

25. In this case the summary appeared to claim a traverse motion of a part of
the grinder, in combination with a rotary one, so as to bring up the knife to
the stone steadily, though spiral in form; on referring to other parts of the
specification, it still seemed to be the combination of those two motions, and
it was held that such a combination, with the mode of effecting it, was a
legal subject of a patent. Ib.

26. But it being conceded that this was not original, the plaintiff was not
allowed to claim certain parts of the machine which he had not distinguished
in any portion of the specification, as the new improvement, or not with rea-
sonable certainty. Ib.

27. It is not enough to describe such part, but he must state it to be claimed
as new. lb.

28. So if he claims the whole, either in parts or in combination, he must state
that distinctly. Ib.

29. And if the improvement meant to be claimed as new, is not distinguished
from the rest, the only mode of obviating the difficulty is by a new patent on
an amended specification. Ib.

30. Although the defect may have arisen from inadvertence and not with the
design of deceiving the public. Grant et al. v. Raymond et al. I. 604.

31. If the patent be for an improvement, the specification should describe the
thing in use, that it may be known in what the improvement consists. Sul-
livan v. Redfield, I. 477 ; Dixon v. Moyer, I. 324.

32. It is not sufficient to show it by exhibiting the invention on the trial.
Dixon v. Moyer, I. 324; Evans v. Eaton, I. 336.

33. The merely describing in the specification of the parts of the rolling pro-
cess and the modus operandi, does not make them part of the thing granted.
Kneass v. The Schuylkill Bank, I. 303.

34. But describing a mode of "communicating motion from the reed to the
yard beam," will limit the claim to the particular mode, although the claim
in terms embraced more. Stone v. Sprague et al. II. 10.

35. When defective description will not vitiate a patent for an improvement.
See Lowell v. Lewis, I. 131.

See CONCEALMENT.

SPECIFICATION-CLAIM.

1. Must not contain claim of more than the invention; void. Stanley v.
Whipple, II. 1.

2. Must not be of more than the patentee has invented. Ib.

3. When the specification describes one mode of accomplishing a particular
result, but the claim embraces all modes, the patent is void. Stone v. Sprague
et al. II. 10.

4. For a method of cutting ice by means of an apparatus worked by any other
power than human, is void, being a claim for an abstract principle. But a
claim for the application of the principle by means of two machines de-
scribed is good; provided a disclaimer be duly entered as to the former.
Wyeth et al. v. Stone et al. II. 23.

5. If the patentee claims more than he has invented, the patent is not void,
but, under the 9th section of Stat. 3d March, 1837, is good for what he has
bonâ fide invented, provided it be definitely described, and distinguishable
from the rest of the thing patented. Peterson et al. v. Wooden, II. 116.
6. The inventor of a new compound is not limited to the precise ingredients
set out; but if the object may be accomplished by the substitution of others
that have never been so used, he may extend his claim to them also. Ryan
et al. v. Goodwin et al. I. 725.

7. Annexed to a reissued patent need not contain a claim for all things that
were claimed in the original patent, but the patentee may retain whatever be
thinks proper. Carver v. Braintree Manufacturing Co. II. 141.

SPECIFICATION.-CONSTRUCTION.

1. Patents are entitled to a liberal construction. Blanchard v. Sprague, I. 734.
2. The Courts will give a liberal construction to the language of specifications
and will in all cases by taking the whole together, adopt that interpretation
which will give the fullest effect to the nature and extent of the claim. Ryan
et al. v. Goodwin et al. I. 725.

3. Should be construed fairly and liberally and not subjected to any over nice
and critical refinements. Ames v. Howard et al. I. 689.

4. If the Court can clearly see the nature and extent of the claim however im-
perfectly and inartificially expressed, the patent is good; but if it cannot be
seen without resorting to conjecture, the patent is void. Ib.

5. It is the duty of the Court rather than the jury to construe the language
used in a specification if no parol evidence is offered in explanation, or none
which is contradictory. Davoll et al. v. Brown, II. 303.

6. The construction should be liberal for the patentees, but the description
must be so certain as to be understood by those acquainted with the subject
matter. lb.

7. But the whole of the specification as well as the summary and drawings are
to be looked to in determining the invention. Ib.

8. In coming to a result practical views rather than subtle distinctions must
govern. lb.

9. The word "about" in the specification of Davis's patent for improvement
in the mould-board of a plough, rejected for uncertainty. Davis v. Palmer,
I. 518.

10. The meaning of technical words of art used in a patent as well as the
surrounding circumstances which may materially affect their meaning are
to be interpreted by the jury. Washburn et al. v. Gould, II. 206.
11. Of a patent for a saw set, describing it as having a hammer of iron, with
a steel point, and says nothing of any other material or equivalent, and the
evidence was that a hammer, entirely of steel, was first tried and abandoned by
the patentee, before application for a patent; it was held to be doubtful
whether saw sets made by the defendant with hammers entirely of steel, was
a violation. Aiken v. Bemis, II. 644.

12. Where the plaintiff claimed the "construction and use of an endless apron
divided into troughs and cells in a machine for cleaning grain, operating
substantially in the way described," It was held that the claim was for a
combination of the endless apron with the machine for cleaning grain. Pitts
v. Whitman, II. 189.

13. Where the plaintiff, in a patent for "a new and useful improvement in the
ribs of the cotton gin," claimed the increasing the space between the upper
and lower surface of the rib either "by making the ribs thicker at that part,
or by a fork or by any other variation of the particular form," it was held
that the claim was sufficiently accurate as matter of law, and it was not
necessary to describe all possible modes by which the rib might be varied.
Carver v. Braintree Manufacturing Co. II. 141.

66

14. Where the original patent was for a new and useful improvement in the
ribs of saw gins for ginning cotton," and the reissued patent was for a "new
and useful invention in the manner of forming the ribs of saw gins for gin-
ning cotton," and in the reissued patent was claimed, in addition to the
thickness of the rib, the sloping up so as to leave no shoulder; it was held
that the claim in the reissued patent was not for two distinct improvements,
but that the same thing was patented in both patents. Ib.

15. A claim generally for "communicating motion from the reed to the yard
beam" will be limited to the particular mode described. Stone v. Sprague
et al. II. 10.

16. Woodworth's patent held to be for an improved machine. Washburn et al.
v. Gould, II. 206.

For CONSTRUCTION OF CLAIM, see Winans v. Boston and Providence Rail-
road Co. II. 136; Prouty et al. v. Ruggles, II. 92.

See SPECIFICATION; CLAIM.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

See WRIT OF Error.

STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. To promote the progress of the useful arts is the interest and policy of
every enlightened government. The Patent Laws of the United States are
founded thereon; the grant of a patent is the reward stipulated for the ad-
vantages derived by the public for the exertions of individuals, and is intend-
ed as a stimulus to those exertions. These laws ought to be construed in
the spirit in which they were made. Grant et al. v. Raymond et al. I. 604.
2. The true meaning of the words of the patent law, "not known or used be-
fore the application," is not known or used by the public before the applica-
tion. Pennock et al. v. Dialogue, I. 542.

3. The progress of science and the useful arts would be materially retarded if
an inventor were permitted to hold back the secret of his invention until the
danger of competition should force him to obtain the exclusive right, and
would be a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate
their discoveries. Ib.

4. Whether Congress can constitutionally decide the fact, that a particular in-
dividual is an inventor, so as to preclude judicial inquiry into the originality
of the invention - Queere. Evans v. Eaton, I. 243.

5. The Act for the relief of Oliver Evans does not preclude such inquiry. E.
6. The provisions of the 6th section of the Act of 21st February, 1793, are in-
tended to declare the defence that shall be available to a party charged by a
patentee with a violation of his right. Delano v. Scott, I. 700.

7. The provisions of the 10th section of the same act apply only to cases in
which a patent has been obtained by fraud, surreptitiously, or by false sug-
gestions, and are intended to protect the public from imposition. I.
8. Constitutionality.

See DAMAGES; ENGLISH STATUTES.

SURRENDER.

1. A patent, invalid by reason of a defective specification, may be surrendered,
and a new patent will be granted upon a corrected specification. Smith v.
Pearce et al. II. 13.

2. Although the law does not in terms authorize a new patent in the case of a
mistake innocently made by the patentee, yet to employ the means necessary
to the correction of inadvertent error, by issuing a new patent, and thus give
complete effect to its object and intention, cannot be a departure from the
spirit and character of the act. Grant et al. v. Raymond et al. I. 604.
3. The Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York having decided
that under the Act of 1793, a patent might be surrendered for a defect aris-
ing from inadvertence and mistake, and a new patent issued, with an amend-
ed specification, upon which decision the Department of State had acted in
other cases, the Supreme Court declined to disturb the practice arising there-
upon, although the question was not free from difficulty. Ib.

4. In such case the new patent has relation back to the emanation of the first,
and the application may be considered as appended to the original applica
tion. Grant et al. v. Raymond et al. I. 604; Shaw v. Cooper, I. 643.

5. The second patent being a continuation of the first, the rights of the pa-
tentee must be ascertained by the law under which the original application
was made. Shaw v. Cooper, I. 643.

6. Although a patent reissued, operates as from the commencement of the ori-
ginal patent, it cannot affect causes of action arising before reissue. Wood-
worth et al. v. Hall et al. II. 495-517.

7. Where the renewal of a patent surrendered is void, perhaps the surrender
itself becomes also void, and the original patent remains in force. Ib.
8. By patentee will not affect the rights of assignees, unless they consent to
the surrender. Woodworth et al. v. Stone, II. 296.

See Morris v. Huntington, I. 448.

SURPRISE.

1. It is the practice to postpone or continue the cause in all cases of surprise
at the trial, when clearly made out, if moved for. Ames v. Howard et al. I.
689.

See PRACTICE.

2. But if the party elects to go on without motion for postponement or con-
tinuance, relying upon other matters, he is understood to waive the surprise,
and if unsuccessful with the jury, cannot have a new trial on this ground.
Ib.

TERMS - CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. The words, not known or used before the application," mean "not known
or used by the public before the application." Pennock et al. v. Dialogue, I.

542.

2. The words," any newly invented machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter," in the 7th section of the Act of 1839, have the same meaning as
"invention," or "thing patented." McClurg et al. v. Kingsland et al. II.

105.

TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS.

To letters-patent are not to be encouraged, or construed liberally for him mak-
ing them. Woodworth et al. v. Hall et al. II. 495.

TECHNICAL TERMS.

To be interpreted by the jury. Washburn et al. v. Gould, II. 206.

TREBLE DAMAGES.

The jury will find the actual damages, which the Court will treble. Gray et
al. v. James et al. I. 120.

UNCERTAINTY.

In the description of the thing invented, will avoid a patent. Hovey v. Stevens,
II. 479.