9. A letter from the Commissioner of Patents on an official matter, tending
to prove the date of the invention, may be admissible, as official corres-
pondence, or as part of the res gesta, being a declaration accompanying an
act. Allen v. Blunt et al. II. 530.
10. Parol evidence of the contents of a letter was rejected because no satisfac-
tory proof was offered of the loss of the letter; or of its having been received
by the party to whom it was addressed. Ib.
11. Affidavits of either party will be received to establish or rebut such pre-
liminary facts.
12. The mere putting of a letter in the post-office will not raise a presumption
that it was received, as a foundation for parol evidence of its contents, if no
answer was returned, and the party to whom it was addressed makes affida-
vit that it never came to hand. lb.
13. A verdict on an issue out of Chancery between the parties, is not a bar,
when no judgment was ever rendered thereon; or on the merits of the bill;
it having been dismissed on plaintiff's motion. Ib.
14. A verdict upon an issue ordered by a Court of Equity is not final upon the
facts it finds, nor binding upon the Court, unless adopted by the Court upon
a subsequent hearing on the merits. Ib.
15. Quare, whether the verdict in a suit at law is evidence of any thing but
the fact that it was rendered, unless there be a judgment thereon. Ib.
16. Deposition taken under the 30th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, can-
not be read in evidence, unless the judge certifies that it was reduced to wri-
ting by himself or by the witness in his presence. Pettibone v. Derringer, L
17. Declarations of a patentee at a time previous to his application for letters-
patent, admissible to prove that he then asserted a right as inventor of the
thing then described. Evans v. Hettick, I. 166.
18. Declarations of a party made before the dispute arose, in connection with
acts, may be competent evidence for him as tending to show then existing
intentions. Hovey v. Stevens, II. 479.
19. The declarations of a person as an agent in relation to the business in-
trusted to him, and made at the time when so intrusted, are competent con-
cerning it, in an action by a third person against the principal, as part
of the res gestæ, if they relate to the act clearly. Aiken v. Bemis, II. 644.
20. Parol evidence bearing upon written contracts and papers ought not to be
admitted without the production of such written contracts and papers. The
Phil. & Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, II. 46.
21. Although generally the declarations and conversations of plaintiff are not
admissible in favor of his own rights, yet in many cases of inventions it is
hardly possible in any other manner to ascertain the precise time and exact
origin of the invention. Ib.
22. The declaration of a patentee merely that at some former time he invented
a particular machine, may well be objected to. But a declaration at a par-
ticular time, describing an invention in detail, and explaining its operation,
is legitimate evidence of it as early as that period. Ib.
23. The mode of conducting a trial, the order of introducing evidence, and
the times when it is to be introduced, are matters resting in the discretion of
the Court.
24. The original patent being destroyed by the burning of the Patent Office,
the only record of the specification being in the Franklin Journal, the claim
is not limited by that publication, because the whole of the specification is
not set forth in it. Stimpson v. West Chester Railroad Co. II. 335.
25. Minutes of a hose company of which the plaintiffs were members, and at
whose instigation and expense the hose, the subject of the patent, was as-
serted to have been invented, may be read on the part of the defendant, to
prove that the plaintiffs were not the inventors. Pennock et al. v. Dialogue,
I. 466.
26. But other entries made at other times in the same books cannot be read to
prove that the company acknowledge the plaintiffs to be the inventors, (the
defendants not being members,) or to show that the company were not the
inventors, it not being alleged by the defendant that the invention was by
the company. 1b.
27. A report to the hose company is not a public work within the meaning of
the sixth section of the Patent Law. Ib.
28. Minutes of other hose companies of which the plaintiffs were not members
cannot be read in evidence by the defendant for any purpose.
Ib.
29. The defendant's refusal to submit to arbitration under the 9th section of
the Act of 1793, is not conclusive proof that patent was obtained surrepti-
tiously. Stearns in Error v. Barrett, I. 97.
30. Proof that the plaintiffs at a particular time made a specimen of the thing
patented, which had not been before seen or heard of by the witness is primâ
facie evidence that it was invented by the patentee. Pennock et al. v. Dia-
logue, I. 466.
31. That persons, whose prior use of the machine had been proved by the
defendant, had paid the patentee for license to use the machine since the
patent-ought not to be absolutely rejected, though entitled to very little
weight. Evans v. Eaton, II. 243.
32. That the invention of the defendant, is better than that of the plaintiff is
improper except to show a substantial difference between them. Alden et al.
v. Dewey et al. I. 17.
33. To show that the invention was not original, but was suggested to the
plaintiff by another, although the precise mode of carrying it into effect was
not pointed out is not sufficient unless the jury are satisfied that it was so
far communicated that the plaintiff could have applied it without more in-
ventive power. Ib.
34. The oath of the inventor made prior to the patent may be opposed to the
oath of a witness in the case whose testimony is offered to show that the
invention was not original. Ib.
35. The decision of the board constituted to act on applications for extensions
of patents is conclusive of certain facts-but not as to the right of an
administrator to an extension. Brooks et al. v. Bicknell et al. II. 118.
36. When practical mechanics are enabled to supply any omissions in the spe-
cification, an intention to defraud will not be presumed. Gray et al. v. James
et al. I. 120.
37. An offer to the patentee to take from him a license, does not estop the
person in offering to deny that the patentee was the original inventor. Evans
v. Eaton, I. 68.
38. May be given of the use by other persons than those named in the notice
of special matter. Evans v. Kremer, I. 66; Evans v. Eaton, I. 68.
1. The defendants cannot put in new rebutting evidence to affidavits of the
plaintiff offered in reply to that first offered by defendants. Ames v. Howard
et al. I. 689.
2. It is incumbent on them who seek to show that the examination of a wit-
ness has been improperly rejected, to establish their right to have it admit-
ted; for the Court will be presumed to have, acted correctly until the con-
trary is established. The Phil. & Trenton Railroad Co. v. Stimpson, II. 46.
3. And it is the duty of the party who insists upon the right to put particular
questions to a witness to establish that right beyond any reasonable doubt
for the very purpose stated by them. And they are not at liberty to desert
that purpose, and show the pertinancy or relevancy of the evidence for any
other purpose not then suggested by the Court. Ib.
4. A party cannot by his own omission to object to the admission of improper
evidence, brought out on cross-examination, found a right to introduce testi-
mony in chief to rebut or explain it. Ib.
1. Burden of proof on a trial of the general issue under the 10th section of
Act of 1793, lies on the plaintiff. Stearns in Error v. Barrett, I. 97.
2. Plaintiff must prove that the thing made by defendant, substantially re-
sembles the plaintiffs invention. If they differ in form and proportion only
they are the same. Dixon v. Moyer, I. 324.
3. Under the general issue without notice, the defendant cannot give in evi-
dence any matters mentioned in the sixth section of the act of Congress.
Kneass v. The Schuylkill Bank, I. 303.
4. But under the general issue he may give in evidence the act of Congress,
without notice and without pleading it. Also alienage — and a license. Ib.
5. On the general issue, without notice, the defendant may object to the plain-
tiff's recovery, because there is no specification; or that it is unintelligible;
that the patent is broader than the discovery; that it is for an improvement
not distinguished from the original invention. And that the suggestions of
the petition are not recited in the specification. Ib.
6. There is no limitation of the period in which, when the general issue is
pleaded, the defendant may give in evidence that the patentee is not the
original inventor. Evans v. Eaton, I. 68.
7. If the general issue has been pleaded, is it competent for the defendant to
give in evidence that the machine is useless, and has been abandoned?
Quare. Gray et al. v. James et al. I. 120.
See ALIENAGE; CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE; DECLARATIONS.
8. See Equity-Evidence, where witnesses differ as to the fact of infringe-
See INJUNCTION; ONUS PROBANDI; LICENSE; NOTICE.
9. For the effect of the decision of the board on applications for renewals, see
Brooks et al. v. Bicknell et al. II. 118.
With a machine to test its value is such a use, within the 6th section of the
Patent Act, as will avoid a patent for a subsequent invention. Watson v.
Bladen, I. 510.
1. May be granted to an administrator. Washburn et al. v. Gould, II. 206;
Woodworth v. Sherman, II. 257; Woodworth et al. v. Hall et al. II. 495.
2. And the letters of administration need not be produced. Woodworth et al.
v. Hall et al. II. 495.
3. Does not enure to the benefit of the assignee or grantee, under the original
patent, unless such right has been expressly conveyed by the patentee.
Woodworth v. Sherman, II. 257.
4. A patent extended by the board, and also extended by special act of Con-
gress must be considered as a patent for twenty-eight years. Woodworth et
al. in Equity v. Edwards et al. II. 610.
5. The specification for both extensions is the original one; and if surrendered
for defect therein, the new and reissued letters should be for twenty-eight
years— and although the old specification may have been adjudged good,
in several suits yet if still questioned and litigated — and appears to be in
some degree inoperative from certain defects supposed to have happened by
mistake, the Court, on its surrender, may issue new letters for the twenty-
eight years in an amended specification. Ib.
6. An act of Congress extending the patent, passed after the original patent
had expired providing that "no person who shall have used the said im-
provements or have erected the same for use before the issuing of the said
patent shall be liable to damages therefor," did not authorize the use of such
improvements after the issuing of the second patent. Evans v. Jordan et al.
I. 20.
Does not enure to the benefit of the assignees under the original patent. But
those assignees who were in use of the patented machine at the time of ex-
tension still have a right to continue the use of it.
Wilson v. Rousseau et al.
II. 372.
1. In any of several material facts set forth in the specification invalidates the
patent. Delano v. Scott, I. 700.
2. Though a patentee believes himself bonâ fide to be the original inventor of
the improvement patented, yet the fact of his not being so, if it does not con-
stitute a false suggestion in obtaining it, appears to be a sufficient ground for
repealing it, under the act of 1793. lb.
3. Refusal to refer under 9th Sec. of Act of 1793, not conclusive proof of. Stearns
in Error v. Barrett, I. 97.
4. Proceedings to repeal patent for-burden of proof. Ib.
See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. A mere difference in the manner and form of applying an invention which
is the same in principle with one previously used, will not justify or sustain
a new patent. Delano v. Scott, I. 700.
2. But change of form or proportion, which produces a new effect, does not
come within the inhibition of the statute. Davis v. Palmer, I. 518.
3. Suggestions of form made by the mechanic employed to construct the ma-
chine, will not invalidate the patent. Pennock et al. v. Dialogue, I. 466.
See EVIDENCE; GENERAL ISSUE; IMPROVEMENT; PRINCIPLE.
1. The mere existence of a previous patent is not sufficient to establish frand
in a subsequent patentee of the same invention, without actual knowledge.
Delano v. Scott, I. 700.
2. A patent cannot be said to be obtained by fraud of the right of another, who
expressly or tacitly permitted him to obtain a patent. Dixon v. Moyer, I.
See REISSUED PATENTS; EVIDENCE.
GENERAL ISSUE.
See PLEADINGS.
1. Every instrument is to be interpreted by a consideration of all of its provi-
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