Allen v. Blunt et al. 2 Wood. & Minot. Or the objection was only technical. 2 D. & E. 4; 1 Bet. P. 338, note; 6 Taunt. 366; 7 Greenl. 442; 2 Pick. 177, 310; 1 Pick. 206; 5 Day, 479; 1 Bibb, 265, 605. It is an exception, too, if the point was frivolous or litigious. 9 Conn. 1; 12 Mass. 22, 163; 3 Johns. 239; 3 Wend. 83; 1 Johns. Cas. 250; 5 Johns. 137; 2 Marsh. 546. Furthermore, if I could find errors in the instructions to the jury, not specified, which led or were likely to lead to injustice, such as my remarks, that the improvement was useful in itself, though in fire-arms or instruments of war and death, because increasing the powers of high civilization over barbarism, and thus tending to preserve and perpetuate all the benefits of the former from the destruction which, in former ages, often assailed it from rude force; and my other remark, that if this invention was not useful to the community in making pistols, the defendants would not be likely to use it; or if other presumptions of error existed, because the finding for the plaintiff by the jury was unexpected and strange, when in fact the plaintiff alone had taken out any patent for this improvement, and had first brought it into general use, and the defendants had not pretended themselves to have invented it; or because the giving so much damages for a violation of so useful a patent, was matter of surprise, when the whole amount was not likely more than to indemnify him for all his costs and expenses in so protracted and severe a litigation, and much less all his losses of larger sales and profits. I say, if injustice was thus apparently stamped on any * part of the proceedings by observations not ob- [* 155] jected to, or by occurrences, which the Court is now conscious were wrong, it would make me hesitate in refusing another trial. But when the whole aspect of the case is the other way, it seems to be my duty, in the exercise of a sound discretion, not to disturb what the jury have decided. Allen v. Blunt et al. 2 Wood. & Minot. The second motion for the allowance of a bill of exceptions to be now filed, so as to embrace these reasons assigned for a new trial, in order to bring a writ of error on them, involves several considerations, different from those in the naked motion for a new trial. This second motion is founded upon the special proviso to the 17th section to the Patent Act of July 4, 1836. That section allows a writ of error and appeals "to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same manner and under the same circumstances as is now provided by law in other judgments and decrees of Circuit Courts, and in all other cases in which the Court shall deem it reasonable to allow the same." This presents a novel question. I am not aware of any case, and none is referred to on either side, where this portion of the Patent Law has received a construction in any court during the ten years since its passage. In the absence of any decision, I am inclined to the opinion, that, however anxious my wishes are to facilitate attempts of parties to have a revision of the decisions of this court whenever dissatisfied with them; yet I am limited by Congress in my power to allow it, and must confine the indulgence to cases where it appears to the Court to be "reasonable," looking to the subject-matter of this provision, and the general law as to appeals. Opposing parties, also, have an interest in this matter against further delay and expense; and the public has a policy as to limited jurisdiction in suits, which is to be respected; and, therefore, without yielding to my own wishes to permit a writ of error or appeal [* 156] * in all cases, I must execute the act of Congress as it exists in regard to the public interest and the convenience and rights of parties. What then is reasonable as a general rule in respect to this request? Allen v. Blunt et al. 2 Wood. & Minot. Adverting to the manifest policy of the law as to appeals and writs of error, independent of this particular provision, it will be seen, that most cases are to be disposed of finally, in the States where one of the parties reside, as less expensive and more convenient, unless the amount in controversy be as large as $2,000, or unless the judges disagree in their opinions. There is nothing in the public policy as to the sum being now too large, which limits appeals, and hence causing a disposition to carry up cases of smaller pecuniary importance. On the contrary, two thousand dollars was regarded as high here in 1789, as three or four thousand would be now. The necessary delay of justice in the Supreme Court, beyond what once existed before the country grew to be so much larger and wealthier, increases the grievance of being compelled to go there unless required by strict law. I regard these objections more than any additional expense in further hearings there, at such a distance, instead of nearer home, as the attendance of witnesses and parties is not required there. But they all show, that in a case where the amount, as here, is little over half of what was required in 1798 to carry a case up, it should not be deemed reasonable to aid in doing it, unless to promote some great end or interest, not involved simply in the payment of the sum, found as damages in this particular case. One of those ends undoubtedly is, uniformity in the construction of our great system of Patent Laws throughout the United States, and because questions connected with the Patent Laws themselves, when decided, govern numerous other cases and much larger amounts [* 157 ] than are disclosed in any one verdict. These considerations show that the exceptions to be allowed, using a reasonable discretion, ought to relate to constructions of the Patent Laws. If not to be confined to these, Allen v. Blunt et al. 2 Wood. & Minot. why limit the indulgence to patent cases? There is no reason why, as to the other incidental questions, not relating to patents, the parties in these suits should enjoy privileges concerning their decision, not enjoyed by other suitors as to such questions. Why should it be permitted, then, as to matters casually connected with suits upon the Patent Acts? Why, if adverting to the public interests, or the rights of opposing parties, prolong litigation on such points at great inconvenience, delay, and expense? So it is discreet and reasonable to confine the appeals, even on patent questions under the Patent Laws, to such as involve important, and not trifling matters connected with those laws, not mere technical difficulties; also to such as involve questions really doubtful. If the discretion concerning what is "reasonable," which is to be exercised by the Court, is not to extend to a selection of cases having questions, that really relate to the Patent Laws, Congress would have provided, that appeals should exist in respect to all patent actions without distinction. Looking to the first test, none of the causes assigned for a new trial, are to be considered in deciding as to a bill of exceptions, but the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 9th, as none others relate to the construction of the Patent Laws. Now the fifth, as it will be seen, if allowed in any form, must be in one already substantially settled by the Supreme Court in Stimpson v. Westchester Railroad, 4 Howard, before cited; and one, probably not controverted by the defendant, when explained as it is understood by the Court. [* 158 ] *The sixth, as has been shown, either attempts in its present form to raise a point about a "public use" of the plaintiff's patent, which was not made at the trial, or, if it merely relies on the position, that a prior invention is not valid when a subsequent one is made, but not Hovey v. Stevens. 3 Wood. & Minot. patented, before the first one is patented, it seems too clear against the defendant to hang a doubt on. The seventh is now abandoned. The eighth is for a supposed omission to instruct the jury on particular points, and not for mis-instructions, and of course cannot be a ground for a bill of exceptions, independent of what has before been said against the intrinsic character of the rulings desired upon it. The case does not, therefore, seem to contain matter to make it a reasonable one for granting this privilege. Both motions are refused; and judgment must be entered on the verdict. WILLIAM HOVEY V. SILAS STEVENS. [3 Woodbury & Minot, 17. October T. 1846.] In a patent for an improvement in the machinery to grind knives, it is necessary, by the act of Congress, not only to describe the machine to be used under the patent, but to distinguish what part of it, or what combination under it, is new, or is the improvement claimed to be invented. It is made necessary, also, by that act, to do this in clear, intelligible, and certain terms. This is not now required to be done with so great accuracy as was formerly exacted, nor to be done in technical language; but it must be made with reasonable certainty and clearness. It may be done in a summary at the close of the specification, disclosing as new any of the machine before described, which is old in its parts, or in combination, or it may be done in the summary, referring in terms, or by implication, to other parts of the specification for assistance, and in such case the other parts are to be considered as explana. tory of the summary, or a portion of it, for this purpose. In this case, the summary appeared to claim a traverse motion of a part of the grinder, in combination with a rotary one, so as to bring up the knife to the stone steadily, though spiral in form. On referring to other parts of the specification, as to what his invention consisted of, it still seemed to be the combination of those two motions, and it was held that such a combination, when |