may petition for a writ as the person aggrieved. People ex rel. Canaday v. Williams, 90 Hun, 501.

An application by one stockholder of a bank on behalf of himself and of its other stockholders, for a writ of certiorari to review an assessment of the bank stock, will be denied, where the papers do not show any authority on the part of the petitioner to make such application in behalf of the others and they have not signed the petition. People ex rel. Kohler v. Feitner, 71 App. Div. 572.

A bank is a "person aggrieved" under the statute, when in its representative capacity of agent, it seeks to maintain a proceeding in behalf of its stockholders, in relation to the assessment and taxation of its shares of stock. In re First National Bank of Ossining, 182 N. Y. 460; People ex rel. American Exchange National Bank v. Purdy, 196 N. Y. 270. The decisions in the last two cases are contrary to those in Kohler v. Feitner and in the Merchants National Bank case, supra, because, under the law at the time of the former decisions, bank shares were assessed against each holder and the tax paid by him. Laws of 1882, Chapter 409, Section 312, as amended. The bank is now regarded as the agent of its shareholders under the Tax Law, which makes it the duty of the bank to collect the tax from the shareholders and pay the same.

When the assessment is void for want of jurisdiction, the person so assessed is a "person aggrieved" and entitled under the statute to review the assessment by certiorari. People ex rel. Kellogg v. Wells, 182 N. Y. 314, reversing 101 App. Div. 600; People ex rel. Strong v. O'Donnel, 47 Misc. 226.

Where an assessment is levied on trust property against a resident and a non-resident trustee, such assessment is illegal as to the non-resident, who may review the same by writ of certiorari without awaiting proceedings for its enforcement and is to be regarded as a person aggrieved. People ex rel. Kellogg v. Wells, supra.

In the following cases under the Code certiorari the rule is equally well-settled, that the remedy is confined to the person or party aggrieved:

Where the Common Council of the city of New Rochelle was authorized by its charter to designate and accordingly did designate two newspapers representing the two principal political parties in that city, in which should be published all public notices, ordinances, etc., it was held in certiorari proceedings that the publisher of another newspaper published in that city, was not a "party aggrieved" under Section 2127 of the Code. Indeed, there was nothing to show that there might not be other newspapers published in that city, which might be said to fairly represent the principles of the same political party, which the relator claimed to represent. People ex rel. Sweet v. Raymond, 131 App. Div. 160 (1909).

If it appears in certiorari proceedings instituted by a party who claims to have been illegally removed by a municipal board, that the relator was never entitled to the office, he cannot be said to be a "person aggrieved" no matter how informal or irregular the proceedings of the board may have been. Russell v. Commissioners, 76 Hun, 147 (1894); People ex rel. Healy v. Fire Commrs., 27 App. Div. 530 (1898); People ex rel. Blakeslee v. Commrs., 135 N. Y. 447 (1892).

Joinder of Relators.-Sec. 290 of the Tax Law provides:

"Two or more persons assessed upon the same roll who are affected in the same manner by the alleged illegality, error or inequality, may unite in the same petition."

The statute was not intended to permit all parties to unite who are aggrieved because of their local assessments but only applies to a situation wherein the adjudication upon the complaint of one taxpayer necessarily determines the complaint of the others. People ex rel. Wash. Bldg. Co. v. Feitner, 163 N. aff'd 49 App. Div. 385; People ex rel. Zollikoffer v. Feitner, 74 App. Div. 130; aff'd 172 N. Y. 618.

Y. 384;

The relators are improperly joined when their petition shows that neither petitioner owns lots in any city block in which the lots of either of the other relators are situated; that no two of the lots are of the same assessed valuation, and that the reductions in value asked are not uniform, either as to owners or lots. People ex rel. Litchfield v. O'Donnel, 113 App. Div. 713; aff'd 187 N. Y. 536.

The petition; grounds for certiorari; "erroneous" and "illegal" assessments defined.- The grounds that may be set forth in the petition for the granting of a writ of certiorari, are error or illegality in the assessment. The assessment may be at the same time erroneous and illegal. An erroneous assessment is one where the assessors have jurisdiction, but err in the exercise of their power; an illegal assessment is where they have no power to act at all. Natl. Bank of Chemung v. Elmira, 53 N. Y. 49, 58 (1873); U. S. Trust Co. v. Mayor, etc., 77 Hun, 182 (1894). An illegal assessment under section 290, Tax Law, (formerly 250), extends to a void assessment, but an assessment may be "illegal" without being "void," as for instance,

an erroneous assessment.

In assessments on real or personal property, a tax is deemed erroneous where there has been an over-valuation, or in the case of real estate, where a disproportionate assessment has been made, but where an increase is made without notice, after the books are open, the assessment is illegal and void as far as the increase is concerned and application to the commissioners need not be alleged. People ex rel. Littman v. Wells, 91 App. Div. 172 (1904).

Where the review of an assessment upon the ground of its illegality is sought under the provisions of the act, only the conclusions of fact specifying the grounds of illegality need be stated and not the evidence necessary to support them; the petition is in this respect in the nature of a pleading. People ex

rel. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tax Com'rs, 144 N. Y. 483 (1895); People ex rel. Wechsler v. Harkness, 84 Hun, 445; Matter of Nisbet, 3 App. Div. 171 (1896); Matter of Cathedral of Incarnation, 91 App. Div. 543. A relator, however, has the right to waive some of the questions presented before the tax commissioners. People ex rel. Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'rs, supra. The petition should state such facts, as, if admitted by the return would establish that the relator was entitled to relief. If this is not done a motion to dismiss the proceeding should be granted. People ex rel. Sweet v. Blake, 72 Misc. 646. In the petition for certiorari a party is precluded from alleging for the first time an error in its verbal statement seasonably made to the assessors upon application for reduction. People ex rel. German Looking Glass Co. v. Barker, 75 Hun, 6 (1894).

The petition; allegations as to description of property.— An allegation of the petition that the assessment roll did not contain a description of the relator's property, nor give the quantity of land to be assessed, or the number of the lot, or any description of it sufficient to comply with the Tax Law, and the duties of the assessors, is to be regarded merely as an allegation of law. Where it appears from the return that the property in question was described on the assessment roll as "paper mill now in operation, store house and office between the canal and the river" such description will be regarded as sufficient. People ex rel. Sweet v. Blake, 72 Misc. 646.

The petition; allegations as to over-valuation.—An allegation that the relator's property was assessed in 1911 for $20,000, and that in former years the property had been assessed for less than $20,000 is insufficient and not equivalent to an allegation that the property was assessed for more than its fair value. People ex rel. Sweet v. Blake, supra.

An allegation in a petition that property was assessed at $210,000 more than its market value is equivalent to a state

ment that the assessment is $210,000 in excess of the sum for which such property, under ordinary circumstances, would sell and such petition is sufficient. People ex rel. Broadway Imp. Co. v. Barker, 14 App. Div. 412.

An allegation of over-valuation in the language of the statute is sufficient, provided the amount of over-valuation is specified or can be determined. Matter of Nisbet, 3 App. Div. 171 (1896).

Where a petition stated that the commissioners of taxes and assessments of the city of New York "have illegally and erroneously included in their valuation of the personal property of the said corporation on said roll for taxation the following: The then market value of the capital stock of said corporation, to wit, 112 per cent. upon the whole of said capital stock," the court held that the petition did not specify as a ground of illegality merely an over-valuation of the capital stock to the extent of 12 per cent., but fairly apprised the commissioners of the objection that their method of assessment was illegal and erroneous. People ex rel. Equitable Gaslight Co. v. Barker, 66 Hun, 21.

Petition; allegation as to inequality.-An allegation that the assessment upon the petitioner's property is erroneous, unequal and disproportionate because the property is not assessed at the same proportionate valuation as other real property on the same assessment roll, or an allegation that the property is assessed at a higher proportionate valuation than other property on the same roll is insufficient. The petitioner must present a state of facts which, if unexplained, would show that the inequality of which he complains will subject him to the payment of more than his just proportion of the taxes. People ex rel. Wechsler v. Harkness, 84 Hun, 445. So, too, where only a single instance of inequality is set forth, it is insufficient to raise the question and a writ of certiorari issued thereon will be quashed upon motion. People ex rel. Witthaus v. O'Donnel, 46 Misc. 519; Peo