Amendment embraces in its general terms a prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches or seizures. Ib.
Generally. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 7.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Construction where meaning not clear.
Where its meaning is not clear, a contract is to be construed in the
light of circumstances surrounding the parties when the contract
was made and a practical interpretation given thereto. (Lowber
v. Bangs, 2 Wall. 728.) Harten v. Löffler, 397.
2. Admissibility of oral evidence to identify property described as "about."
"About" is a relative, and frequently ambiguous, term, the precise
meaning of which is affected by circumstances; and oral evidence
is not inconsistent with, or contradictory of, a written contract
which simply identifies property as shown on a diagram annexed
thereto, and is admissible to show the intent of the parties in the
light of the surrounding circumstances. Ib.
3. Damages; measure of, for breach of contract to sell real estate.
Where the vendee sues for breach of a contract to sell real estate and
the benefit of the business and goodwill as well, the measure of
damages is the differences between the purchase price and the
market value at the time of the contract and evidence as to the
value of each item is admissible.
4. Admissibility of hypothetical question as to value of property in action
for breach of contract to sell.
A hypothetical question of value of property is not admissible when
there is no evidence to support the hypothesis on which it is based.
Ib.
5. Duty of courts to deny aid to carry out illegal contracts.
The court cannot lend its aid in any way to a party seeking to realize
the fruits of an illegal contract, and, while this may at times result
in relieving a purchaser from paying for what he has had, public
policy demands that the court deny its aid to carry out illegal con-
tracts without regard to individual interests, or knowledge of the
parties. Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 227,
6. Illegal; effect of refusal to enforce.
The refusal of judicial aid to enforce illegal contracts tends to reduce
1. Locus of Federal corporation for purposes of suit.
Notwithstanding that it maintains an office in another State, the de-
fendant corporation which was organized under an act of Congress
is suable in the district designated by it as where its office is lo-
cated and in which its agent resides and its directors meet to affirm
their acts adopted in the other State. Matter of Dunn, 374.
2. Liability for acts of agent.
In actions for tort a corporation may be held responsible for damages
for the acts of its agent within the scope of his employment, Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, even
if done wantonly, recklessly or against the express orders of the
principal. New York Central R. R. v. United States, 481.
3. Liability for acts of agent.
A corporation is responsible for acts not within its agent's powers
strictly construed but assumed to be done by him when employ-
ing authorized powers, and in such a case no written authority
under seal is necessary. (Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172
U. S. 534.) Ib.
4. Liability for acts of agent in respect of rates for transportation.
The act of an agent exercising the authority of a corporation which is a
common carrier to make rates for transportation may be con-
trolled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to the
carrier itself and imposing penalties therefor upon the carrier. Ib.
While corporations cannot commit some crimes, they can commit
VOL. CCXII-39
crimes which consist in purposely doing things prohibited by
statute, and in such case they can be charged with knowledge of
acts of their agents who act within the authority conferred upon
them. Ib.
6. Stockholders' liability; enforcement of.
A judgment of the highest court of Connecticut, involving the liability
of stockholders under provisions in the constitution of Minnesota,
reversed on the authority of Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516.
Converse v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 567.
While courts may refuse to enforce legislation on constitutional grounds
the power should only be exercised in the clearest cases. Knoxville
v. Knoxville Water Co., 1.
2. Federal interference with enforcement of state regulation fixing rates for
public service corporation.
Federal courts should not declare an ordinance fixing rates for a public
service corporation unconstitutional and suspend its operation
before it goes into effect unless the rate is clearly confiscatory; and
unless complainant furnishes substantial evidence to that effect,
the bill should be dismissed without prejudice to a further applica-
tion to the courts if the rate after going into effect is actually con-
fiscatory. Ib.
3. Duty to take jurisdiction—Right of party to choose tribunal.
It is not a question of discretion or comity for the Federal court to take
jurisdiction of a case; it is the duty of that court to take jurisdic-
tion when properly appealed to; and it should not be criticised for
so doing even though the case be one of local interest. Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404. The right of a party plaintiff to choose
the Federal court cannot be properly denied. (Re Metropolitan
Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 110.) Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 19.
4. Interference with legislative act fixing rates.
Rates, when fixed by legislative authority, for public service corpora-
tions, should allow a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
property at the time it is being used, but the legislative act will not
be declared invalid by the courts unless the rates are so unreason-
ably low that their enforcement would amount to taking the prop-
erty for public use without compensation. (San Diego Land and
Town Co. Cases, 174 U. S. 739; 189 U. S. 439.) Ib.
Except in very clear cases, courts should not interfere with state rate
legislation before the legislation goes into effect. (Knoxville v.
Knoxville Water Co., ante, p. 1.) Ib.
Value of the property employed being an essential element in determin-
ing whether a rate is or is not confiscatory, and being also largely a
matter of opinion, where the determination of the question de-
pends upon such value, a court of equity should hesitate to inter-
fere by injunction to suspend the rate before it goes into operation
and a fair trial has been made. Ib.
7. Powers of this court to interfere with state legislation in fixing, and
judicial action in imposing, fines.
The fixing of punishment for crimes and penalties for unlawful acts is
within the police power of the State, and this court cannot inter-
fere with state legislation in fixing fines, or judicial action in im-
posing them, unless so grossly excessive as to amount to depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. Waters-Pierce Oil Co.
v. Texas (No. 1), 86.
8. Federal and state; duty to respect jurisdiction of each other.
As the Federal and the state court exercise jurisdiction within the same
territory, derived from and controlled, by separate authority, each
must respect the jurisdiction acquired over property by the other.
Palmer v. Texas, 118.
9. Exclusiveness of jurisdiction over property.
When either a Federal, or a state, court of competent jurisdiction takes
possession of, or acquires jurisdiction over, property, that property
is as effectually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the other court
as though removed to the territory of another sovereignty. (Wabash
Railroad v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 54.) Ib.
10. Jurisdiction over property; effect of the giving of a supersedeas pending
appeal from order appointing receiver.
Jurisdiction over property, properly acquired by the state court on the
qualification of the receiver, is not lost by the giving of a super-
sedeas pending appeal which, as in this case, merely suspends the
order of appointment. Ib.
11. Jurisdiction over property; right to limit interference by other courts.
When a state court has acquired jurisdiction over property before any
application is made to the Federal court it has the right while law-
fully exercising that jurisdiction to determine how far it will per-
mit any other court to interfere therewith. (People's Bank v.
Calhoun, 102 U. S. 256.) Ib.
12. Jurisdiction over property; accrual on appointment and qualification of
receiver.
Jurisdiction over property by a state court so as to withdraw it from
the jurisdiction of Federal courts in the same territory, does not
necessarily depend on possession, but is acquired as soon as the
receiver has been appointed and has qualified. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Lake St. Electric Railway Co., 177 U. S. 59, followed;
Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, distinguished. Ib.
13. Federal courts bound by state court's construction of state statutes.
The courts of a State construe its statutes and their judgment is con-
clusive in the Federal courts. Ib.
14. Discretionary power to determine rights.
The law must save the rights of parties and not leave them to the dis-
cretion of the courts as such. Louisville &c. R. R. Co. v. Stockyards
Co., 132.
15. Power to cure defect in provision of state constitution.
Where a general provision in the constitution of a State is void as tak-
ing property without due process or compensation, and compensa-
tion has not been provided by statute, the defect cannot be cured
by the courts inserting provisions for compensation in judgments
under such constitutional provision. Ib.
16. Wisdom of legislation no concern of.
Where the subject is within the power of the State it is not within the
province of the judiciary to disregard statutory standards on the
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