the aggregate amoount guaranteed shall not exceed $2,000 in the case of nonreal-estate loans, nor [$4,000] $6,000 in the case of real estate loans; or a prorated portion thereof on loans of both types or combination thereof. Provided further. That the Veterans' Administrator may authorize and approve a single guarantee of any loan made to a veterans' cooperative housing project but such guarantee shall not exceed the aggregate of the guarantees which would have been available to the individual cooperative veteran owners of the project.

REPORT TO MAYOR-ELECT WILLIAM O'DWYER BY THE EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON HOUSING

MAYOR'S EMERGENCY COMMITTEE ON HOUSING, Randall's Island, New York, N. Y., December 17, 1945.

Hon. WILLIAM O'DWYER,
Mayor-Elect of the City of New York,

New York 17, N. Y.

DEAR GENERAL: When you appointed the members of this committee you asked that their report be in your hands not later than December 17. In order to comply with this request, we have held numerous conferences and two all-day meetings at which we have heard recognized experts on the problems involved, have gathered figures and pertinent information from other sources and have agreed upon our findings. It must be quite obvious that an exhaustive treatise on this subject could not possibly be prepared in the time at our disposal, if indeed any real public purpose would be served by it in an emergency such as this. We are, therefore, presenting to you our conclusions in summary form.

These conclusions represent the best judgment of the majority of the members of the committee, based upon their experience in housing and construction matters generally, their knowledge of the city, the facts and suggestions which they have considered, and their genuine interest in assisting you in reaching constructive conclusions.

The problem falls naturally under two heads. First, the long-term emergency looking forward over a period of 10 years, and, second, the immediate emergency, the duration of which we cannot exactly define. We consider the long-term emergency first because it is only in this way that the really fundamental needs can be met permanently and because the schedules on which we are relying for expediting the permanent housing solution will obviously determine the extent, duration, and needs of the immediate emergency period.

LONG-RANGE PROGRAM

We have attached to this report a schedule which will show how fast at best the public and redevelopment housing programs, for which money is in hand or in sight, can be carried out. This schedule covers a period of 3 years. It does not include strictly private housing possibilities in this period, which will be referred to separately. This schedule is optimistic. The original schedule which preceded it became obsolete because of lags in many features of the program. The present schedule can only be met if all the various officials, Federal, State, and local, and capital, labor, contractors, and material men cooperate to a degree and extent beyond anything which has been evidenced in recent months in the construction field.

Briefly, the schedule shows that there are 23 new public housing projects including 30,172 units for which funds are in hand or in sight which have been agreed to by the city planning commission and the housing authority. They are in one or another stage of development, and aggregate approximately $213,000,000 and will accommodate about 120,000 people. The first of these projects cannot possibly be completed and ready for occupancy until the very end of 1946. The rest of these projects are scheduled for completion at various times running into 1948. It is entirely unlikely that more than half of the accommodations renting at approximately $7 a room in these public housing projects will be ready before the summer of 1947.

The housing authority advises that if the Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill (S. 1592) becomes law, $50,000,000 per year for 4 years will be available for use in New York City. This will provide housing for an additional 22,500 units accommodating 90,000 people over and above those accommodated by the 3-year schedule mentioned above. The sites for these extra projects have not as yet been approved by the planning commission.

As to redevelopment projects, there are six such projects agreed upon with banks and insurance companies, and actually under way, aggregating approximately $93,000,000 in cost, and providing 16,000 units accommodating 60,000 people in all. Of these projects, only the three sponsored by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. are moving rapidly. They are now under construction. Stuyvesant Town, housing 24,300 people in 8,761 units, at an average rental of $14 a room, will open its first units in the early spring of 1947 if no new difficulties crop up. Cooper Village, which is for a higher rental group, and Riverton in Harlem, renting at an average of about $12.50 a room, should be ready in the early summer of 1947. Savings banks projects are further behind and are not likely to be ready for occupancy until the fall of 1947.

A number of additional redevelopment projects have been under consideration, but favorable action by the insurance companies and savings banks, excepting as to two projects which seem to be on the way to approval, has been postponed because of alarmingly high building costs, shortage of materials, higher labor cost, fear of jurisdictional disputes, high land costs, question of average rental limits, taxation of income by the Federal and State Governments, and other difficulties. It must be borne in mind hat fiduciaries responsible to savings depositors and to policyholders for the safety of investments cannot make loans involving equities without the most careful scrutiny of the financial stability of the project, and that until some of these alarming obstacles are removed, a full-scale redevelopment program cannot be expected. On the other hand, it is absolutely essential that there be a much larger program of this kind if we are not to be dependent wholly upon public funds. Many of the same difficulties arise in the case of public-housing construction, but they are not as serious deterrents because of the fact that public funds to meet higher costs are more readily obtainable than private funds. However, unless costs are kept down or additional funds are made available, the volume of public housing may have to be reduced. Although approximately 180,000 persons will be housed in postwar public housing and redevelopment projects within the next 3 years, about 22,000 will be displaced by slum clearance and by construction of arterial expressways in 1946.

We are unable to offer an accurate estimate of mass construction of one-family and multiple-family houses as strictly private enterprises in this period. Plans have been filed for a number of projects of this kind. No doubt they will proceed as fast as material can be obtained. One builder estimates that 14,000 singlefamily houses will be built in New York City and the suburbs in 1946 in spite of prevailing conditions in the material market. This estimate is confirmed by the FHA. The FHA is an important factor in this situation, and to lesser degree in the redevelopment housing program. This agency can do more than any other to stimulate private building, provided that important amendments to the National Housing Act are adopted. These amendments provide for insured loans up to 90 percent for 25 years on private houses and increases the mortgage for multiple dwellings from $5,000,000 to $50,000,000 on any property or project for redevelopment companies and the like and mortgage per room from $1,350 to $1,500.

The record of the FHA in this area in the past has been excellent. It has a firstrate grasp of the problem in all of its aspects, and, with the liberalization of the National Housing Act to meet present conditions, can be a tremendous factor in the program. As will appear later, the FHA can also do a great deal to stimulate conversion.

Beyond the public and redevelopment housing covered by the attached schedules and financed by funds which are or will soon be available, we must consider immediate extensions to these programs, covering the last 6 years of the 10-year period under consideration. It seems to be pretty generally agreed that the number of public-housing family units required in the whole 10-year period is at least 150,000. This figure represents low-income families now living in distinctly substandard dwellings, and anticipated additional families within the low-income groups, or, to put it another way, families which cannot be provided for by private capital or capital or fiduciaries. At the ratio of 3.5 to a family, this means 525.000 people to be provided for in nublic housing. Since the program for the first 4 years will provide for only 227.000 persons, there remains a minimum of 298,000 people to be accommodated in the remaining 6 years of the 10-year period. As a first step toward obtaining additional funds for more public housing, we urge that Governor Dewey recommend to the State legislature, which is about to convene, a proposition to be voted on by the people in the fall of 1946, to provide the subsidies necessary to service the remaining $80.000.000 of loan funds available under the State constitution for public housing and also the appropria

tion of the whole of the balance of $80,000,000. This proposition would be similar to the one adopted by a large majority this fall. Of the $80,000,000 and of the appropriate subsidy, a substantial proportion would be available in New York City on January 1, 1947, assuming that the people adopted the proposition. In the meantime, sites could be selected and other preliminary steps taken in anticipation of a favorable vote.

As a second step, we recommend that the pending Wagner-Ellender-Taft bill be amended so as to provide increased subsidies for the lowest-income group and a guaranty of the bonds of the local housing authority for additional public housing for persons of the upper bracket of the lowest-income group. In terms of New York City, we have reference to the group which can pay approximately $10 a month per room, as distinguished from the lowest-income group which is able to pay about $7 a month per room. The city will be assured of collecting in taxes the amount now levied on the site. We are reluctant to reach this conclusion, because the majority of members of this committee, as a matter of principle, do not favor grading the various lower-income groups, since all groups beyond those of lowest income in theory should be provided for by private or redevelopment capital. We are, however, convinced that private capital and capital of fiduciaries in the metropolitan region cannot in the next 10 years meet the needs of people who are not able to pay more than $10 per room per month. The lowest rental which the banks and insurance companies have been able to establish in the case of redevelopment houses is $12.50 per room on properties available at relatively low cost because they are vacant or have few buildings on them, and $14 a room in the average congested slum area. Even these figures are going up as prices rise. There is simply no prospect in such areas of building by private capital, even with partial tax exemption, at prices which will permit charging as little as $10 a room. Even in outlying areas it is doubtful whether for a long time it will be possible to build one- or two-family houses at anything approaching the $10-a-room rate. To put it in terms of purchase instead of rental, the suburban one-family houses which were built by subdividers and developers on a large scale previous to the war for $5,000, with or without FHA guaranties, will for some time cost over $6,500. The carrying charges become correspondingly greater, and the house which was within the means of the $45- or $50-a-week wage earner is now out of his range. The speculative builder will still be a prominent factor in the picture, but he will aim at higher-income groups.

We recommend that the necessary amendments be made to either the GI bill of rights or the National Housing Act or both to provide for the insurance of loans to eligible veterans at a ratio of 100 percent of the FHA valuation at a maximum interest rate not to exceed 4 percent and that the mortgage insurance premium of one-half of 1 percent be paid for by the Veterans' Administration, that no loans be insured beyond a valuation of $10,000 and that there be no limitation on the amount which the veteran may pay for the property except that any excess over and above the valuation set by the FHA must be paid for in cash, that the property be urban, suburban or rural for singlefamily occupancy. These provisions would insure veterans of properly supervised construction and would establish a selling price which would give the builder a reasonable profit based on the cost of production. The cost of such housing per month should be within the means of the veteran purchaser. We recommend that the New York State public housing law and if necessary the National Housing Act be amended so as to provide for the payment of all necessary costs and expenses in connection with removal of tenants who must vacate premises to make way for public housing. The amendment should also permit improvements to be made to dwellings required to house tenants forced out of the public housing site and should permit all such costs and expenses to be charged to the housing project. This worked successfully in clearing the area for Stuyvesant Town and will be used in clearing right-of-way for arterial highways.

IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY PROGRAM

It will be seen from the above that although the long-range program is the only permanent answer to the problem it cannot possibly meet the immediate emergency because it will not produce housing units in quantity before 1947. Therefore, the immediate emergency becomes so much more serious. The extent and duration of this immediate emergency cannot be definitely fixed. It appears to arise from several causes including the discharge of men from the armed forces, the cession of all building for civilian housing purposes during the war, the increase in population due to war marriages and births in families of service

men, the normal increase in city population, and finally, the attractions which the city holds out to people from other areas who have decided to stay here for a while or permanently.

Because of the lack of any accurate information as to the number of veterans and nonveterans who need housing now and in the immediate future and the type of housing needed, we recommend that an immediate registration of the veterans and nonveterans be made. The New York Housing Authority has indicated that it is willing to undertake this survey. This survey should be made as soon as possible and collect as much necessary information as can be obtained. The work should be done under the supervision of the New York City Housing Authority and with the cooperation of all governmental agencies. As to discharge of servicemen: The Army advises that the rate of discharge per month, beginning in January, will be about 800,000 for the whole country, about 90,000 for the State of New York,and about 45,000 for the city of New York. This rate of discharge will be about the same for February, will be reduced to about 30,000 in March and April, 20,000 in May and about 10,000 in June. The Navy advises that approximately 16,000 men will be discharged in January, 11,000 in each of the months of February and March, 7,000 in each of the months of April, May, and June, and 13,000 in each of the months of July and August. These figures do not reflect the considerable number of discharged veterans not listed as coming from New York City, but who will be discharged, in this area and who will remain here, for one reason or another, for longer or shorter periods of time. Nor does it include their relatives and friends who come here to meet them and are part of the enormously augmented transient population reported by hotels, public, travel and welfare agencies, and others. It should be noted, however, that the peak of Army discharges was reached in October, and it should be emphasized that the discharges will end in the late spring.

It is impossible to obtain accurate figures as to the number of married servicemen requiring living quarters, but it seems to be beyond dispute that there is a tremendous amount of doubling up of families all over the city, due to this factor and to the normal increase in families and children. The New York Telephone Co. and the Consolidated Edison Co. have furnished us with rough estimates indicating that they anticipate a 1 percent increase in total population of the city in the next 3 years, and in the same period of time a 3.7 percent increase in the number of families, which amounts to 82,000 additional families. These companies raised the number of additional family units needed in the next 3 years from 82,000 to 100,000 because of requirements of small families now doubled up and early marriages of veterans. The increase in the number of families in the city would be distributed as follows: in Manhattan 10.7 percent, in the Bronx 21.4 percent, in Brooklyn 27.6 percent, in Queens 36.6 percent, and in Richmond 3.7 percent.

The health department considers the total population increase figure abovementioned as being too low. Its own estimate for the 3-year period using its usual method of calculating trend is an increase of 2 percent.

It has similarly been most difficult for us to arrive at any definite, reliable conclusion as to the number of family units required to meet the immediate emergency. The estimates vary all the way from 20,000 to 100,000. For purposes of this report, the majority of the committee agree that the absolute minimum is somewhere in the neighborhood of 40,000 family units, which means not less than 140,000 people. This is a most conservative figure based upon the assumption that the single veterans will be taken care of through the armories and otherwise.

We have assumed that the immediate emergency period involving purely temporary adjustments and expedients will last for 2 years, and that by the time this period expires permanent construction-public, redevelopment, and private will have been provided in sufficient quantity, and the transient population will have been reduced to a sufficient extent, so that the immediate emergency and urgent need for otherwise undesirable expedients will have largely disappeared.

We are also unable to obtain any accurate figures reflecting the number of single veterans as distinguished from married veterans in the totals abovementioned. Many of the single veterans now in the city, and who are likely to be here until next fall, will be transients who will not stay permanently, but will certainly constitute a major problem during the whole of the year 1946. Dealing first with this group and the lack of housing accommodations for them, we believe that to the extent that they cannot be provided for in homes, hotels,