hands of well-educated architects, who are permitted to have free play for their talent, the result will be far more to their satisfaction than if they build upon models that have grown stale long ago; and, therefore, in commending, as we do, the works of Ruskin, in this connection, we feel that we are promoting the best interests of art.

ART. V. THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGNS, ETC.

The Russo-Turkish Campaigns of 1828-9. By Col. CHES

The Czar and his People. By JOHN S. MAXWELL. 1854.
The Englishwoman in Russia. 1855.

The Russian Shores of the Black Sea. By LAWRENCE OLI-
PHANT. 1854.

Russia as It Is. By REYNELL MORRELL. 1854.

The Knout and the Russians. By GERMAIN DE LAGNY. 1854. Russia as It Is. By Count A. GUROWSKI. 1854.

Autocracy in Poland and Russia. By JULIAN ALLEN. 1855. Russia. By the MARQUIS DE CUSTINE. Republished. 1854. WE are now spectators of a scene in Europe, which may develop events more important to the world than the revolutionary wars of France. What the issue will be no man can tell. The most sagacious statesman may err as greatly as the novice, and the wildest prophecy approach fulfilment earlier than the conjecture based on the maturest reflections of the politician. It is the habit, in these latter days, to indulge in philosophical speculations upon the future. But however able men may be to theorize upon the past, we hold in little estimation that human foresight which ventures to declare its knowledge of things to come. The mistake of the

commander of a corps-the accidents of a day-the misunderstandings of a council of war-a local tumult-the changes in the opinion of an individual, and causes light as the falling of a sparrow, may divert events from that path upon

which they seem to have entered, and conduct the fate of 'nations to conclusions far opposite to the deductions of our reasoning.

We do not, therefore, design to emulate the example of reviewers in England, France, and in this country, who have indulged in speculations as to the future. It is simply our purpose to consider the causes in which this new European war originated, and the political and physical condition of that power against which the cabinets of Lord Palmerston and Louis Napoleon are united. We shall consider that we have fulfilled all the duty properly belonging to public journalists, if we are able to present such a summary of the causes of this war, and of the internal resources, as will assist the reader in understanding the results which may take place in the pending struggle.

It is necessary for us, in the fulfilment of this object, to recur to the relations existing between Russia and Turkey before the present hostilities commenced. In 1724, it will be remembered, Peter the Great invaded the territories south of the Caucasus. After some conquests, he entered into a treaty with Persia, by which he acquired certain provinces of Georgia, on condition that he should recover for the Persians territories claimed by Shah Tamas, which had fallen into the hands of the Affghans. These conditions were not fulfilled, and the Russians remained in possession of the soil which they had thus acquired. They were subsequently, and for a brief season, deprived of them by Nadir Shah; but Heraclius, the sovereign of Georgia, being unable to maintain his place upon the throne in consequence of intestine troubles, afterwards declared himself the vassal of Russia, on condition that his dominions should be guarantied to himself and his successors. Georgia remained in the undisturbed possession of the family of Heraclius from 1783 to the year 1801, when its vassalage was changed into a state of absolute dependency. It was then declared to be a province of the Russian Empire by the ukase of the Emperor Alexander, dated September 12th, 1801.

This annexation brought the lines of the Russian Empire near to the territory of Turkey bordering on the Euxine Sea, and to the territory of Persia on the Caspian Sea. As a necessary consequence, dissensions soon occurred and a series of petty conflicts took place, which continued up to 1807. Hostilities were renewed in 1809, which lasted with Turkey until the treaty of Bucharest in 1812, and with Persia until the treaty of 1813. By both of these treaties the boundaries of Russia were still further extended.

The peace, resulting from these several treaties, remained unbroken until 1826. It was violated by the Prince Royal of Persia, who entered Russian territory in that year with a large army. About the same period, the Greek insurrection assumed a formidable appearance. The Turks were unable to cope with the revolution, and Ibrahim Pacha was summoned to their assistance. With this accession, the Turks speedily regained their ascendency, and Greece must have been subdued, except for the treaty entered into by France, England, and Russia, at London, on the 6th of July, 1826. This treaty, which was avowedly made to stop the effusion of blood, was followed by the naval battle of Navarino, on the 20th of October, 1827, in which the Turkish fleet was destroyed by the allies, and the power of Turkey in the Mediterranean wholly annihilated. We may well accord with Wellington, who pronounced that battle "an untoward event," since it broke the Ottoman power, and thus weakened one of those bulwarks in Europe, against Russian aggression, to which the policy of its cabinets has more lately been directed in strengthening and maintaining at an enormous expense of blood and treasure.

After this event, the old differences between Russia and Turkey were renewed; and the part taken against Turkey by England and France reduced them to the position of spectators only in the contest. It is manifest, now, that Russia did not intend to accept any reasonable conditions from the Porte. In 1827, the army of Paskiewitch received orders to invade Asiatic Turkey; and in 1828, the Russian forces com

menced actual hostilities. The larger number of authorities agree that there was no substantial reason for this aggression, except in the desire to possess a portion of the territories of the Ottoman Empire. This war lasted until the signing of the treaty of Adrianople, on the 28th of August, 1829. It was bravely contested by the Turks with varying success, but it was then manifest that they could not maintain the independence of their empire in a single-handed conflict with Russia. By the treaty of Adrianople, Russia acquired a considerable territory, in which was an important fortress, a portion of the seacoast of Asia, the left bank and islands of the lower Danube, and the Salina mouth of that river. In addition to these concessions, the Porte surrendered the fortresses of the Principalities to Russia, retaining only a barren sovereignty and a small revenue from them; and it provided for the effectual extinction of its influence there, by agreeing that no Mahommedan subject of the Porte should remain within their limits for a longer period than eighteen months after the date of the treaty. Russia further reserved the right to send troops into the Principalities upon certain contingencies.

The surrender of Turkey to the control Russia by England and France, in consequence of their participation in the events preceding and following the battle of Navarino, became, afterwards, still more absolute. When the Egyptians gained the battle of Konia, England refused to give Turkey any assistance. Russia afforded aid at the price of the treaty of 1833, which bound Turkey by an alliance offensive and defensive, and obliged her, by a secret article, to close the Dardanelles against any power with which Russia might be at war.

In 1849 and 1850, the Russians, by virtue of an alleged article in a convention made at Balta Liman, in 1849, entered the Principalities with an army to suppress a supposed conspiracy. This conduct was, however, not justified by the treaty of 1849, which provided only for the entrance of the troops of both parties. Great Britain intervened, and, after long negotiations, the Russian army was withdrawn.

In March, 1853, Prince Menschikoff paid an official visit to the Porte, soon after his arrival as a minister from Russia. It has been recorded that he appeared in plain clothes, and that he neglected to pay the minister for foreign affairs the customary visit of civility. This was regarded as an omen of evil; and the import of his errand clearly appeared, when he demanded, as early as the 22d of March, a convention for a protectorate over the Greek Christians of Turkey. He repeated his demand on the 29th of April, and again on the 5th of May, when he added that a reply must be sent within five days, or that "painful obligations" would be imposed upon him. Whatever may be the sympathies of any one in the struggle now progressing, it cannot be denied that this demand of Menschikoff was wholly unreasonable. The Greek Christians of the Turkish empire were, for the most part, voluntary residents; and it would have been a fatal weakness, if Turkey had agreed to admit the protectorate of Russia over any class of her subjects. It would be fully as reasonable for France to assume a protectorate over the Catholics residing in England, as it was for Russia to demand it over the Greek Christians in Turkey.

The reply of the Reis Effendi, on the day specified by the Russian Embassador, was eminently reasonable and pacific. He admitted it to be the duty of the Sultan to maintain the religious freedom of his subjects, but said that he could not enter into a treaty which would deprive him of his rights of sovereignty over a large portion of his people. Menschikoff replied at once to this letter, reiterating his demands, and allowing only three days for the answer of the Porte. The Turkish ministers forthwith intimated to the Prince that they would advise with him upon these subjects at the residence of the Grand Vizier. He did not do as they desired, but went directly to the palace and insisted upon seeing the Sultan. He was told that it was Friday, and that the Sultan was keeping his apartment on account of his mother's death. Notwithstanding this, he remained at the palace. The Sultan finally saw him, and told him that his ministers were