pendence in the North, since a country, having cheap breadstuffs, is generally more prosperous than one in which they are dearer. We repeat, it is not which section consumes the most of its own substances, or enjoys the highest amount of social prosperity, that we are now considering, but which of the two sections profits most by its intercourse with the other. Russia produces, perhaps, more than France; but upon a comparison of their reciprocal contributions to the prosperity of each other, Russia would be more indebted to France for silks and brandies, than France to Russia for linseed or linen duck.

But the author has subsequently set down the true point of comparison when he says:

"In estimating the 'power and gain' to the North, resulting from its union with the South, it is required that the reader should remark that the whole of their own vast product is in constant course of being exchanged among themselves; whereas it is only the exchangeable surplus of the South with which the people outside of those States have any thing to do. The man of New York derives no advantage from the corn that is fed in Virginia to the slave that is raised for exportation to Mississippi. The corn raised in Alabama appears abroad only in the form of cotton, while that of Louisiana comes to the North only as sugar or molasses."

"What a plague," then, "have we to do with the buff jerkin," the vegetables which "go to the shops of the North to carve out spades, plows, and steam engines ?". with the iron crop of $30,000,000, or the coal crop of $20,000,000, or with "the earnings of railroads," which represent the cost of interchanges? These prove the wealth and the necessities of the North, not its independence.

It is the surplus of production exported which constitutes the profit, so the greater the Southern consumption of Northern manufactures, the greater the Northern profit upon the transaction. So if the aggregate exportable product of the North were quadrupled, and the Southern demand increased in the same ratio, the dependence of the North upon the

South for a market, would be increased precisely in the same ratio, but the author only considers the importation of Southern products into the North, a source of advantage to the latter section. The profit arising upon sale of Northern goods to Southern customers, is not estimated.

If the Union were dissolved, the trade would continue.

It is true, the South would sell its products to the North as heretofore, as to a foreign country. But would the North continue to manifest the same ability to purchase? A large part of the Southern staples, now taken at the North, are reimported into the South for consumption. Suppose that consumption be cut off by any cause? The demand would pro tanto cease.

But without admitting that the statistical estimate of comparative values produced is either accurate or properly applied, we ask any impartial reader to consider this plain and succinct statement of the relation between the sections.

The Eastern and Northern Atlantic States do not produce the provisions they live upon. Their soil produces no staple for exportation. They depend upon commercial intercourse with other countries for subsistence. They sell merchandise to the South; they send quack medicines and quack science into the South; they cater in every manner for the custom of the South. On the other hand, there are no Southern drummers seeking to sell the staples of the South to the North. Southern people go to Saratoga to buy health; to Philadelphia and New York to buy goods. Does not the social and sectional relation here show a dependence upon the part of

the North?

In the event of Disunion, the Northern Confederacy would be stronger than the South.

To sustain this theory, the author has divided the States into black and white, like the squares upon a chess-board, and this upon the sole and arbitrary distinction of freedom and slavery. In one division we have fifteen free States, in another twelve slave States, in a third, the three States of Missouri, Maryland and Delaware, which the author is

pleased to deem doubtful. Kentucky and Virginia are kindly loaned for a few years to the Southern system, perhaps to enhance the profits of conquest. We cannot gainsay the proposition unless we except to the reasoning by which the theory is sustained. This we assuredly do. But to show the absurdity of Disunion in the abstract, we give the argument employed to show that Maryland would, in that event, join the Northern Confederacy.

"Maryland is fast becoming a mining and manufacturing State, and the policy of the North favors diversification of employment, and thus furnishes a market for coal and iron, that cannot be obtained in the South. Baltimore has a large trade with the West, and the largest portion of it, that which she has made the greatest efforts to secure, lies north of the Ohio; and it is in that quarter augmentation is most rapid. Her slaves are few in number, and in the event of separation, she would have the guarantee of the North for their possession during the period of preparation for gradual and quiet emancipation; whereas, were she in a Southern Union, but few would remain at the close of a single year from the date of separation from Pennsylvania. Her union with the North is one, therefore, not to be dissolved."

It might have been added that Maryland commands iron, lumber and other material for manufactures. She commands, also, an avenue of access to the abundant West. She enjoys a climate favorable to continuous industry. Already, under the force of these attractions, she has attracted capital and skill. Thus qualified to become the manufacturing State of a Southern Confederacy, she would at once succeed to the monopoly of the home market, stretching from Mason and Dixon's line to Mexico.

Fanatics never reason, therefore those who' address them never need do so. But he who assumes to assign destinies to States, should understand perfectly their existing condition. It is said that Maryland possesses a market in the North for her coal and iron. Let us see if she could lose them by adhering to the South.

We are subsequently told that if the Union were dissolved, the South would not decline to sell its staples to the North.

It is also claimed that in the same event Boston will preserve her India trade, New York her China trade, Philadelphia her West India trade. Yet England and Canada send iron and coal to the markets of the United States, though neither of them are willing to unite with our political association. Why, then, should Maryland change her political association to preserve her markets for a staple indispensable to the industry of others? Commerce consists in an intercourse between people of different States. The argument would confine it to those who live under the same form of political rule. But if the future associations of Maryland are to be determined by considerations of relative interest, let us see how she will stand. Maryland possesses inexhaustible mines of coal better adapted than any other in the United States to the generation of steam. To this may be added the immense trade which comes up from the Chesapeake and its tributaries, as well as from North Carolina and Tennessee. This trade has built up the city of Baltimore. As the interest, so the antecedents of Maryland ally her to the South. Maryland was taken from the territory of Virginia. She sympathizes with her sister,

-The mountains look on Marathon
And Marathon upon the sea.

Mount Vernon is within sight of Maryland, and the thunders of Yorktown reverberated within her hearing. She has fought shoulder to shoulder with Virginia against Indians, English and Abolitionists, and the blood of Gorsuch is unappeased. Still this despicable argument of interest is strengthened by an appeal to fear, lest the prospect of a good coal market should not move her. It is argued that Maryland would cleave to a Northern Union, because, during the short interval of preparation for "gradual and quiet emancipation," they would have the "guarantee of the North" for their "possession!" whereas, if she were a member of a Southern Union, they would escape into Pennsylvania within a year. Maryland is then to be determined in her future association by a guarantee for the hire of her own property for a few years!

But the author is mistaken. The value of slaves in Maryland is not the leading consideration. Nor is the appeal to her interest the proper way to approach an honorable people.

But the argument of interest is as deceptive as it is insulting. If Maryland would go into a confederacy to secure the hire of her own slaves, would it not be more profitable to continue in a confederacy where she might have the benefit of their sales? Would slaves cease to run away or abolitionists to kidnap them, because of the guarantee of the North? Do the guarantees of the present constitution arrest this evil? Such are a specimen of the reasons given by the author why "the Union of Maryland with the North is not to be dissolved." But it will be found that ethnography cannot decide the question. The exact sciences clog the flight of theory. The sun of reason melts the wax from its wings. Geography corroborates the testimony of commerce, and determines that the destinies of Maryland are with that system of states in which she was born. The western territory of Maryland rests upon and is embraced by Virginia. Her eastern division is a peninsula bounded by the Chesapeake and the ocean. From this it will be seen that the access of Maryland to the West lies through the territory, and that the right of way to that trade has been derived from Virginia. It will therefore be obvious that the whole commerce of Maryland must go to sea through the capes of Virginia. It is not therefore probable that with her chief source of commercial sustenance, with her whole means of access to the ocean or the interior within the dominion of a Southern State, Maryland would accede to a Northern confederacy, when, by so doing, she would separate herself from franchises which were conceded to the comity of friendly states, and would be resumed upon the establishment of foreign relations. We repeat that these are specimens of the reasons by which the public mind of the North is prepared for Disunion, by organizing future confederacies upon the arbitrary and delusive allocations of latitude. Reason tells us that men rather divide with reference to interests than of climate or complexion.