questions, since the district court rested its decision wholly on different grounds, which we alone consider here. The district court was of the opinion that "petitioner has had a full, complete, and competent consideration and decision in the Supreme Court of Florida of all the various matters here sought again to be presented." The district court had reference to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court referred to by petitioner in his papers filed with the district court. They were: House v. State, 127 Fla. 145, 172 So. 734, a writ of error from petitioner's conviction; 1 House v. State, 130 Fla. 400, 177 So. 705, an application for leave to file a coram nobis proceeding; and the denial by the Florida Supreme Court without opinion of three petitions for habeas corpus filed by petitioner. By each form of proceeding petitioner attempted to raise the questions he now raises in the present petition; but in each instance, so far as appears, the Florida Supreme Court, without considering the merits of petitioner's contentions and without affording a hearing on the merits, denied relief to petitioner, on the ground that the particular remedy sought was not the appropriate one under Florida law to raise those contentions. See House v. State, 127 Fla. 145, 148; House v. State, 130 Fla. 400, 406; cf. Skipper v. Schumacher, 124 Fla. 384, 401-404, 169 So. 58. The district court also referred to a denial by this Court of a petition for certiorari, filed here after the denial by the Florida Supreme Court of one of the applications for habeas corpus. See House v. Mayo, 322 U. S. 710. The 1In a habeas corpus proceeding, the Florida Supreme Court decided that the judgment against petitioner, entered in 1927, was defective in that it did not contain an adjudication of guilt. State ex rel. House v. Mayo, 122 Fla. 23, 164 So. 673. The court remanded petitioner to the trial court for the imposition of a proper sentence. On February 22, 1936, the trial court resentenced petitioner to the same term originally imposed. The opinion referred to in the text, 127 Fla. 145, was on a writ of error from petitioner's conviction, taken after the resentence in 1936. Opinion of the Court. 324 U.S. district court thought that this was an expression "of the opinion that no meritorious question is presented by the matters of which petitioner here complains." But as we have often said, a denial of certiorari by this Court imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case. See Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers, 240 U. S. 251, 258; Seney v. Swift & Co., 260 U. S. 146, 151; United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 490; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Powe, 283 U. S. 401, 403–404. It is true that where a state court has considered and adjudicated the merits of a petitioner's contentions, and this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court's decision, a federal court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus adjudicated. See Ex parte Hawk, supra, 118. But that rule is inapplicable where, as here, the basis of the state court decision is that the particular remedy sought is not one allowed by state law, for in such a case this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the decision. Woolsey v. Best, 299 U. S. 1, 2; New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688, 690; Williams v. Kaiser, supra, 473, 476–479. The decision of the district court is thus not supported by the grounds assigned for it, and should have been reversed by the court of appeals. And the judges of that court erred in not considering whether the case was an appropriate one for a certificate of probable cause, as they were authorized to do by 28 U. S. C. § 466. We think that they also erred in not issuing the certificate. The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for leave to file the petition for certiorari are granted. The petition for certiorari is granted, the order of the court of appeals and judgment of the district court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings in conformity to this opinion. The motion for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus in this court is denied. Ex parte Abernathy, 320 U. S. 219; Ex parte Hawk, supra. So ordered. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS is of opinion that the writ of certiorari should be denied. MUSCHANY ET AL. v. UNITED STATES. NO. 31. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.* Argued October 18, 1944.-Decided February 5, 1945. Option contracts for the purchase of land by the United States from the petitioners provided for payment by petitioners of a 5% commission to the Government's optioning agent and stipulated that if condemnation proceedings should be instituted the option price should constitute just compensation. In subsequent condemnation proceedings the Government disaffirmed the contracts. The district court upheld the contracts; the circuit court of appeals reversed. On review here, held: 1. The contracts contemplated that the agent's commission should be added to the vendors' net price. P. 56. 2. Issues of fraud, misrepresentation and duress are not before this Court, since the trial court made findings supported by substantial evidence against the Government on those issues; the findings were not reversed by the circuit court of appeals; and the issues were not argued here. P. 57. 3. Evidence that the Government's purchasing agent engaged in questionable conduct in securing options from other vendors was not relevant to the issue of the validity of the petitioners' contracts. P. 58. *Together with No. 32, Andrews et al. v. United States, also on writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Opinion of the Court. 324 U.S. 4. Mere disparity between the original cost of the lands to the seller and the sale price to the Government does not render the contracts invalid. P. 58. 5. The provision of § 1 of the Act of July 2, 1940, prohibiting use of the "cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting," is applicable to purchases of lands. P. 60. 6. The contracts did not violate the provision of § 1 of the Act of July 2, 1940, forbidding use (under that section) of the "cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting." P. 61. 7. The contracts were not invalid as contrary to public policy. P. 64. (a) The nature of the agent's interest and the contingent character of his fee are not such as to vitiate the contracts. P. 65. (b) In the absence of a plain indication of public policy through long governmental practice or statutory enactments, or of violations of obvious ethical or moral standards, this Court should not assume to declare Government contracts contrary to public policy. P. 66. (c) The provisions of §§ 41, 112 and 113 of the Criminal Code and of the Act of March 3, 1917, do not manifest a public policy against the use of contracts of the type here involved. P. 67. (d) Nor does the action of Congress on subsequent legislation indicate that the contracts are contrary to public policy. P. 68. 139 F. 2d 661, reversed. CERTIORARI, 321 U. S. 760, to review the reversal of judgments in two condemnation proceedings which involved the validity of contracts of the United States for the purchase of lands. Mr. William R. Gentry for petitioners in No. 31. Mr. Samuel M. Watson, with whom Mr. Redick O'Bryan was on the brief, for petitioners in No. 32. Mr. Paul A. Freund, with whom Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Littell and Mr. Norman MacDonald were on the brief, for the United States. MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court. Writs of certiorari were allowed to petitioners by this Court in these two cases to review the action of the Cir 49 Opinion of the Court. cuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.1 That appellate court reversed the action of the District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri which had upheld the validity of contracts between petitioners and the United States for the purchase of land for the Weldon Springs, Missouri, ordnance plant. The contracts were pleaded by petitioners as defendants in eminent domain suits to establish the proper condemnation award. The petitions for certiorari were granted, 321 U. S. 760, because of asserted conflict with United States v. Grace Evangelical Church, 132 F. 2d 460. Jurisdiction of this Court rests on § 240 of the Judicial Code. Under the authority of the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of 1941, 54 Stat. 872, the President approved the Weldon Springs project on October 17, 1940. Pursuant to this approval, the War Department claims that it proceeded to acquire the necessary land under the act of July 2, 1917, 40 Stat. 241, as restricted by the National Defense Act of July 2, 1940, 54 Stat. 712. The statutory authority of the War Department to proceed as it did is not questioned except on the issue of whether the purchase contracts entered into in acquiring the needed land violate the first section of the act of July 2, 1940, which provides: "Provided further, That the cost-plus-a-percentage-ofcost system of contracting shall not be used under this section; but this proviso shall not be construed to prohibit the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract when such use is deemed necessary by the Secretary of War." 54 Stat. 713. The duty to act for the War Department in obtaining the land lay in the office of the Quartermaster General and specifically in the Real Estate Branch of that office. In an effort to expedite the acquisition of the needed land, 1 United States v. Muschany, 139 F. 2d 661. |