beneficiary is specified and in esse or that the amount of the gift is definite and certain.13 The considerations, which petitioners advance to support their position, from the minority of the beneficiaries and their consequent legal disability to manage and control their property are intermingled with others relating to the motives of the donors in making the gifts. It is said that their purpose was to provide for the "comfort, support, maintenance and welfare," including education, of the grandchildren; that the latter were incapable of taking over the management and control of the property; that accordingly it was necessary for some arrangement to be made for vesting this power in trustees or others capable of exercising it; that the trustees were given no power to withhold either income or corpus in case of need; and consequently the whole fund became available to the beneficiary for his maintenance "immediately upon the consummation of the gift," so that he was vested at once with the right of present enjoyment as fully as any child of tender years could be and in no way differently, taking account of his disability, than any owner of property by title in fee simple. 13 The absence of these factors is relevant as showing the more clearly that postponement exists and therefore the exemption does not apply. Their presence does not show that there is no postponement or that the exemption applies. The administrative difficulties relating to these matters "in many instances" were reasons for denying the exemption. They do not and were not intended to encompass the full scope of the denial. As the statute extended the exemption "in the specified amount, to all gifts, whether large or small, 'made to any person,'" Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U. S. 393, 397, so it denied the exemption to all gifts, whether large or small, vested or contingent, made to any person, whether specified and in esse or ascertainable only in the future, and whether for a specific or a presently unascertainable amount, if the gift is one of a "future interest in property," that is, one as to which enjoyment is postponed to some future time. So far as the argument turns on the motive of the donors, it may be answered that the statute and the regulation make no such test. If motive has bearing, it is only by reason of its effect upon the element of time and whatever relation may be given, by the particular terms of the gift, to it and the disclosing of a purpose to provide for or against immediate enjoyment. The statute in this respect purports to make no distinction between gifts to minors and gifts to adults. If there is deferment in either case the exemption is denied. Consequently in this case the donors' laudable desire to make provision for their grandchildren in case of future need cannot nullify the deferment which the recited absence of present need, coupled with the terms of the trust, brought about. Again, contingency of need in the future is not identical with the fact of need presently existing. And a gift effective only for the former situation is not effective, for purposes of relief from the tax, as if the latter were specified, whether the donee is an adult or a minor. Upon the facts, furthermore, the trusts hardly can be taken as designed primarily for the periods covered by the children's minority. They did not terminate with the ending of that period. The graduated scale of payments, beginning at age twenty-five and ending at thirty-five, together with the prohibition of payment earlier except in case of necessity, shows principal concern for a period of adult life. And, from the fact that this would be the period when the grandchildren normally would be assuming family responsibilities of their own, the inference well might be drawn that the chief purpose was to give aid and some security in that time. The contingent provision, in case of earlier need, cannot be taken therefore to represent the donors' primary concern as expressed in the instruments. Cf. Fisher v. Commissioner, 132 F. 2d 383, 386. 18 Opinion of the Court. But, whether so or not, in the particular circumstances that need was but a contingency to be realized, if at all, in the future. And, until realized, the contingency stood squarely in the way of any child's receiving a single dollar from the fund. Finally it is urged that unless these gifts are to be taken as conferring the right to immediate enjoyment, no gift for the benefit of a child of tender years can be so regarded since in any such case "some competent person must be the primary judge as to the necessity and extent of reasonable requirements of the beneficiary." The argument is appealing, in so far as it seeks to avoid imputing to Congress the intention to "penalize gifts to minors merely because the legal disability of their years precludes them for a time from receiving their income in hand currently." Cf. Disston v. Commissioner, 144 F. 2d 115, 119. But we think it is not applicable in the facts of this case, since by the terms of the trusts and the facts recited in the instruments none of the fund, whether income or corpus, could be applied immediately for the child's use or enjoyment. It does not follow, as petitioners say, that if the exemption does not apply in this case it can apply in no other made for a minor's benefit. Whenever provision is made for immediate application of the fund for such a purpose, whether of income or of corpus, the exemption applies. Whether, in the case of a gift requiring such an application of the income, but providing for retention of a corpus no more than reasonably sufficient to produce the income required for this purpose and to insure its continued payment during minority, the donation would fall within the exemption, as to corpus as well as income, is a question not presented on this record and therefore not determined. The regulation has received the construction now reaffirmed with substantial consistency. The statute, with the meaning thus settled, has been reenacted by Congress. The construction should be followed until Congress sees fit to change it. The judgment is Affirmed. REPUBLIC OF MEXICO ET AL. v. HOFFMAN. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. No. 455. Argued January 11, 12, 1945.-Decided February 5, 1945. 1. The decisions of the two courts below that the vessel in question was not in the possession or service of the Mexican government are supported by the evidence. P. 33. 2. A merchant vessel owned but not possessed by a friendly foreign government held not immune from a suit in rem in admiralty, where the Department of State has refrained from certifying that it allows the immunity or recognizes ownership of the vessel without possession by the foreign government as a ground for immunity. Pp. 36, 38. 3. Since the Department of State has long and consistently followed the policy of recognizing immunity from suit of a vessel in the possession and service of a foreign government, the courts have allowed such immunity upon proof of such possession and use even when not certified by the Department of State. P. 36. 4. It is the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which the Government, though it has had numerous opportunities, has not seen fit to recognize. P. 38. 143 F.2d 854, affirmed. CERTIORARI, 323 U. S. 697, to review the affirmance of a judgment for the libellant in a suit in rem in admiralty. Mr. Morris Lavine for petitioners. 14 Congress withdrew the exclusion, as to gifts in trust, in the Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, § 505, amending § 504 (b) of the 1932 Act. But it was restored, though reduced to $3,000, by the Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798, § 454. 30 Opinion of the Court. Mr. Harold A. Black, with whom Messrs. Farnham P. Griffiths and Allan P. Matthew were on the brief, for respondent. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court. The question is whether, in the absence of the adoption of any guiding policy by the Executive branch of the government, the federal courts should recognize the immunity from a suit in rem in admiralty of a merchant vessel solely because it is owned though not possessed by a friendly foreign government. Respondent, owner and master of the Lottie Carson, an American fishing vessel, filed a libel in rem in the district court for southern California against the Baja California, her engines, machinery, tackle and furniture, for damage alleged to have been caused when the Baja California negligently caused her tow to collide with the Lottie Carson in Mexican waters. The Mexican Ambassador to the United States, acting in behalf of his government, thereupon filed in the district court a suggestion that the Baja California at all times mentioned in the libel and at the time of her seizure was owned by the Republic of Mexico and in its possession, and engaged in the transportation of cargoes between the ports of the Republic of Mexico and elsewhere. Libellant put in issue the allegations of the suggestion that title to the Baja California was at any time in the Mexican government and denied that she was in that government's possession, public service or use. Trial of these issues proceeded upon stipulated evidence. In the meantime the United States Attorney for the District, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, filed in the district court a communication from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, in which the State Department called attention to the claim of the Mexican government, already detailed. The Department |