Opinion of the Court.

324 U.S.

with the provision of § 1 authorizing award of more than the amount deposited as estimated compensation, as indicating a purpose to make the transfer of title irrevocable upon the filing of the declaration and the making of the deposit.18 From the fact that the Government may become irrevocably committed to pay, it does not follow that the owner is irrevocably committed to submit to the taking, since the statute's terms are not in pari materia in this respect. Neither § 3 nor § 5 purports to bind the owner irrevocably. On the contrary, § 5 deals only with authority to expend appropriated funds for demolition of existing structures and construction of new ones; and the concluding proviso, requiring the opinion of the Attorney General that "title has been vested in the United States or all persons having an interest therein have been made parties to such proceeding and will be bound by the final judgment therein," (emphasis added) before the funds are expended, seems clearly to contemplate that title is not indefeasibly vested in the United States merely by following the administrative procedure. Final judg

States has become irrevocably committed to pay the amount ultimately to be awarded as compensation, it shall be lawful to expend moneys duly appropriated for that purpose in demolishing existing structures on said land and in erecting public buildings or public works thereon, notwithstanding the provisions of section 355 of the Revised Statutes of the United States: Provided, That in the opinion of the Attorney General, the title has been vested in the United States or all persons having an interest therein have been made parties to such proceeding and will be bound by the final judgment therein."

18 Including or following the finding required by § 3, which provides: "Action under this statute irrevocably committing the United States to the payment of the ultimate award shall not be taken unless the chief of the executive department or agency or bureau of the Government empowered to acquire the land shall be of the opinion that the ultimate award probably will be within any limits prescribed by Congress on the price to be paid."

ment in "such proceeding," that is, the main condemnation suit, is necessary for that purpose. The operation of §§ 3 and 5 is to cut off the Government's right to abandon the proceedings. It is not to compel the owner to submit to unauthorized takings.

Accordingly, in our opinion the right of the owner to challenge the validity of the taking, for nonconformity with the prescribed statutory purposes, was not destroyed by the 1931 act. Nor was the right to do this upon appeal, existing before that act was adopted, affected. No such "severance" was made as the court deciding the Puerto Rico case thought was created. No new right of separate appeal was given. The preexisting right of appeal, including appeal on grounds relating to validity of the taking, remained in force to be exercised when and only when final judgment, disposing of the cause in its entirety, has been rendered. The statute makes no other explicit provision. Nor is one so clearly implied that we can make it. The weightier implications are the other way.

We have not discussed other issues presented or suggested in the briefs or argument, since that has not been necessary to the disposition of this cause. These include the question whether, when possession has been taken and damage has been done to the premises in the course of proceedings not authorized, the remedy by appeal is adequate. That issue has not been made in this case, since the grounds urged rest upon the provisions of the 1931 act relating to title and their effect, through the proceedings had, upon the petitioners right. They do not relate simply to the taking of possession, the right to take it or damages resulting from exercise of that right, apart from the question of title. Possession in this case had been taken, pursuant to the terms of the 1917 act, prior to the time of the purported transfer of title. It will be time enough to con

sider the question concerning adequacy of the appeal or possible existence of other remedy affecting such a case when it arises.

The judgment is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Concur in the result.

GEMSCO, INC. ET AL. v. WALLING, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR.

NO. 368. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

*

Argued December 5, 1944.-Decided February 26, 1945.

Under §8 (f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Administrator has authority, as a necessary means of making effective a minimum wage order for the embroideries industry, to prohibit industrial homework. Pp. 254, 269.

144 F.2d 608, affirmed.

CERTIORARI, 323 U. S. 695, to review a judgment affirming a wage order promulgated by the Administrator under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Messrs. Samuel S. Allan and Seymour D. Altmark, with whom Messrs. Walter Brower, Samuel J. Cohen, Coleman Gangel, Ilo Orleans and Myron P. Gordon were on the brief, for petitioners.

*Together with No. 369, Maretzo et al. v. Walling, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, and No. 370, Guiseppi et al. v. Walling, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, U. S. Department of Labor, also on certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

Mr. Archibald Cox, with whom Solicitor General Fahy, Messrs. Douglas B. Maggs, Louis Sherman and Kenneth Meiklejohn were on the brief, for respondent.

Briefs were filed by Messrs. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General of New York, Orrin G. Judd, Solicitor General, Wendell P. Brown, First Assistant Attorney General, and Roy Wiedersum, Assistant Attorney General, on behalf of the Industrial Commissioner of the State of New York, and by Messrs. John H. Nolan, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and John J. Cooney, on behalf of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, as amici curiae, in support of the respondent.

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue to be decided in these cases is narrow. It is whether respondent, as Administrator, has authority under § 8 (f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060, to prohibit industrial homework as a necessary means of making effective a minimum wage order for the embroideries industry. The question arises in proceedings brought to review the order pursuant to § 10. The cases were consolidated for hearing in the Circuit Court of Appeals, which sustained the Administrator's action, one judge dissenting. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F. 2d 608. Because of the public importance of the question and its importance for purposes of administering the statute, certiorari was granted, 323 U. S. 695, limited to the stated issue.1

One of the Act's primary objectives was "a universal minimum wage of 40 cents an hour in each industry

1 The petition sought review also on questions of due process and delegation of legislative power. Cf. note 10 infra.

2

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" and to reach this level as rapidly as was "economically feasible without substantially curtailing employment." §8 (a). Accordingly, § 6 established basic minimum statutory wages, to be stepped up from 25 cents an hour to 40 cents generally during the seven years from the section's effective date, October 23, 1938. Limited flexibility was provided in accordance with the declared purpose to reach the 40-cent level earlier if "economically feasible." Cf. 83 Cong. Rec. 9256. Section 8 empowers the Administrator to convene industry committees which, after investigation, report to him their recommendations concerning minimum wages and reasonable classifications. 8 (a), (b), (c), (d). The Administrator is then required by order to approve and carry into effect the committee's recommendations, after notice to interested persons and opportunity to be heard, if he finds they "are made in accordance with law, are supported by the evidence . . . and . . . will carry out the purposes" of the section; otherwise he must disapprove them. § 8 (d).

The Act's scheme is therefore a combination of "statutory" minimum wages fixed by §6 and what may be termed "committee" wages,' fixed by order made pursuant

2 Section 6 (a) (3), cf. also § 8 (e) and text infra page 267, provides for issuance and continuance in effect of wage orders, to some extent at least, after the seven-year period: "Sec. 6 (a). Every employer shall pay to each of his employees . . . (3) after the expiration of seven years. . . not less than 40 cents an hour, or the rate (not less than 30 cents an hour) prescribed in the applicable order of the Administrator issued under section 8, whichever is lower . . ."

3 "The committee shall recommend to the Administrator the highest minimum wage rates for the industry which it determines, having due regard to economic and competitive conditions, will not substantially curtail employment in the industry." § 8 (b). Recommendations for classifications are covered by § 8 (c).

4 Cf. the concurring opinion of L. Hand, C. J., 144 F. 2d 608, 623. The combination is the result of a compromise, reached in con