Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. 44. Cf. Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 208; Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441. And so we turn to the consideration of the patents and the patent law to ascertain whether the monopoly which they have given appellant affords a lawful basis for the control over the marketing of motor fuel which the record discloses. Cf. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476. In considering that question we assume the validity of the patents, which is not questioned here. The patent law confers on the patentee a limited monopoly, the right or power to exclude all others from manufacturing, using, or selling his invention. R. S. § 4884, 35 U. S. C. § 40. The extent of that right is limited by the definition of his invention, as its boundaries are marked by the specifications and claims of the patent. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 510. He may grant licenses to make, use or vend, restricted in point of space or time, or with any other restriction upon the exercise of the granted privilege, save only that by attaching a condition to his license he may not enlarge his monopoly and thus acquire some other which the statute and the patent together did not give. He may not, by virtue of his patent, condition his license so as to tie to the use of the patented device or process the use of other devices, processes or materials which lie outside of the monopoly of the patent licensed; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra; Carbice Corporation v. American Patents Corp., 283 U. S. 27, 31; Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U. S. 458; cf. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 462; International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U. S. 131, 140; or condition the license so as to control conduct by the licensee not embraced in the patent monopoly, Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20; Interstate Circuit 436 Opinion of the Court. v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 228-230; or upon the maintenance of resale prices by the purchaser of the patented article. Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453; BobbsMerrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1; Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8; cf. United States v. General Electric Co., supra, 485. Appellant, as patentee, possesses exclusive rights to make and sell the fluid and also the lead-treated motor fuel. By its sales to refiners it relinquishes its exclusive right to use the patented fluid; and it relinquishes to the licensed jobbers its exclusive rights to sell the lead-treated fuel by permitting the licensed refiners to manufacture and sell the fuel to them. And by the authorized sales of the fuel by refiners to jobbers the patent monopoly over it is exhausted, and after the sale neither appellant nor the refiners may longer rely on the patents to exercise any control over the price at which the fuel may be resold. Adams v. Burke, supra; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, supra; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, supra; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., supra. The picture here revealed is not that of a patentee exercising its right to refuse to sell or to permit his licensee to sell the patented products to price-cutters. Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 with United States v. A. Schrader's Son, 252 U. S. 85. A very different scene is depicted by the record. It is one in which appellant has established the marketing of the patented fuel in vast amounts on a nationwide scale through the 11,000 jobbers and at the same time, by the leverage of its licensing contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents, it has built up a combination capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers' prices and suppressing competition among them. It Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. seems plain that this attempted regulation of prices and market practices of the jobbers with respect to the fuel purchased, for which appellant could not lawfully contract, cannot be lawfully achieved by entering into contracts or combinations through the manipulation of which the same results are reached by the exercise of the power which they give to control the action of the purchasers. Such contracts or combinations which are used to obstruct the free and natural flow in the channels of interstate commerce of trade even in a patented article, after it is sold by the patentee or his licensee, are a violation of the Sherman Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., supra, 453; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, supra; Victor Talking Machine Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810, 817; cf. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, supra. Agreements for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate commerce are, without more, unreasonable restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act because they eliminate competition, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, and agreements which create potential power for such price maintenance exhibited by its actual exertion for that purpose are in themselves unlawful restraints within the meaning of the Sherman Act, which is not only a prohibition. against the infliction of a particular type of public injury but "a limitation of rights which may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained." Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, 49; American Column Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 400; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra, 397, 398. The extent to which appellant's dominion over the jobbers' business goes beyond its patent monopoly, is emphasized by the circumstances here present that the prices and market practices sought to be established are not those prescribed by appellant-patentee, but by the 436 Opinion of the Court. refiners. Appellant neither owns nor sells the patented fuel nor derives any profit through royalties or otherwise from its sale. It has chosen to exploit its patents by manufacturing the fluid covered by them and by selling that fluid to refiners for use in the manufacture of motor fuel. Such benefits as result from control over the marketing of the treated fuel by the jobbers accrue primarily to the refiners and indirectly to appellant, only in the enjoyment of its monopoly of the fluid secured under another patent. The licensing conditions are thus not used as a means of stimulating the commercial development and financial returns of the patented invention which is licensed, but for the commercial development of the business of the refiners and the exploitation of a second patent monopoly not embraced in the first. The patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for the exploitation of a monopoly of another, see Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, than for the exploitation of an unpatented article, United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States, supra; Carbice Corporation v. American Patents Corp., supra; Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co., supra; American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F. 2d 207, or for the exploitation or promotion of a business not embraced within the patent. Interstate Circuit v. United States, supra, 228-230. Protection of Health and Quality of Product. The trial court was of opinion that such interest as appellant has in protecting the health of the public in connection with the distribution of the fuel, and in preventing adulteration, deterioration and dilution of the motor fuel in the hands of the jobbers may be adequately protected without resort to the jobber license device which has been and is capable of being used for other and illicit purposes. Compare International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, supra, 139, 140. This Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. conclusion is, we think, amply supported by the record. The precautions taken to protect the public health in the handling of the motor fuel by jobbers and service stations include the health restrictions imposed on jobbers by the refiners included in their contracts with jobbers, inspections, more or less perfunctory, by representatives of appellant, and the posting by jobbers and distributors of notices supplied by appellant stating that the fuel contains lead and is for use as a motor fuel only. These activities are not interfered with by the decree. There is no authentic instance of injury resulting from the handling of lead-treated gasoline, after its manufacture, attributable to its lead content. Extensive expert study, carried on under direction of appellant over a period of years, detailed in the record, resulted in a report that the risk arising from the absorption of lead through the skin in the handling of the lead-treated fuel is so small as to be negligible, and that the use of the fuel made in conformity to the refiners' licenses has not caused or produced any dangers or hazards to health. The avoidance of such dangers as there may be in the handling of the motor fuel by jobbers and distributors is plainly not beyond control by public health regulations, and would seem, as the district court thought, to be amply secured, in any case, through the self-interest of the refiners in requiring the purchasers of their gasoline to take proper health precautions including the posting of notices which appellant supplies and by the continuance of appellant's inspection, all of which are permissible under the decree. It is likewise apparent that the interest the appellant has in preventing dilution, adulteration and deterioration of the treated gasoline in the hands of the jobbers may be similarly protected without continued resort to jobber licenses, which is precluded by reason of their use and the danger of their continued use for other and illegal purposes. |