and after that the corporation used it in the same way and with the
like knowledge. In 1884 S. severed his connection with the corpora-
tion. During all this time he made no claim for remuneration for the
use of his patent, and when asked why he had not, replied that he did
not desire to disturb his friendly relations with the L. & B. Company.
In 1884 he filed this bill in equity, with the usual prayers for an
accounting and for an injunction. Held, (1) That, on authority of
McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, it might be presumed that S. had
licensed L. & B. and the L. & B. Company to use his invention; (2)
That, on the authority of Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342, it
might be presumed that S. had recognized an obligation, flowing from
his employment by the partnership and by the corporation, to permit
them to use his invention; (3) That he was guilty of laches in allow-
ing so long a period to elapse before asserting his rights; (4) That
the excuse he gave for not asserting them was entitled to a less favor-
able consideration by a court of equity than if his conduct had been
that of mere inaction. Lane & Bodley Co. v Locke, 193.
13. The second claim in letters patent No. 233,240, for improvements in
dress forms, issued October 12, 1880, to John Hall, and by him as-
signed to Charles A. Morss, viz.: "2. In combination with the stand-
ard a and ribs c, the double braces e2, the sliding blocks f1 and ƒ2, and
rests h1 and h2, substantially as and for the purposes set forth," when
read and interpreted with reference to other and broader claims which
were made by the patentee and were rejected by the Patent Office,
must either be held to be invalid for want of invention, or must be so
limited in view of that action by the Patent Office, and in view of the
prior state of the art, as not to be infringed by a combination leaving
out one of the elements of the patentee's device. Knapp v. Morss, 221.
14. A claim in letters patent cannot be so construed as to cover what was
rejected by the Patent Office on the application for the patent. 1b.
15. The combination of old elements which perform no new function, and
accomplish no new results, does not involve patentable novelty. Ib.
16. The end or purpose sought to be accomplished by a device is not the
subject of a patent, but only the new and useful means for obtaining
that end. Ib.

17. Letters patent 248,646, granted to Charles Gordon, October 25, 1881,
for "an improved apparatus for cooling and drawing beer" are void
for want of patentable novelty, and the invention patented was antici-
pated. Magin v. Karle, 387.

18. The first claim in letters patent No. 218,300, issued August 5, 1879, to
William Mills and Christian H. Hershey, for an improvement in hair-
crimpers, viz.: "A hair-crimper consisting of a non-elastic metal core
C, and braided covering A, said covering A being cemented to said
core C throughout its entire length, substantially as described," is
void for want of novelty. Giles v. Heysinger, 627.

See CONTRACT, 3.

PLEADING.

1. While it is true that a receipt is open to explanation by parol proof
to show what its real consideration was, the issue to that effect must
be raised by the pleadings, and must have been taken in the court
below, to be available here. Horn v. Detroit Dry Dock Co., 610.
2. An accord and satisfaction cannot be set aside for mutual mistakes in
regard to material facts, if the alleged mistakes have not been set
up by proper pleadings. 1b.

PRACTICE.

1. Oral argument is not allowed on motions to dismiss appeals or writs
of error.
Carey v. Houston & Texas Central Railway Co., 170.
2. On motion to dismiss or affirm it is only necessary to print so much of
the record as will enable the court to act understandingly without
referring to the transcript. Ib.

1. After the expiration of the time limited by the act of June 8, 1872,
17 Stat. 339, c. 354, for the completion of its road to Santa Fé, if not
before that time, the Denver and Rio Grande Railway Company was
entitled to claim the benefit of the act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482,
c. 151, upon complying with its conditions. United States v. Denver &
Rio Grande Railway, 1.

2. The act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 482, c. 151, granting a right of way
to railroads through the public lands, and authorizing them to take
therefrom timber or other materials necessary for the construction of
their roadways, station buildings, depots, machine-shops, sidetracks,
turnouts, water stations, etc., permits a railway company to use the
timber or material so taken on portions of its line remote from the
place from which it is taken. Ib.

3. It is not decided that the act of March 3, 1875, gave a right to take
timber from the public domain for making rolling stock; nor what
structure, if any, not enumerated in that act would constitute neces-
sary, essential, or constituent parts of a railroad. Ib.

4. Under the authority conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury by
the act of May 14, 1890, 26 Stat. 109, c. 207, entitled "An act to pro-
vide for town site entries of lands in what is known as 'Oklahoma,’

and for other purposes," it was entirely competent for the Secretary
to provide for an appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office in case of contest. McDaid v. Oklahoma Territory, 209.

5. When an appeal from a decision of the trustees appointed by the
Secretary under the provisions of that act was duly taken, it became
the duty of the trustees to decline to issue a deed to the appellee until
the appeal was disposed of. 1b.

6. The general rule laid down in Garland v. Wynn, 20 How. 6, following
in principle Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, 212, and maintained in
Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becker, 147 U. S. 47, 57, that where several
parties set up conflicting claims to property, with which a special
tribunal may deal, as between one party and the government, regard-
less of the rights of others, the latter may come into the ordinary
courts of justice, and litigate their conflicting claims, is announced
to be the settled doctrine of this court. Turner v. Sawyer, 578.

See STATUTE, A, 1, 2.

RAILROAD.

1. In its ordinary acceptation and enlarged sense, the term "railroad
includes all structures which are necessary and essential to its opera-
tion. United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., 1.

2. On the 10th of February, 1879, the Council Bluffs and St. Louis Rail-
way Company leased their projected railway from Council Bluffs to
the state line to the St. Louis, Kansas City and Northern Railway
Company for the term of 91 years. Together the lines formed the
Omaha Division of the Wabash system. On the 15th of February,
1879, the lessee issued bonds to the amount of $2,350,000, secured by
a mortgage to the United States Trust Company, to complete and
equip the division. In November, 1879, the lessee was consolidated
with the Wabash Railway Company, under the name of the Wabash,
St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company. The new corporation
assumed all the obligations of the old ones, entered into possession of
all the property, issued bonds to the amount of $17,000,000, secured
by a general mortgage to the Central Trust Company, and other
bonds, and continued to operate the property down to May, 1884,
when it filed a bill alleging its own insolvency, and asking the court
to appoint receivers of all its property, which was done. A prefer-
ential indebtedness was recognized by the court to the extent of
$4,378,233.49, which the receivers were directed to pay. The rentals
and interest amounted to $2,175,062, of which $82,250 was for the
rent of the Omaha Division. These also were ordered to be paid by
the receivers. It turned out, practically, that so far from being able
to make all these payments out of earnings, they were never enough
to pay the preferential debts, and that the Omaha Division was
operated at an actual loss, without taking the rental into account.

These facts were made known to the court by the receivers in March,
1885, whereupon it ordered, in April, 1885, that the subdivisional
accounts be kept separately, and that no rent or subdivisional interest
be paid where a subdivision earned no surplus. It also ordered the
preferential debts to be paid before rentals. The instalment of rent
or interest on the Omaha Division due in April, 1885, not being paid,
a bill was filed to foreclose the mortgage upon it, and when a default
took place in the payments due in October, 1885, a receiver was asked
for. In the following March a receiver was appointed as asked for,
and the Omaha Division was surrendered to him by the general
receivers of the Wabash system. He intervened in the Wabash suit,
praying for payment by the general receivers of the overdue rent on
the Omaha Division, amounting to $222,075.77. A decree of fore-
closure and sale of the Wabash system, under the general mortgage,
was entered, which reserved specially all rights under the Omaha
Division, and under this decree a sale was made and the property was
transferred to a new corporation called the Wabash Western Railway
Company. The petition for the payment of rent of the Omaha
Division, after reference to a master and report by him, resulted in a
decree for the payment of one month's rent with interest, instead of
sixteen months, as prayed for. Held, (1) That the court was bound
to take into consideration the peculiar circumstances under which the
receivers took possession of and operated the Wabash system;
(2) That, following Quincy, Missouri &c. Railroad v. Humphreys, 145
U. S. 82, the court did not bind itself or its receivers to pay the agreed
rent eo instanti by the mere act of taking possession, but that reason-
able time had to be taken to ascertain the situation of affairs;
(3) That the order made by the court below to pay the rents only
after the discharge of the preferential debts was correct; (4) That
the owners of the Omaha branch, or the trustees of its mortgage,
knowing that that branch was in the hands of the general receivers,
might have intervened in that suit for the protection of their property,
and were bound by the order for payment of the preferential debts;
as it is settled that whenever, in the course of a receivership, the
court makes an order which the parties to the suit consider injurious
to their interests, it is their duty to file a motion at once asking the
court to cancel or to modify it; (5) That the petition of the receivers
of March, 1885, and the order of the court thereupon touching sub-
division earnings, was notice to the branch lines that they must not
expect payment of their rent, when the subdivision earned nothing
beyond operating expenses; (6) That as the mortgage to the United
States Trust Company did not convey the income or earnings of the
road to it, but only authorized it to take possession in case of default,
the trustee could only secure the earnings by taking possession in
such case; (7) That until the mortgagee asserted its rights under the
mortgage to the possession of the road by filing a bill of foreclosure

and by demanding possession, it had no right to receive the earnings
and profits; (8) That the judgment of the court below, awarding a
recovery of only one month's rent, was right. United States Trust Co.
v. Wabash Western Railway, 287.

3. The general rule applicable to this class of cases is, that an assignee or
receiver is not bound to adopt the contracts, accept the leases, or
otherwise step into the shoes of his assignor, if, in his opinion, it
would be unprofitable or undesirable to do so. 1b.

4. In such case a receiver is entitled to a reasonable time in which to elect
whether he will adopt or repudiate such contracts. Ib.

5. If a receiver in a suit for foreclosing a railway mortgage elects to adopt
a lease, he becomes vested with the title to the leasehold interest, and
a priority of estate is thereby created between the lessor and the
receiver, by which the latter becomes liable upon the covenant to pay
rent. lb.

See PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2, 3.

RECEIPT.

See PLEADING, 1.

RECEIVER.

See NATIONAL BANK;
RAILROAD, 2, 3, 4, 5.

RULE.

See COSTS.

SALARY.

1. The Supervising Architect of the Treasury is not entitled to extra com-
pensation, above his salary, for planning and supervising the erection
of a department building in Washington, occupied by other depart-
ments of the government. Mullett v. United States, 566.

2. In this case the delay in bringing suit leads to the conclusion that the
architect recognized the work for which he sues as within the scope of
his regular duties. Ib.

3. The payment to an Indian agent of the amount appropriated by Con-
gress for the payment of his salary being less than the amount fixed
by general law as the salary of the office, and his receipt of the sum
paid "in full of my pay for services for the period herein expressed,”
is a full satisfaction of the claim. Belknap v. United States, 588.
See NATIONAL BANK, 2.

SALE ON EXECUTION.

By the laws of Colorado, title to land sold under execution remains in the
judgment debtor till the deed is executed. Turner v. Sawyer, 578.

See ABATEMENT;
MINERAL LAND.